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ABSTRACT 
REDD integrates conservation, sustainable management of forest and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks, emerged though a global partnership under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. Ludikhola watershed in Gorkha district, 
Nepal, is selected for this research where REDD+ pilot project was carried out from 
2010 to 2013. The dynamic relationship between actors, knowledge, power, 
corruption and policy at the micro level and the reciprocal effects of these 
relationships on gender, class and caste has been investigated in REDD+. The 
objectives of the study were; to analyze the community forestry as a resource regime 
and investigate the empirical aspect of REDD+ through governance policies, to 
evaluate how powerful actors exercise their power in the introduction and 
implementation of REDD+ in CF and to study how corruption occurred in the 
REDD+ pilot project. Three CFUGs were selected for the household survey. The 
findings showed that the CF is a place where different actors exercise their power to 
influence decisions regarding forest management.   
In the REDD+ pilot project, main goals of maintaining and enhancing biodiversity 
were not met; there were a lack of distribution of benefits and information to different 
groups of local people. 69% of the total respondents say that powerful actors did not 
take account of their voice during the formation of rules and regulations. The 
community forestry was not properly conducted in levels of a participatory 
mechanism; it is more functioning through key actor´s interests. A significant 
relationship between corruption and powerful actors was found; the test also showed 
that higher castes and government officials have the significant relationship with 
corruption in community forestry. 47% thought that there was fraud monitoring and 
reporting, 42% embezzlement and 11% bribing. It is realized that much of the existing 
policy frameworks in community forestry needs to be revised to create a facilitating 
environment for REDD+ and there is a great need of improved agricultural practices 
and providences of the option for other livelihood diversification to reduce the forest 
dependency. Although, its ability to reduce net-carbon emissions, control leakage and 
increase local benefits through a national REDD+ policy may seem difficult to 
accomplish. Globally, there are no acknowledged motivations connected to the 
REDD+ policy, besides the obvious interest in limiting climate change. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Deforestation and forest degradation contributes about 17% of the global emission of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) (IPCC, 2007). To address this, various forest management strategies 
have been developed. Current environmental policies and decision-makers are looking at 
ways to prevent/stop anthropogenic factors that result in climate change. Under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the concept and types of 
activities known as Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) 
mechanisms and policies have been proposed for reducing emission through conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing 
countries. REDD+ is introduced locally, regionally and nationally where institutional and 
organizational changes take place to accommodate new policy change. The REDD+ approach 
has been regarded as a cost effective way to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions by 
providing large-scale carbon emission reductions from developing countries through 
comparatively low-cost mitigation measures to industrialized countries towards their 
emissions reduction obligations. Moreover, REDD+ has the potential to provide a window of 
opportunity to developing countries to achieve the goal of sustainable development, poverty 
reduction, as well as biodiversity conservation (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). 
REDD+ facilitates comprehensive actions, which helps to deliver carbon mitigation outcomes 
that are effective, efficient and equitable (Vatn and Angelsen, 2009). Therefore, REDD+ has 
portrayed as a win-win approach to protect and manage their primary forests.  
However, there have been many questions coming out regarding REDD+ outcomes and 
benefit sharing strategies at the local level. From an equity standpoint, it can be argued that 
REDD+ benefits should not only go to the factors that have been causing high emissions but 
also to indigenous groups or other forest users that have a record of responsible forest 
management (Luttrell et al., 2012). In Nepal, the REDD+ pilot project was started in 2010 
under the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) in 104 community 
forestry (CF) committees. In these communities, the reported outcomes in carbon 
sequestration and forest conservation are increasing but there are still unsolved forest 
management issues that have been seen such as corruption, uneven distribution of carbon 
 2 
benefits among local and participation of local people in decision-making process. In its own 
management, also to satisfy the donor agencies, Nepal demonstrated a commitment for 
improving governance and reducing corruption. Nevertheless, concerns remained concerning 
these old patterns of bad governance and there has not been any major structural change on 
governance of community forestry and REDD+. 
In this context, the REDD+ pilot project is not safe from political influence and corruption 
risks, which may affect its potential outcomes. These issues have therefore become a broader 
discussion on upcoming REDD+ policies. How can the poor institutional system, corruption 
and different forms of power constrain to achieve the target of REDD+ and enhance the local 
livelihoods? Before making any national level REDD+ policies or implementing others new 
projects in any area, it is important to take lesson from previous REDD+ pilot projects 
focusing on transparency, accountability and participatory approaches to analyze if the 
reported outcomes were trustworthiness or not. 
Among the pilot project areas, Ludikhola watershed in Gorkha district, Nepal, is selected for 
this research with an attempt to analyze transparency, accountability and participation of local 
people in decision-making process and benefit-sharing mechanisms. To analyze these issues, I 
will examine how far the state and local institutions are responsible for creating poor 
governance conditions in CF and how politician, economist and rent-seeker interests are 
accounted for in policy-making processes? This research analyzes the relationship between 
power and corruption through analyzing the existing resource governance regime. It helps to 
identify the actors and their interest, motivations and negotiation in policymaking process and 
how these influence the resource regime and expected outcomes. Overall, this thesis aims to 
investigate the dynamic relationship between actors, knowledge, power, corruption and policy 
in micro level and the reciprocal effects of these relationships on gender, class and caste. So, 
the principle research question is how power is exercised in the existing resource regime and 
what factors are influencing the establishment of corruption and in what ways poor local 
people are marginalized in benefiting from forest resources. Similarly, to analyze how these 
issues serve as a barrier to the national REDD+ projects in the future. In doing so, both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods are used.  
1.2. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Nepal is a landlocked country sandwiched between China in the North and India in the South, 
mainly covered by hills, mountains and the Himalayas. The country is divided into 5 
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development regions, 14 zones and 75 districts. The country is rich in ecological diversity and 
is a part of a biodiversity hotspot region. It lies within the subtropical monsoon climate due to 
its varied topography and there is a wide climatic variation. Hills and mountains cover about 
80% lands out of 14.7 million hectors and remaining lands are valleys, plain Terai and 
Bhabar (MoFSC, 2013). The country is divided into five physiographic Zones: high Himal 
(51%), high Mountains (29%), middle Mountains (16), Siwaliks (1%) and Terai (3%). A wide 
range of climatic conditions exists in Nepal due to the altitudinal variation that is reflecting in 
the contrasting habitats, vegetation and fauna. Due to the climatic and physiographic 
conditions, environmental problems such as soil erosion and landslide occur. 
Figure 1. Map of Nepal 
 
Source: Tribhuvan University, Department of Geology (Dahal, 2006) 
Nepal has been classified as least developed country, 80% of its population is involved in 
agriculture, which constitutes 41% of GDP. The country strongly relies on traditional 
methods for agricultural production and depends on weather patterns.  
  
 4 
Table 1. Land use distribution of Nepal, 2000 
Type of Land use Area (1000 ha) Percentage (%) 
Cultivated Land  3,052 21% 
Grass land  1,745 12% 
Forest 5,518 37% 
Shrub Land/ degraded forest  706 5% 
Non-cultivated land 998 7% 
Others Land Uses 2,729 18% 
Total 14,7484 100 
Source: Ministry of Population and Environment (MoPE, 2000) 
1.2.1. The Evolution of REDD+ Policies 
Since the 1990´s, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released the 
first Assessment Report, increasing attention has been paid to reduce the greenhouse gas 
emissions. Hence, the 2001 report concluded that, in the absence of effective climate polices, 
we must expect a warming of between 1.4 and 5.8
0
C (centigrade) between the years 1990 and 
2100 (IPCC 2001). Similarly, the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) recommended to the international community to strive to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interferences with the climate system (UNFCCC 1992). In addition, the 
UNFCCC Article 2 states that the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.  
After adaptation of the Kyoto Protocol by international communities in 1997, developed 
countries were allowed to reduce their emission by investing in developing countries through 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a way of mitigating climate change through 
afforestation and reforestations, ultimately, avoided deforestation was excluded as an option 
to mitigate climate change (Stephan, 2013). As a result, in 2005, in Montreal Canada 
negotiations started at COP 11 of UNFCCC, a coalition of rainforest nations wanted avoided 
deforestation to be included as one of mitigating strategies to GHG emissions in the post 2012 
regime. At the beginning, it focused on reducing rate of loss of forest area, which was known 
as Reduced Emission from Deforestation (RED). Later, another D was added to it then it 
became Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD). 
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The REDD approach ascribes a value to forests through carbon sequestration. The REDD+ 
mechanism is simply combining policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating 
to reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries 
(Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). At COP 13 in Bali in 2008, REDD was proposed 
as a way of climate change mitigation to be part of the official negotiation agenda for a post 
2012 regime. Similarly, in 2008 COP14 in Poznan referred to as “removals” that was 
expressed as the “+”, where REDD+ played a significant role in the Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009). REDD+ became the official language by adding – sustainable management 
of forests, forest enhancement and forest conservation, thereby see in it as a potential win-win 
situation with reduction of carbon emissions, enhanced poverty alleviation and biodiversity 
conservation (Vatn and Vedeld, 2011). In 2009 at Copenhagen, during 15
th
 COP meeting, the 
REDD+ was officially adapted. The Copenhagen Accord unfortunately had stronger words 
and less agreement on financial mechanism: “We recognize the crucial role of reducing 
emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of 
greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to 
such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD+ to 
enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries”(UNFCCC, 2009). 
Despite this recognition of REDD as one of way forward for climate mitigation, it did present 
a clear agreement of a financial mechanism by the global community. During its 16
th
 COP in 
Cancun, UNFCCC came with different suggestions such as reversing forest loss and all 
participating developing countries to reduce human pressure on forest. Meanwhile, the 
Cancun Agreements is, gave a way to support developing countries to prepare for REDD+ 
policy and developed countries agreed to give financial support of $30 billion between 2010-
2012 and $100 billion every year after 2020 for climate change mitigation and adaptation 
activities (UNFCCC, 2009). At present, REDD+ is implementing as a pilot project through 
the UN-REDD program, the Forest Investment Program (FIP), the World Bank Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) and various individual bilateral agreements. The REDD+ pilot 
project is entitled “Design and Establishment of a Governance and Payment System for 
Community Forest Management under REDD+” and is implemented as a pilot project by 
three different NGOs since 2009, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development 
(ICIMOD), Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bio-resources (ANSAB) and 
Federation of Community Forest Users´ Nepal (FECOFUN).  
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1.2.2. REDD+ in Nepal 
In Nepal, the implementation of REDD+ measures through pilot projects started in 2009 
under the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), who funded the 
REDD+ project in 105 communities. Benefits of REDD+ has been demonstrated in three-
watershed area in Nepal with the Forest Carbon Trust Fund (FCTF) in Charnawati river in 
Dolakha district, Ludikhola river in Gorkha district and Kayarkhola river in Chitwan district. 
It involved more than 15,000 households in the districts (Uprety et al., 2011). This study 
depicts a single community, Ludikhola watershed in Gorkha district. It has been selected for 
generating empirical evidence to accomplish this study and microanalysis is minutely 
presented in sub-sections. Nepal submitted the Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP) and got 
funds from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Nepal‟s engagement with the 
FCPF began in 2008. In 2009, The Royal Norwegian government (the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation, NORAD) entered into contract with three different Non-
governmental Organizations (NGOs) to implement REDD in Nepal. The REDD forestry and 
Climate Change Cell (REDD Cell), within the Ministry of Forest and Soil Conservation 
(MFSC) did the readiness activities in Nepal. At present, this fund is used at the national level 
to prepare a reliable and credible MRV system for the REDD readiness process. An analysis 
has forecasted that impacts of climate change in Nepal are manifold, around 20 glacier lakes 
are highly threatened of outburst, snow is melting rapidly, glacier lakes are expanding, and 
irregularity in rainfall has caused both extreme flood and droughts (GON, 2013). The 
Government of Nepal is therefore carrying out REDD+ strategies to mitigate climate change 
and reduce deforestation as they may facilitate from carbon trade.  
In Nepal, REDD+ is posed as a potential for climate, biodiversity and people. These three 
aspects consists of how the REDD+ mechanism may help to change stakeholders practices 
and behaviors which could lead to reduce CO2 emissions and enhancement of biodiversity 
and socio-economic conditions. Although Nepal doesn‟t play a significant role in 
anthropogenic GHG emission, it has still been facing its consequences due to its fragile and 
mountainous geography. Nevertheless, this approach is dependent on the design of its 
institutional framework, which aims to support forest users by developing clear and strong 
tenure rights. Payment for reduced emissions through REDD+ mechanism is based on carbon 
monitoring and verification that will encouraged parties to invest in it (Caplow et al., 2011).  
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However, Nepal submitted the Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP) for the REDD 
mechanism on April 19, 2010 to the World Bank, and got fund access from its Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF). In this context, Nepal has to prepare institutionally, legally, 
technically and socially to benefit from the REDD+ mechanism after 2013. However, the 
country‟s preparedness is slow because of limited understanding about developing the 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) requirements and the existing available 
information on forest cover and land-use change. The Nepalese government stated that a 
complex political transformation and different complementary projects of other donors have 
been delaying their work so an extension of the R-PP grants implementation period till June 
2015 has been granted (MoFSC, 2013). 
1.2.3. Forest management in Nepal 
Until the 1950s, the ruling class people controlled lands and forests resources in Nepal. 
Generally, the rulers granted land to people who supported them in their operations for state 
expansion, by patronage to family members and local elites in the form of Birta (Upreti and 
Müller-Böker, 2010, Regmi, 1978). Birta existed before the Rana rule and accelerated the 
forest resources in two ways: either they gave land in the form of Birta to their own family 
members, or relatives of the ruling classes or significant amount of income received from the 
export of timber from the Birta land to India (Regmi, 1978). Rana were satisfied from a 
momentum income, and they promoted the slogan “Hariyo ban Nepal ko dhan” (green 
forests, Nepal‟s wealth), originally introduced by King Prithivi Narayan Shah. During this 
period, the Nepalese people were rarely benefited from forest, because there were separate 
rules and regulations for the general public. Apart from the Birta
1
, there were other forms of 
land tenure in Nepal Jagir
2
, Talukdars
3
 and Kipat
4
. The Birta system was dominant over 
other tenure system from the time of Nepal‟s unification and there were different forest 
management system in operation. Under the Kipat system, Jimmawals (local headmen) were 
established as tax collectors and they were responsible for the forest resource management, 
the latter exercised state power over people as they were politically appointed by the state 
(Hobley and Malla, 1996, Regmi, 1978).  
                                                 
1
 Birta system was granted land as a gift 
2
 Jagir system was established due to a shortage of cash to pay lower ranking soldiers. 
3
 Talukdars were local functionaries of the state, who used to collect revenue for the state 
4
 Kipat system represented a communal form of land tenure that defined rights of use.  
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Most of the forest resources were used under different tenure system to maintain the loyalty 
of local allies to the Shah dynasty until 1950. In 1957, the forests were nationalized; stringent 
regulations were enforced to protect forests from people who were thought of as enemies by 
the Panchayat
5
 elites and forest bureaucrats (Banjade and Ojha, 2005). The elected 
government in 1960, the party-less Panchayat system encouraged the clearing of Terai forest 
for infrastructure development. Nepal‟s Terai forest destruction accelerated when the King 
Mahendra decided to construct the East-West highway, invited non-resident Nepalese to settle 
on cleared forestland and encouraged landless mountain people to resettle in the Terai by 
clearing the dense forest (Hobley and Malla, 1996, Upreti and Müller-Böker, 2010).  
The management of common resources, such as forest, pasture and water has been a subject 
of great debate among natural and social scientist over the last 40 to 50 years, especially after 
the publication of the article, “The Tragedy of Commons” by Hardin (1968). He defined 
(mistakenly) common property resource as unmanaged, “open-access” no-man‟s-land, 
inevitably doomed to degradation as each individual takes more of the resources than would 
be optimal from the perspective of all the users as whole (Hardin, 1968). Hardin‟s argument 
was that powerful and actors would thus promote either privatization or government 
management of natural resources including forestland. The government of Nepal caused many 
of these common property management (traditional) systems to break down, in fact creating 
the very type of open-access situation that they were intended to control.  
In response, Panchayat Forest (PF) and Panchayat Protected Forest (PPF) Regulations of 1978 
were promulgated and local bodies as administrative responsibility. The degraded forest were 
handed to the village Panchayat, the lowest political and administrative body for plantations 
and protection management. The Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) 1988, provided 
a basic framework for the forestry sector and classifies Nepal‟s forests into six categories. 
Nepal‟s forest is legally divided into two categories: National Forest and Private Forest. 
National Forest includes five categories: (1) Community Forest (CF), (2) Government 
Managed Forest (GMF), (3) Leasehold Forest (LF), (4) Religious Forest (RF), and (5) 
Protected Forest (PF). An overview of different categories of forests, area, tenure and features 
are presented in Table 1.  
                                                 
5 
Panchayat system was directly headed by the king. It had three tiers of elected bodies of Panchayat politicians;     
village panchayat, district panchayat and national Panchayat. Despite the election of panchayat members, the    
real power was derived from the monarchy. 
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Nepal has been striving to improve its degraded forests and grasslands in the Terai and Mid-
hills with local people‟s plantation movements and implementing biodiversity conservation 
strategies from the government. In previous years, Nepal lost 50% of its original forests and 
half of the remaining forests lands are degraded. These issues have been widely discussed in 
the literature and it is also indicated that deforestation and land degradation is a serious and 
continuing problem, also linked to illegal timber trading practices. In 1957, the government 
attempted to address these problems through a nationalization of the forest that undermined 
the traditional management system and accelerated the process of degradation. Realizing this, 
the government introduced different forest management strategies, where community forestry 
program is one that aims to manage communities‟ forests through collective action or 
participation.  
Table 2. Features of Various Forest Categories in Nepal, 2012 
Category Area 
(%) 
Tenure Features 
Land Forest 
Community 
Forest  
25% GoN CFUGs  Forest management, utilization and 
protection have been carried out by CFUGs 
based on operational plan (OP), which is 
guided by CF operation guidelines prepared 
by government  
Leasehold 
Forest   
 
Religious 
Forest 
10% GoN UGs  Rights over land and forest are granted to 
User Groups (UGs) for particular years. 
These forests exclude the outsiders and 
allocate the poorest household groups in the 
forest-degraded area.  
 Religious groups get the forest use right after 
registered to District forest office, where 
outsider kept out. It is a very small 
proportion of total forest. 
Government 
Managed 
Forest  
45% GoN GoN  Government has all rights over resources and 
manages according to Management Plan. 
Protected 
Forest  
20% GoN GoN  Forest use is banned, exclusively for the 
protection purpose. But Buffer Zone 
Community Forests (BZCF) have user right 
in surrounding area access to forest 
resources. 
Sources: Adapted by Nepal Forest Act 1993, (FAO, 2012, GoN/MFSC, 2002) 
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1.2.4. Forest Use and Forest Policy in Nepal 
Nepal has 5.8 millions hectares of forests comprising 39% of the total national area (USAID, 
2010). Forests and forest products provides various direct and indirect benefits to the Nepali 
people and to the country‟s economy and environment. The forest sector contributes 9.45 
percent in terms of direct products and 27.55 percent including indirect services to the 
national gross domestic product (Acharya and Dangi, 2009). Similarly, direct benefits such as 
firewood, fodder, leaf litter, thatch grass, weed, climbers, medicinal plants and charcoal are 
crucial livelihood means for poor, indigenous, Dalits and women who has no land or little 
own land to subsistence on. Forests cover about 70% of energy needs for cooking and heating 
and 42 % of fodder for livestock (Khadka, 2009). Landless semi-nomadic groups or 
pastoralists depend on forests for fodders availability to their cattles. Some indigenous people 
(Rautes
6
) rely on forests for food through hunting and gathering and for their shelters.  
Despite high dependency on forests, forest policies have neglected the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the poor, indigenous people and Dalits (Khadka, 2009). Historically, 
forests have been used particularly to meet the state‟s interest and powerful individuals from 
the local and national levels. Different types of forest protection systems have been existed in 
the name of customary rights. Both formal and informal institutions of government and 
community elites are holding power in forest management and different forest product use 
system. However, the state adopted varying policies to manage forests and removed the 
customary rights of people to common property. However, elites groups have been 
dominating the agrarian society, where they make rules and regulations from their own 
perspective. In the case of CF, ad hoc nature of governance practices is influenced by 
powerful actors who also promoted that the lower caste people should respect and follow their 
voices. Still, the access to forest resources has been arranged through community elites‟ de 
facto control, where forest staff and local elites regulate local forest user groups according to 
their own interest. This has led to elites being in a position to direct groups‟ decisions. 
Until 1976, forest policies were grounded on forestry staff‟s control over resources. The 
Private Forest Nationalization Act of 1957 was the first policy that was formalized by forestry 
staff. The emergence of the community forestry (CF) policy in 1976 established the 
community approach to manage government owned forests under the participation of 
community and the state by introducing the concept of people‟s participation in forest 
                                                 
6
 Raute are a nomadic ethnic group who live in the forest area. They have their own cultural identities and do 
hunting of Langur and macaque monkeys for subsistence. 
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management. The community forestry provides services to users in three ways; firstly, it is 
present services such as protection of soil, water and environment, secondly, it is productive 
services such as firewood, fodder, raw medicine, fruits and thirdly, it has cultural services 
such as provision of greenery and beauty. (TEEB, 2010, Yadav, 2004). Not all community 
forestry have performed well, some of the community forests are being allowed to erode in 
area, quality and vitality and the sector‟s institutions are wrestling with corruption, declining 
technical capacity and diminished credibility and prestige (Magrath et al., 2013).  
1.2.5. Community Forestry in Nepal 
In Nepal, community forestry was formally introduced in 1978 with the objectives of 
reducing ecological degradation and increasing the supply of basic forest products for 
subsistence needs (Gautam et al., 2002). The total forest of Nepal covers about 5.8 million ha, 
of which 25% is under community management. In 1988, the Master Plan for forestry 
introduced the community forestry as a higher priority initiative based on their ability and 
willingness to manage the forest. The rationale for community forest management is based on 
the social and institutional arrangements for property rights, which is generally referred to as 
“common property regimes”. The current model of CF is organized by Community Forest 
User Groups (CFUGs), where villagers use a particular area of national forest to protect and 
develop, as a community forest under the current Forest Act of 1993 and Forest Rule of 1995. 
CFUGs receive technical, managerial, financial and institutional support from the 
government, national and international donor agencies, NGOs and from the civil society. 
Generally, a CFUG is a specific group of households. Households constitute the members of a 
CFUG where the main variables used to determine the membership is according to 
geographical proximity of the households to forests and their historically dependency on the 
forest (Khadka, 2009). CFUGs have been able to exercise a bundle of property rights over 
access, use, management and exclusion rights and sanctions. At present, approximately 
17,000 community forest user groups have been formed, about 1.2 million hectares of 
national forest have been turned into community forest that provide a large and growing 
repository of carbon which is restored and conserved through the efforts of local communities 
(Rana et al., 2012). The basic assumption of CFUG is that users are united for capacity 
building, participation in different training and workshops to encourage user participation in 
decision-making and benefit-sharing processes for livelihood development through managing 
community forests. They have a limited formal access and use rights although they de facto 
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have been managing forest products. Local forest users are supposed to benefit equally in the 
community forestry but in many cases, Dalits, indigenous and poor users have been restricted 
in accessing forest products even for subsistence. Most of the poor households are not 
benefiting as much as others and they are also not actively involved in community 
participation (Hobley and Malla, 1996). 
1.2.6. Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Nepal 
A recent study by a Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources estimated that 10 million 
cubic feet (270,000 cubic meters) of timber had been illegally cut and smuggled from the 
Terai forest during 2010 (Magrath et al., 2013). Recent estimates claim that about 84,000 ha 
of forest are annually being lost through illegal ways and it has been identified that a range of 
institutions have been involved in illegal logging and corruption (Poudel et al., 2011). The 
Parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources and Means (2010) reported that between 
2009-10, Nepal experienced its worst deforestation for 30 years, particularly in government 
managed forest (Poudel et al., 2013). The report also highlighted that government officials, 
political leaders, and CFUGs are involved in timber smuggling, illicit trade and corruption. It 
is widely believed that the level of illegal activities is higher in forestry sector and widespread 
commercialization of forest products; especially high-value timber from the Terai is 
experiencing a continuation of deforestation and forest degradation. There are many drivers of 
deforestation and degradation in Nepal, many of them linked to local/national economic 
development and private gain. 
Despite long-standing commitments to protect forest to support biodiversity conservation and 
sustainable forest management, the evidence shows that the scope and scale of illegal timber 
trade has not stopped. In Nepal, there are particularly two main underlying factors of 
deforestation, which are important to note, namely weak tenure regimes and bad political 
decisions. The continued existence of black markets for high-value timber is widely 
considered to be driven by some organizations, which is channeled by particular groups and 
getting support from particular political leaders. Therefore, it is important to understand the 
proximate drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Logging, shifting cultivation, 
conversion of forest to agricultural land, encroachment and urbanization/industrialization are 
the key proximate factors of global deforestation in general, which concerns specific activities 
on the ground (Peskett et al., 2008). In Nepal, a lack of land tenure has significantly 
contributed to deforestation which gained momentum due to the government‟s resettlement 
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program, unauthorized settlements, illegal clearing of forests for the agriculture and illicit 
felling of timber for smuggling across the border (Dhital, 2009). The second key proximate 
driver of deforestation is expansion of agricultural land for food production, firewood 
collection, and charcoal production. In this regard, food production, firewood collection and 
charcoal production are often a natural by-product of deforestation and forest degradation.  
When it comes to deforestation and forest degradation in Nepal as a whole, the available data 
is varied. Current forest governance sector is marked by a distrust and suspicion of authorities 
and decision makers. Transparency and predictability is lacking, allegations of corruption are 
widespread and disputes linger. Timber harvests are governed by the Department of Forestry 
for Government Managed Forests and by CFUGs in the case of community forestry. The 
timber Corporation of Nepal (TCN) and DFOs sell forest products from government-managed 
forests and CFUGs sell forest products from their community forest. They sell the timber at 
significantly reduced prices to private companies, mostly contractors and very few of forest 
product in the market. Practically, this work is done without informing local people, routinely 
ignored in implementation and manipulated in the interests of private and corrupt gain. The 
prices and royalty rates of forest products are consistently 60 percent lower than in India 
(Magrath et al., 2013). Such kind of poor understanding regarding sustainable development 
benefits, weak tenure regime and issues of corruption also within national agencies and 
institutions in terms of resource management have played a part in failing to address the issue 
of deforestation and forest degradation.  
Nepal is the most corrupt country in the South Asia (except Afghanistan); it is at 146
th
 
position out of 178 countries, where politicians, government officials and private sector rob 
the state coffer openly. Basically, people get information about corruption such as illegal 
timber trading
7
, mismanagement of allocated forest funds but all of these issues have gone un-
answered because of the political influence in this sector. Corruption occurs at all levels of the 
Nepalese society from local to national government, civil society, judiciary functions, 
business, military and other services who embezzle a lot of money away. For example, Nepali 
Times published a series of in-depth investigative reports about erosion of Chure Hills forest, 
where the negligence of police officers to control widespread illegal activities in the area are 
reported. 
                                                 
7
 Illegal timber trade defines the processes of buying or selling of timber in violation of national law, also applies 
to harvesting wood from conservation areas.  
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1.2.7. Caste/Ethnic Stratification in Nepal 
Today, caste matters in Nepalese society; caste discrimination is an age-old phenomenon in 
Nepal. Dalits have been facing discrimination for decades, several terms given to them for 
recognition either in derogatory or in non-derogatory nature. As a result, ritual pollution and 
spatial restriction became part of Dalits‟ social identity, in addition to that receiving 
education, land and public services is illegal for Dalits (Haug et al., 2009, Bennett, 2005). 
Due to these rules and regulations, Dalits have been historically discriminated in Nepalese 
society. During the Rana-Shah regime (1846-1951), the Hindu polity was enacted by the state 
and was used as the basis for social order (Hachhethu, 2003). The first Civil Code of Nepal- 
the Muluki Ain was promulgated in 1854, which provided the legal framework of social order 
in a hierarchical caste system, while ethnic group categorized as middle caste group in the 
touchable category. People belonging to any of these social categories suffer in numerous 
ways according to various contexts and conditions; the law and constitutions distributed the 
state resources according to the caste hierarchy. The lower caste people often get the higher 
severity of punishment for the same offence (Bennett, 2005). In the case of state resource 
distribution, most of the land belonged to higher caste people particularly Brahmin and 
Chhetris. 
A new Civil Code replaced the Civil Code 1854 in 1963, where some racial changes could be 
seen from equality perspective. However, the 1962 constitution mentioned that kinship and 
Hindu religion were the core components. The Civil Code denies women equal inheritance 
rights and the right to pass citizenship to their children and inadequate to deal with sexual 
offences. This “rule of the game” is influenced to marginalized groups in terms of 
government policies and institutional structure. After the people‟s movement of 1990, Nepal 
entered into a multiparty democratic system under a constitutional monarchy and described 
Nepal as “a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and democratic” nation. It also declared that all 
citizens are equal irrespective of their religion, race, gender, caste, ethnicity or belief but also 
include that we explicitly support to protect the traditional practices. Nepal‟s Ninth Plan 
(1997-2002), addressed Dalits and Janajati by name for the first time and included them in the 
development programs. According to the National Census 2001, 13% of total populations of 
Nepal are Dalits who are deprived of benefit fund from socio-economic, political and cultural 
rights in the society due to the traditional practices. Dalits women are the most vulnerable 
groups who face the double burden of caste and gender discrimination in all aspect in Nepal. 
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Practically, high-caste women dominate Dalits women, and men also dominate women in the 
collection of forest products from community forests. The influence of single caste and 
gender in decision-making led to inequality access to resources and benefits. Until today, 
ironically, the poor are excluded in policy-making arena in CFUGs to deliver equitable 
benefit sharing of forest resources. Dalits and women are discriminated against at all levels 
from local to national level which led to the exclusion of millions of Dalits and women from 
the benefits so far. Table 3 shows the unequal position of forest officers by caste/ethnicity, 
gender and regions within the forest department. 
Table 3. Forest officers in the department of forest, Nepal 2009 
 
Gender 
 
Terai 
 
Hills 
Total Caste/ Ethnicity 
No Percentage Low 
caste 
High 
caste 
Ethnic Minority 
Male 62 190 252 98% 2 233 15 2 
Female 1 4 5 2% 0 5 0 0 
Total      63 194 257 100% 2 238 15 2 
Total 
% 
25 75    93 6  
Source: Institution of Forestry and Khadka (2009) 
Dalits, indigenous, ethnical groups and women are most dependent on the forest resources to 
support their livelihood. However, after implementing the community forestry, social 
problems arose within CFUGs, including marginalization of particularly low-income people, 
capture of benefits by local elites, and ineffective use of community revenues from forestry. 
There is a lack of well-designed or properly implemented regulatory tools to establish good 
resource management. Governance in the forestry sector has become a matter of public debate 
in Nepal because of shortcomings of governance, including inconsistent law enforcement; 
leave many opportunities for corruption and abuse. As a result, REDD+ cannot get its 
desirable outcomes because data limitations and weaknesses regarding illegal activities are 
inescapable. Thus, it is an essential component for inclusion of marginalized group in REDD+ 
program and measures to increase intersectional and public oversight to give equitable benefit 
sharing, social justice, rights and responsibility to them.  
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1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND JUSTIFICATION 
In Nepal, REDD+ pilot projects have been launched to curb increasing greenhouse gases, to 
conserve biodiversity and generate sustainable development through community forestry. 
However, in community forestry, there are major issues, such as elite capture, political 
influence, mismanagement, power and corruption, which hinder sustainable forest 
management. Access to forest resources has historically interlinked with the caste-based 
social hierarchy, which manifests itself in the structured access to resources. Contemporary 
CF policies focus on state community relationships, which affects the poor people because of 
neglect of transformative participation. Not only policies, but also organizational structure 
and actor‟s role in policy implementing agency have a role of marginalization of outcomes, 
which in turn provide enormous power and authority to the dominant elite in terms of both 
caste and class. These activities and poor coordination of organizations in relation to 
community forestry lead to increased illegal forest use and increased deforestation and 
degradation with their associated effects on the climate. 
Many researchers have argued that CF may offer positive economic and ecological outcomes 
such as increasing vegetation and soil organic carbon. It is just a contingent success because 
some people are deprived of access to resources while others are allowed to access resources. 
There are many cases such as lack of transparency in forest governance, poor downward 
accountability by forest officers, ignorance of forest laws, and the marginalized forest 
dependent people in decision-making process by both local authorities and community 
members. Decentralization of forest management is a factor that can partly explain the illegal 
resource extraction, which is occurring in community forestry by powerful elite. In Nepal, 
decentralization is not properly executed. It has been open to hijack by local elites, forest 
officers and non-representative organizations (Brockington, 2008). Land ownership, land 
right and tenure are under the control of the government whereas the CFUGs are given the use 
right and management rights under contracts with the district forest office. This implies that 
government own land and forest are owned by CFUGs under the District Forest Officer 
(DFO). Such complex and weak strategies easily create poor downward accountability to a 
local electorate that developed discretionary powers and secure transfer of right and 
authorities. At the same time, the DFO ensured that the community forestry has followed the 
minimum environmental requirements and created a more harmonized society. Such kinds of 
weakened and thin descriptions empower the local elites, forest officers, and NGOs to 
function as an authority in community based forest management. Effective collective actions 
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failed to mention the problem of corruption at the local level, which is developed as a social 
norm in the community. In such a situation, how we can be sure that REDD+ is out from 
vested economic and political actors. Powerful actors not only affect the REDD+ payment 
and institutional structure but also affect the outcomes and success to establish a new regime. 
In this context, REDD+ revenue streams are vulnerable through embezzlement, bribes, illegal 
timber trade, cutting trees and fraud monitoring, reporting and evaluation. The embezzlement 
at state level is bad and big, which run through the nexus of powerful actors. Every 
government sectors have become corrupt machinery in the central level and it influences the 
local level too. 
Power concentration increase corruption, illegal resource exploitation and tax evasion, that 
together constitute the main source of illicit financial flows (Søreide and Williams, 2014). 
Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index 2008 ranked Nepal 121 out of 180 
countries and World Bank Institute‟s governance indicators for corruption control give a 
percentile score of 29 to Nepal. Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority 
(CIAA) receives nearly 4,000 cases every year. There is a widespread perception that 
corruption spans across sectors and stakeholders - including political parties, local elite, and 
forestry department, which ranges from petty to large-scale corruption, and has been on the 
rise. Collusion and corruption are the outcomes of weak forest governance which create 
problems in forest development and effective implementation of policies on 
REDD+(Gregorio et al., 2012). In many situations, most of the benefits from community 
forestry appear to have been captured by powerful actors, local leaders and external 
stakeholders because these actors often get permission to trade timber by giving certain 
percentage of benefits to forest officers. Such kind of activities directly impact on the local 
people livelihood and forests condition.  
In the context of Nepal, effective governance in most situations is changed by the presence of 
heterogeneous culture, which produces complex power and knowledge among different 
groups of actors. In such a situation, powerful actors and different social institutions influence 
resource governance to shape the outcomes in the community level to fulfill their interests 
rather than what it‟s supposed to be. Such kind of vested structure and agency of the 
community forestry will be highly challengeable to get the outcomes for the REDD+ pilot 
project. Owning to existing power relation and corruption, it may not be easy to achieve an 
overall good governance of national REDD+ architecture and a good leadership, now and in 
the future. It involved different interests of actors from the national to the local level for 
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introducing and implementing the pilot project. The REDD+ pilot project is operated by 
NGOs, INGOs and local communities, where it is important to understand the actors‟ 
structures and new array of institutions that project holds. Only receiving recommendations 
from their expertise may not be sufficient to understand the overall outcomes of resource 
governance and environmental outcomes. So it is important to understand how they serve as a 
facilitator to achieve objectives of REDD+ pilot project in the community forestry. Similarly, 
it is necessary to analyze how corruption occurs in the natural resource management and how 
it affects overall resource regime. In Nepal, very little research has been conducted to analyze 
the power, corruption and its impact on REDD+ pilot projects. In this thesis, it will be 
identified whether the implementation of REDD+ project should be continued in the future or 
not. 
1.3.1. Objectives: 
 Objective 1. 
  To analyze the community forestry as a resource regime and investigate the empirical 
aspect of REDD+ through governance policies  
1. How the community forestry has been working as a resource regime at the local level? 
2. How REDD+ pilot project worked as a resource regime in the community forestry? 
3.  To what extent does REDD+ deliver cost efficient, ecological effective, equality, 
socially legitimate and outcomes? 
Objective 2. 
 To analyze how do powerful actors exercised their power in the introduction and 
implementation of REDD+ in CF 
1. What are the formal and informal institutions involved in the REDD+ pilot project? 
What roles do they play in the decision-making process? 
2. Have any organizations or administrative bodies been established at community level 
related to information sharing, land use planning, and benefit sharing?  
3. Who are the powerful actors of the community? In what ways powerful actors were 
involved in the process of introduction and implementation of REDD+? 
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4. How was the decision to implement the REDD+ pilot project in the communities 
reached? Did powerful actors account the local peoples‟ voice to establish rules 
regarding forest resource use? 
5. Did local people (especially women, Janajati and Dalits) have clear and enough 
information and involvement regarding the implantation of REDD+? Are they 
informed in the participation of decision-making processes? 
Objective 3.  
To analyze how corruption occurred during planning, implantation and evaluation of 
the REDD+ pilot project. 
1. What are possible forms of corruption? How do local people evaluate the corruption 
during the processes involved in introducing REDD+ in CF? 
2. How and where corruption did arise during planning and implementation process of 
REDD+ pilot project and investigate its implication for local people? 
3. What are local peoples overall perception about corruption in the CF? How do they 
evaluate it? 
4. What can be done to counter various sources of corruption and can REDD help to 
control or reduce corruption?  
1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Environment and development issues require a complex theoretical sets of knowledge, 
practical skills and execution of tasks which furthermore demands not only knowledge from 
diverse sources like local community, but also conceptual frameworks to integrate that 
knowledge and to comprehend natural resource management problems with a view to find 
sustainable, legitimate and feasible solutions (Vedeld, 2003). Therefore, this research will be 
presented by using relevant theories and approaches of social sciences. 
Chapter one will be linked to general introduction, backgrounds, objectives and research 
questions of this study. In chapter two, I have presented various theories and frameworks, 
which I used in this research. In chapter three, literature review will be presented. After that, 
in chapter four, methods are put forward explaining the tools used when collecting and 
analyzing data; steps considered for the quality control of this research are presented. Chapter 
five gives an introduction to the local study area, is contextualized presenting location maps, 
study area selection criteria and description of study area. The first objective will be analyzed 
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in the chapter six. Similarly in chapter seven and eight will follow power and corruption. 
Lastly, in chapter nine I have presented conclusions and recommendations from the research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
In this chapter, relevant frameworks and theories describing forest governance and linkages 
between actors and institutions are presented. I present the resource regime framework 
(Vatn, 2005) by the structural process model (Vedeld, 2002) and Ostrom’s design principles. 
After presenting the theories, I describe how the objectives are connected to the theories. 
To study environmental governance, it is essential to focus on the dynamics of the resources, 
actors and the institutions. This framework helps to analyze my first objective and its 
organized research questions. Through this framework, I will be able to understand and 
analyze whether the REDD+ as a resource regime is fit to deliver cost efficient, climate 
effective, equity and social legitimate. Since the REDD+ pilot project is implemented in 
community forestry in Nepal, REDD+ has been established as a resource regime on CF.  
2.1. RESOURCE REGIME FRAMEWORK 
The resource regime framework is developed by Vatn (2005), and has its basis in political 
economy with emphasis on institutional dimensions in relation to environmental resources. It 
is inspired by the work of Ostrom (1990) and her Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework.  
To analyze REDD+ as a resource in the context of Nepal, we first need to understand how the 
REDD+ sets up the system of management of carbon and trees and what will be the possible 
outcomes. It gives an insight to understand existing forest governance structure, processes and 
the outcomes. Basically, the regime is influenced by the institutional structures governing the 
use of forest resources, where the institutional context is created by actors and regulate 
actions. REDD+ is a multi-structural process so it is important to understand how it operates 
and how it impacts directly and indirectly on sustainable forest management. A resource 
regime is a structure of rights and duties (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). This definition relate to 
authority, rights and duties that is necessary in order to manage the resources. Vatn (2005) has 
developed three interlinked concepts in his framework; (1) the resource regime (institution), 
(2) the governance structure (actors and their interaction) and (3) the environmental 
governance system (resources and technologies used). Mainly, I explain three interlinked 
concepts in this framework, why these are important in my first objective and research 
questions.  
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Figure 2. A resource governance framework (Vatn, 2005) 
 
2.1.1. The Environmental Governance System  
In the environmental governance system, two aspects of variables in the framework consist of 
the physical attributes of the environmental resource and the technology and infrastructure, 
which are influenced by certain a use of resources. In this study, the REDD+ goal is to avoid 
deforestation and forest degradation and improve local peoples´ livelihood. So the resource in 
my case is forests in Nepal, which is practically managed under a community resource 
regime. 
Technology and infrastructure provided by the government, which influence actors on the 
choice of regime to be implemented. Characteristics of nature and present technology 
establish both limits and possibilities of the use of specific resources (Oakerson, 1992). The 
forest resources in Nepal previously was used mainly for livelihood subsistence as an energy 
source, but now forest resources are bypassed from the local users and given to powerful 
actors. Powerful actors are influencing the emerging regime because of the improved 
agricultural technology, fragmentation of forests through constructing roads, motor vehicles 
and the open borders between India and Nepal. These kinds of changes have been leading to 
increased pressures on the forest governance system and the resource. Therefore, it is 
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important to specify in REDD+ conditions that both technology and other infrastructure can 
lead to deforestation and leakages simultaneously.  
Therefore, REDD+ is partly trying to change the people´s perceptions through providing 
alternative sources of energy. It has established an Income Generating Activity concept (IGA) 
and introduces resource efficient technology, which might reduce the demand of forest 
resources through providing cooking gas, improved cooking stoves, electricity and biogas. 
REDD+ as a new regime, avoid pressure on forest use by offering alternative technologies 
that may motivate the people regarding forest conservation. Forests are not just there for fuel 
wood; it is rather for other important functions of their survival. From this perspective, the 
assumption is that REDD+ resource regime will be able to deliver cost efficient and 
ecological effective solutions through providing alternative efficient technology and claims to 
increase the carbon sink.  
2.1.2. The Governance Structures (Institutions, Collective choice rule and 
social organizations) 
In this study, institutions are governing policy processes and processes of governance. 
Through these processes, this thesis analyzes, how institutions and collective choice rules set 
up the governance structure and what are other social organizations and institutions role such 
as gender, Dalits, ethnical group, corruption, elites in this community banned processes. Do 
they participate in the introduction and implementation phase of REDD+ pilot project and 
will there free, prior and informed consent in the policy processes? For answering these 
questions, first we have to understand the governance structure and to what extent they 
produce social legitimacy through this process.  
A governance system emphasizes the integrate of formal and informal rules, rule making 
systems and actor networks at different levels of governance to steer societies towards 
mitigating global environmental change (Corbera and Schroader, 2011). Governance refers to 
the “forms of steering that are less hierarchical than traditional governmental policy-making 
(even though most modern governance arrangements will also include some degree of 
hierarchy), rather de-centralized, open to self-organization, and inclusive of non-state actors 
that range from industry and non-governmental organizations to scientists, indigenous 
communities, city governments and international organizations” (Biermann et al., 2009). 
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Governance is more than government in the sense that the process of collective decisions 
from different stakeholders in policy-making arenas occurred by participating in different 
forms of governmental and non-governmental organizations. So this study is more concerned 
about the governance system related to formulation of collective rules, implementation and its 
outcomes. Governance has been defined as “combining different principles for collective 
decision-making, ballot box, willingness/ability to pay, resource control and interest, which 
again has implication for efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy of governance (rights, 
involvement). Governance reflect power relations in the society” (Vedeld, 2010:slide 3). 
There are varieties of governance structure having different members who can define its own 
norms, rules and policies, which can interact with one another in a specific ways. In the 
process of the CF governance, policy formulation is more done by political actors, which lead 
us in the direction of power; as a result, people establish other forms of agencies to coordinate 
in this process. Berger defines, “Policy making is inherently conflictual, involving an uneven 
distribution of power and influence between different institutions and societal actors” 
(2003:222). In community forestry, the concept of participation is related to distribution of 
power among the actors in decision-making governance process and structures. 
In the introduction and implementation of REDD+ in CF, both political and economic actors 
in the forest governance play key roles. They primarily seek to “maximize individual utility”. 
Rules, right and duties formed for implementing REDD+ depend on power dynamics between 
these actors. To understand the REDD+ governance structure, these processes should 
understand first, who are the actors in policy processes and what guidelines are followed 
during introduction and implementation of pilot project in CF and what are the outcomes. 
Institutional theory contains a variety of different approaches but in relation to my study I will 
focus on how formal and informal rules determine actors‟ interactions and also shape 
individual behavior. Formal institutions can be rules such as laws, contracts, political systems, 
organizations, and markets. Informal institutions are conventions, norms, traditions, customs, 
value systems, religions and social trends (Rauf, 2009). 
In the case of CF, CFUGs determine the rules such as the seasonality of tree harvesting, the 
rotation of grazing and timing of firewood collection, except that defines the relationship 
between individuals. In this case, the institutional value can protect the powerful actor and 
bias the weak ones (Vatn, 2005). “Institutions are seen as rules that make up a community and 
they are defined by habitualized actions by of actors where there is a reciprocal typification 
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on how individuals influence institutions as well as institutions influences individuals” 
(Hickey and Mohan, 2005). 
Scott (1995) offers a clear definition of institutions in which he introduces into three key 
concepts: cognitive, normative and regulative. The cognitive part concerns on the mental 
structure, on how we classify objects, giving them meaning and act on the defined domains. 
The normative part focuses on the implicit or value involved and then regulative is when we 
introduce reward or punishment to obtain desire outcomes. He defines “institutions consist of 
cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and 
meaning to social behavior. Institutions are transported by various carriers-culture, 
structures and routines- and they operate at multiple level of jurisdictions” (Scott, 1995:33).  
2.1.3. The Resource Regime (Actors, their Interaction and outcomes) 
We analyze how rules, rights and duties are distributed in the community to access resources. 
REDD+ is a resource regime and we can study how benefits sharing mechanisms or IGA are 
organized and distributed, where many issues have been existing on the ground such as 
property rights system (ownership), top-down policy processes, hierarchical social order and 
participation of local people. To understand REDD+ as a resource regime, we have to 
understand what actors that are involved and how they account for their interest in using of 
forest resources, also exclude other stakeholders especially marginalized groups in governing 
processes to access the resources and benefits.  
Since REDD has been involved in global climate change mitigation strategies, REDD+ also a 
consents of a resource regime. Oran Young defines a resource regime as: “constitute a special 
case of social institutions or practices distinguished by the fact that they serve to order 
behavior relating to the use of natural resources” (Young, 1982:20). He focuses on the 
structure of rights and rules which define the advantages and disadvantages of various actors 
or groups of actors interested in using the relevant resources (Vatn, 2005). 
A regime is the institutional structures that define rules, right and duties to coordinate and 
regulate action among actors following resource regime. According to Chasek et al. (2006) a 
resource regime is “the institutional structures established to regulate resource use” and 
regime can take various forms, including a property right structure like private, common, state 
and open access property. These property rights do govern the access right to the resource, 
and rules concern transaction over the results from the use of the resource. Property rights 
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constitute the most important category of rights incorporated in a resource regime, and have a 
fundamental importance to resource allocation issues (Vatn, 2005). From this, regimes are not 
just rules and norms, they are entitlements of ownership, construed as bundle of rights which 
helps to identify who has what right and responsibility. The property rights system may 
guarantee owners the opportunity to use their property in a variety of ways. Here it is 
important to mention that poorly defined rights, duties and responsibilities actors in the 
institutional structure can misplace the benefits of resource governance.  
The outcomes of a regime depend much on the actor‟s interest, preference and choices. Their 
patterns of interaction help to them to achieve desired outcomes. In respect to the REDD+ the 
planned outcome is reduced deforestation rates as well as improving the local peoples 
livelihoods and manage a sustainable forest management. The outcomes of a regime such as 
REDD+ can be evaluated through the use of the 3Es+ criteria, where effectiveness refer to the 
extent to which goals are reached, efficiency can be measured in terms of cost up against the 
gains obtained, equity refers to the distribution of costs and benefits and co-benefits is 
measured as additional benefits produced out of the same goal Vatn (2005). Vatn and Vedeld 
(2011) suggest that the REDD+ outcomes of a regime can be evaluated against this objective 
on three sets of criteria: “is the mechanism achieving its GHG emission targets 
(effectiveness)? Is this target achieved at the minimum cost (efficiency)? What are the 
distributional implications and co-benefits (equity and co-benefits)? In this aspect, my first 
objective and related research questions are organized and analyze the REDD+ as a resource 
regime.   
2.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURE PROCESS MODEL FOR 
ANALYZING INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
A structure process model helps to analyze the structural setup of REDD+ in an existing 
governance structure. I use this model for comparing between a CF governance structure and 
REDD+ governance structure. CF governance structures were adapted to implement pilot 
project in the research area.  Through this model, investigations are made to analyze the 
changes between before and after implementation of the REDD+ pilot project.  
This model was developed by Vedeld (2002) adapting some ideas from Ostrom‟s IAD model 
and the structural life mode approach for local institutions to work well over time in 
management of natural resources. This model for institutional analysis and local participation 
have some similarities with the resource regime framework described by Vatn (2005). Some 
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of the similarities are physical characteristics of resources where the REDD+ activities are 
influenced by those properties when trying to reduce the deforestation and degradation 
processes. The physical attributes/structure can offer opportunities and limitations for the 
resource to be utilized where available technology can have great influence on the use of 
resources. Another similarity is actors in the two frameworks. Actors are the ones who can 
account their interests on various regimes to be implemented toward the resource in hand. As 
a consequence of actor‟s interest, there are still serious issues within the CF regime including 
transparency, participation, forest management, equity, and caste discrimination. 
Those similarities are important to mention because the resource regime framework to fit the 
structural process model will make us easy to see the change that will happen when 
introducing the REDD+ pilot project as a new regime in the CF. The structure process model 
presents the changes from structure A to structure B after a certain time period and shows 
what processes have taken place to execute new regimes in the area and how local 
communities are involved in the various process. In this process, there are some changes that 
occurred in existing institutions and organizations before the introduction and implementation 
of REDD+ pilot project in CF. 
Figure 3. Modified framework for studying environmental governance systems. 
Source: Based on the structure-process model (Vedeld, 2002) 
 
Participating actors in REDD+ and their distribution of rights, authority and duties important 
on the success or failure of those programs as such have direct bearing on the active local 
participation, sustainable forest management and maintaining robust institutions (Vedeld, 
2002). The REDD+ implementation will succeed when a majority of the local people 
participates in the decision-making process, therefore they should have a clear provision and 
 28 
distribution of forest, land and carbon rights in the communities who are managing forest 
resources. To be able to assess the representativeness of local people participation in a 
REDD+ resource regime, I will look at a wide range of stakeholders in CF who participated in 
the introduction and implementation of REDD+ pilot project. The assumption is that a wide 
range of participation of local people in the implementation phase will result in more effective 
solutions of reducing deforestation and forest degradation. If local people‟s participation is 
low, it will give negative results. In the input situation, I will look into information sharing 
and accountability between actors. Accountability refers to the relationship between the 
principle agent and local people´s representatives; this will be viewed as how the principal 
agent can justify their action to the stakeholders who are not happy by their decisions. This is 
crucial for the REDD+ as to fulfill all the promises given. If the responsible person does not 
deliver its outcomes then no one will be accountable for it and the affected stakeholders will 
lose their trust in future REDD+ projects. 
Concerning the output of the structural process framework will focus on ecological 
effectiveness, equity, efficiency and social legitimacy. The social legitimacy focuses on the 
effectiveness between actor‟s interaction and effectiveness in problem solving capacity; these 
are the scope to evaluate the REDD+ as a resource regime, which is included in the resource 
governance framework as well. 
There are several formal and informal institutions that have been included in the community 
forest; Operational Plan (OP) and Constitution
8
 of CFUGs links to the Forest Laws, 
regulation and policies, community level social-economic networks, norms, value, religions, 
the government officials and donor funded programs. Institutions involve in a continuous 
process of deliberation and rule design, which pose a challenge to change the institutional 
setups. On the other hand, human agents shape them over time and in space. In addition, 
during the implementation and planning process of the REDD+, it should have faced 
considerable governance challenges such as institutional setups (coordinating polices) and 
addressing corruption. The development of the REDD+ policy focused principally on 
establishing and supporting methodological and technological foundations for analyzing 
forest cover and carbon stocks, on the other hand, involvement of actors in the voluntary 
carbon markets are based on the institutional setups of the community forest. Under the 
                                                 
8
  According to the national forest law, CFUGs are autonomous body that organize their own constitution (rules 
and regulation) and register in District Forest Office. OP is management plans for CF for specified time period. 
All forest related activities such as management, utilization, protection and users group function process are 
stipulated in OP and constitution.  
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conditions, REDD+ actions and outcomes should be mentioned and verified across scales and 
one should assess the legal implications of such regimes, focusing particularly on 
marginalized people and the variables to conduct future evaluation of REDD+ on local 
activities.  
2.3. OSTROM’S DESIGN PRINCIPLES  
Ostrom´s design principles helps to analyze how powerful actors exercise their power in the 
introduction and implementation of REDD+ in CF. Understanding of the design principles 
will be analyzed by looking at some of the ideas and concepts of interest, power, participation 
and legitimacy, which are pivotal to understand the actors’ interest and their behavior 
especially in organizing collective choice arrangement. This section will help to analyze the 
actor’s interest and their act in the implementation of the REDD+ in CF and its influence in 
the REDD+ outcomes. In addition, her principles are attempted to see whether CF would be 
sustainable when REDD+ program is launched in Nepal. 
Ostrom‟s design principles are linked to sustainable management of common pool resources 
such as water, forest and pasture by examining the governance of local-scale natural 
resources. In her principles, three features are notable: excludability, subtractibility and 
indivisibility. The formulations of principles are associated with successful collective actions, 
which built trust and norms of reciprocity to reduce uncertainty in a complex and uncertain 
environment.  
Common property theory studies collective ways of managing CPR mainly arose as a critique 
of tragedy-explanations to CPR degradation, represented by Garrett Hardin‟s Tragedy of the 
Commons (1968). This model of thinking is rooted in one of the core assumptions of neo-
classical economics: the rational behavior of individuals to maximize own utility (Vatn, 
2005).  
In Nepal, community forest is organized through collective choice rule, but in reality the 
system is well ordered by global, national and community level conventions, norms, value, 
rules and decision-making process. Conventions, norms, value and rules are collectively 
articulated in legislative or constitutive measures, characterize institutions (Vedeld, 2002). 
People do not follow the formal rules in practice, more often they follow behavioral practices 
such as de facto to establish certain types of rules in regard to particular resources and in 
decision-making process. De facto practices are an operational rule, which is followed by 
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resource users and resource management committee equally. Such actions have to be taken 
into consideration while implementing the REDD+ activities. Ostrom‟s design principles can 
be used to analyze the sustainability of a given natural resource management system.  
2.3.1. Participation 
“The typology of participation” concerns local people and their role in interaction with 
external agencies and authority in planning and implementation of project and policies 
(Pretty, 1995). Participation has also been seen as a bottom-up approach in the sense that of 
policy formulation and policy implementation are delighted for local people who hold 
decision-making powers. Local participation can be seen “as strategy of devolution of 
authority and power, resources, distribution of rights and duties from state to local levels of 
governance and from public to civil society”(Vedeld, 2002:14). According to Vedeld (2002), 
local participation has been put in two perspectives, participation is seen as means to increase 
efficiency and participation is seen as a intrinsic right. From the first perspective, 
participation is seen as means to define an instrumental and goal-oriented process, where key 
actors implement a particular resource regime and bring about local change. The second 
perspective of participation is seen as right, the main aim is to “initiate mobilization for local 
and collective action, empowerment and institution building” (Vedeld, 2002:17). In this 
perspective, we can see inclusive, broad unending, reflective and open dialogue between 
authorities and the civil society, where local people try to investigate through their local 
institutions what is right or wrong and true or false of a project to be implemented. Basically, 
local participation can be seen as a goal. Pretty (1995) makes a distinction between seeing 
participation as a means to increase efficiency and promoting empowerment. In the 
development and management of forest resources, the involvement of affected groups in CF 
should not mean merely their active participation in decision-making, goal-oriented processes, 
where powerful actors and their lifestyle have been seen to bring changes. The approach has 
been tired out in various forms in different context over the last three decades, participation 
had appeal to a variety of actors, including policy makers and donors (Vedeld, 2002). 
Participation connected to the transformatory forms of citizens, substantive
9
 democracy, 
participation and political space (Vedeld, 2002). Local participation can be seen as concerns, 
how poor people can make their voices heard through new forms of inclusion, consultation, 
                                                 
9
 Substantive democracy concerns how to make democratic principles and meaningful institution to make use of 
them by poor people through creating possibilities and capacity building.  
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and mobilization in institutions and policies. I have analyzed participation as strategies that 
are employed by CF and why, how, when and to what degree marginalized people are 
included or excluded in spaces of participation and governance processes. In the case of 
REDD+ pilot project, it is important to see; was it the goal to include marginalized poor 
people or to increase carbon sink? This research will more focus on which sides the 
implementations were viewing local participation, as means or as a right during the 
implementation phase. Nepal‟s CF has been regarded as one of the major forms of 
participatory approach but the program has often not been able to produce the desired social, 
economic and environmental outcomes because of the elite domination and poor participation 
of disadvantaged groups such as women, the poor and Dalits (Poudel et al., 2007). 
2.3.2. Legitimacy  
Participation is seen as a prerequisite for legitimate outcomes (Vedeld, 2002). For a REDD+ 
pilot project in CF, it is extremely important to define rules, which institutions and 
organizations supervise. These must be legitimate from a community perspective. In this 
perspective, as if communities do not think they are legitimate, rules set will not be followed 
hence failure of a resource regime. 
Bäckstrand (2006) defines legitimacy to the overall quality of the social order - the 
institutions, norms and rules rather than actors. In this definition legitimacy stems both from a 
procedural logic, which says that rules are predictable and determined by legitimate actors 
and a consequential logic that rules and institutions lead to a collective problem solving 
(Bäckstrand, 2006). She has used a twofold conception of legitimacy, input and output 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the participatory quality of the decision-making process; 
mainly focus on procedural demands such as representation of stakeholders, transparency, 
access, accountability, information sharing aspects, as these are crucial factors for 
introduction and implementation of REDD+ by legitimate actors. So, here, it is important to 
analyze, to what extent the REDD+ pilot project in CF did include various stakeholders‟ 
interests during the introduction and implementation process. Similarly, output legitimacy 
relates to the problem-solving capacities of the institution or rule and the effectiveness 
between actors‟ interactions. Input legitimacy will increase output legitimacy through 
deliberative mechanisms for enhancing stakeholder consultation, lack of effective regulatory 
capacity prompts the need for greater input legitimacy in terms of transparent and accountable 
decision-making processes (Bäckstrand, 2006).  
 32 
2.3.3. Interest 
Interests are built into social positions such as class, gender or ethnicity by the relationship of 
that position to other positions in the system. Actors are motivated to act on the interests 
structurally built into their social position, but actors may also choose to act against their 
interests, or may fail to recognize their interests (Porpora, 1998). The actors generate various 
conflicting interests through motivating action in structural relationships; as a result the 
intended and unintended consequences have to be face by all individuals as a result of such 
action. In the community forestry in Nepal, conflicting interest can be expected among actors 
such as who gets access to the forests resources, the income generated, and how the change of 
the forests policies affects the livelihood of the local communities. Powerful interests can be 
seen because the valuable timber for economic development are extracted more required as 
per the agreements and as opposed to communities‟ interests in protecting their livelihoods 
and improving their living standard locally. 
The interest of the affected communities‟ can also be seen as what is the value of forests to 
the poor people‟s lives (Lukes, 2005g). Interests can be conceived either objectively or 
subjectively. Objective interests can be conceived concerning benefits and harms from the 
actors involved. Basic needs and basic human capabilities are necessary conditions of human 
welfare; welfare interests may concern health, adequate nourishment, bodily integrity, 
security and unpolluted environment (Sen, 1999). In identity or esteem, interests relates to 
interest because the importance of cultural specificity concerning interests related to rights 
and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth (Lukes, 2005g). In the community 
forest, especially the indigenous people, Dalits, ethnical groups and women have experienced 
centuries of exclusions and oppression from various external actors, forced relocations and 
damage to the surrounding environment in the name of conservation and development. 
Furthermore, the objective interests of the affected groups of people can be defined as welfare 
(education, heath services), security, basic needs such as access to forest resources, access to 
water and a clean environment.  
Subjective interests can include actors‟ preferences and choices, which is expressed by them 
as important. Social actors do not have unitary or dual interests, they have multiple, 
interacting and conflicting ones (Lukes, 2005g). Especially, when important decisions are 
made, there can be obstacles for actors to pursue their interests because of the power relations. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that interest is linked to agency, which can be promoted through 
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narratives that shape understanding of marginalized groups by CFUGs and the state. 
Furthermore, power relations can deny other people‟s agency and hinder them in being able to 
meet their own interest, power may be defined as “the ability of an actor to realize his 
interests in the face of other actors interests” (Hernes, 1978).  
2.3.4. Power (agency) and space: 
Political ecologist Bailey and Bryant (1997:39) defines the concept of power in relation to 
“the ability of an actor to control their own interaction with the environment and in the 
interaction of other actors with the environment” and above one party has the control over the 
environment of another party. They further assert that it is necessary to adopt a more inclusive 
understanding of power that encompasses material and non-material considerations in order to 
understand the role that power plays in conditioning patterns of human-environmental 
interaction (ibid). 
Agency is a characteristic of actors, who can be seen as collectives or individuals that are able 
to formulate and implement decisions (Lewis, 2002). Agency here is defined as the ways in 
which powerful actors exercise their power by implementing rules and regulations, exclusion, 
policies, politics and behavioral practices. Agency often creates spaces as arenas for 
interactions and as different forum for discussion and decision-making. Gaventa (2004) 
suggest that one should investigate how spaces are created, in whose interests and with what 
terms of engagement. I emphasize space and agency because of how powerful actors and their 
organizations seek to exercise and established power relation through creating spaces and 
distribute very little benefits to the poor people from the projects and after completing the 
project they force the poor people to return the benefits that they distributed during the 
project. This means that actors are regulating monopolies to access the resources. It is doing 
through their agency, norms and power. Social structure is a nexus of connections among 
human actors, causally affecting their actions and in turn causally affected by them. The 
causal effects of the structure on individuals are manifested in certain structured interests, 
resources, powers, constraints and predicaments that are built into each position by the web 
of relationship. These comprise the material circumstances in which people must act and 
which motivate them to act in certain ways (Porpora, 1998:344). 
Lukes (2005a) defines three faces of power. He claims that more powerful actors control the 
less powerful actors in three ways: through decision-making power, non decision-making 
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power and ideological power. The decision-making power and non decision-making power 
can often be seen in the government decisions, like to control the agenda in debates. The third 
and the most important power is ideological power, which influence people‟s thought as 
opposed to their own self-interest such as caste system in Nepal. If we combine the definition 
of a norm given by Vatn (2005) and the definition of power, these two definitions compliment 
each other, particularly because of their emphasis on the idea that norms and power are means 
to influence other people´s behavior in certain ways. In this research, I will focus on three 
dimensions of power, which is defined by Lukes (2005a). He has given three criteria to 
measure the level of power for a given group or individuals. Dahl‟s work in the 1950s defined 
the first dimensional view of power which involved “a focus on behavior in the making of 
decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests”(Lukes, 2005a:19). 
Understanding the exercise of power or coercion is easiest in this case, where one prevails 
over the other in decision-making situations by force, by taking away choices backed by a 
threat. In the multi-cultural society, the powerful can simply over-rule the decisions made, 
which is important in my research to analyze the exercised power. 
In the 1960s, Bachrach and Baratz conceptualized the second dimension of power as one that 
“allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on 
potential issues over which there is conflict” (Lukes, 2005a:25). Basically, the second 
dimension of power is like “agenda-control” where one exercise power on what to decide. It 
is important to take into account that the prevailing social norms and values keeps certain 
issues out of the agenda and thus works for the advantage of certain groups. For example, 
recently, Nepal´s RPP analysis pointed to local communities in and around forestlands as the 
key culprits of deforestation and degradation and rooted in forest tenure and governance 
issues (Poudel et al., 2015). This issue will be analyzed according to the second dimension of 
power in this thesis. Lukes conceptualize the third dimension of power, which suggests that 
power can control not only particular behaviors and preferences but also the underlying 
wants, desire and interests. He viewed the power that looks at “ways in which potential issues 
are kept out of politics, through social forces and institutional practices or through 
individual´s decisions” (Lukes, 2005a:28).  
The purpose of this definition is to investigate the dynamic of networked power among actors, 
so I will demonstrate the line demarcating “power over” as the ability to coerce; and “power 
to” as the ability to coordinate in the collective rules making process. In the case of Nepal, 
power allocates certain actors and system is setup with different actors with authority, rights 
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and duties. More powerful actor denies other people‟s interest and hinders them to meet their 
own interest at multiple levels. As a result, inequality, caste discrimination and corruption 
may occur even if there is a clear legal system, because people follow their interests rather 
than what they are supposed to do. In the case of REDD+, the governance system and the 
institutional structure are same as for CF. Both are allocated through formal systems, where 
upper caste people have authority and rights, but this is not legitimate. In addition, the 
problem is creating a power imbalance; resulting in possibilities for people to carry out 
corrupt activities. Legally, CFUGs have a formal system, which defines how they are to be 
done and how cost and benefits are going to be distributed. But in practical life, it is different. 
So this study looks a dynamic understanding of how power operates in REDD+ pilot project, 
as a framework for analyzing spaces, levels and forms of power, based on the work of 
Stephen Lukes (2005). Power operates describes how power is used by actors the continuum 
of spaces and places.   
2. 4. THEORY OF NATURAL RESOURCE CORRUPTION 
In this study, my third objective will be analyzed through the combination of different models: 
the resource regime model and Ostrom´s design principles. In addition, theories of natural 
resource corruption will be considered to assert how it exists with the resource regime. The 
assumption is that the corruption has been established as a social norms, daily life and 
resource governance. From corruption theory, three characteristics of corrupt institutions 
will be measured. The assumption is that the REDD+ funds are not properly allocated 
according to the REDD+ guidelines.  
Natural resource governance elucidate the dynamics of social capital relative to resource use, 
the relationship of de jure state structures to de facto systems of local practice and define the 
role of trust in binding relationships (Robbins, 2000). Institutional relationship between 
individuals order the system of redistribution, establish the social obligation for monitoring, 
determine the role of enforcers and set the fate of violators (Ostrom, 2008). At this level, the 
rules and regulation described by common property theory is indistinguishable from those 
that prevail under corruption. The rules to access a resource, to whom must they apply, at 
what rate of exchange and under what conditions, are questions all answered under systems of 
corrupt management (Robbins, 2000). These institutions are often bound together in a set of 
persisting social relationships, as they require social development such as energy, effort, and 
investment. In this case, the actor‟s intention is not solely economic, it depends on social 
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expectations that rules are enforced in particular ways and no one is informed to higher 
authorities and local people as well. This is not only a traditional phenomenon, which is only 
based on local norms but also resource management institutions where existing patterns of 
social power are strong. Idealized state legal institutions for forest management are adapted 
from de facto rules but in practice they differ from those outlined in de jure obligations. 
Robbins (2000) defines three characteristics of corrupt institutions, which are adopted to 
analyze corruption in CF management. First, characteristics says that corruption is not the 
absence of state activities in the management of natural resources but instead a result of state-
apparatus building (ibid). This one is most important in my case study because new 
techniques of authority and system of responsibility for forest conservation or REDD+ is 
introduced by some NGOs into extant relationships to create condition of conducive 
corruption by ordering institutional controls over natural resources. In this case, the NGOs 
and state authority create conducive conditions for corruption, which again impacts REDD+ 
and various stakeholders. Second, characteristics of corrupt institution are; officials acquire 
monopoly over environmental goods or the control of externalities (ibid). Normally, the DFO 
is posted locally for the supervision of the forestland but they often facilitate preferential 
licensing and bribe demands in order to the report the “condition” of forestland. Corruption is 
not only a development problem in the resource rich countries; it also leads to ecologically 
unsustainable resource uses. Corruption takes two main forms in Nepal; rent seeking and 
patronage, which lead to a destruction of forest rather than conservation. Firstly, large 
resource rents make rent-seeking a profitable strategy and secondly, resource revenues induce 
patronage as governments pay off supporters to stay in power, resulting in reduced 
accountability and worse direct misallocation of public funds (Kolstad and Søreide, 2009). 
Third is “corrupt institutions, seen from within their social and cultural context, may not 
appear as corruption per se, but may instead be seen as legitimate resource management 
institutions” (Robbins, 2000). This is because institutions shape the expectations of their 
participants, naturalizing particular ways of thinking, which establishes a culture or norms of 
corruption to prevent conflicts with conflicting interests. In the context of CF, institutions are 
dynamic in space and time; both de jure and de facto practices actually elucidate the real 
conditions of resource management practices, which may have potential influences in the 
REDD+ pilot project. In this study, I will focus on two types of corruption; one is depriving 
access to resources and the other is paying extra money to get access to the resources. 
 37 
The objectives, research questions and theory/approach that I am going to use in this paper are 
presented in Table 4.  
Table 4. Objectives, research questions and theory/approach  
Objectives  Theory/ Approach 
 To analyze the community 
forestry as a resource regime 
 To investigate the empirical 
aspects of REDD+ pilot project at 
the local level 
 The Resource regime theory  
 Ostrom´s design principles 
 To study the REDD+ pilot project 
model in relation to power.  
 The structural process model, and 
theories of power 
 To analyze corruption in existing 
resource regime in REDD 
 Resource regime model and theory of 
natural resource corruption 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research includes a review of existing literature on REDD+ from global level to micro 
level with special emphasis on research and information. Developing a broad base of 
knowledge around the topic area requires credible interpretations of the current situation. 
This chapter highlights the recent activities of REDD+ combing with its feedbacks from 
global to local level. Literature has been collected from varied sources such as books, 
journals, organizations’ publications, reports and minutes wherever available.   
3.1. REDD+ AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL 
REDD+ is an umbrella term for local, national and international efforts to mitigate global 
emission of GHGs. Building REDD+ architectures have been going on since the idea 
emerged during COP 11 in Montreal in 2005. The assumption was that tropical and sub-
tropical forests face a new set of win-win expectations. So, large-scale carbon emissions 
reductions strategies and policies have been implemented in many developing countries at 
assumedly comparatively low abatement cost (Stern, 2008), while also promoting sustainable 
forest management, improving rural livelihoods and protecting biodiversity. This also 
demands the establishment of institutions both at international and national levels to generate 
the necessary financial resources (Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). It has been emphasized that 
REDD+ framework should be managed under democratic, fair, equitable, transparent and 
accountable governance arrangement (Angelsen, 2013). 
 Globally, many researches, scholars and professionals are closely observing current REDD+ 
policies and framework with particular measures and instruments. Some of the scholars 
critique policies that have been designed to provide incentives for forest conservation, which 
is a narrowly conceived incentive mechanism that may not necessarily impacts on reducing 
emission and sustainable forest conservation (Poudel et al., 2015, Fosci, 2012). The REDD+ 
is associated with multiple objectives and may become overloaded and this may reduce its 
effectiveness. REDD+ shifts are observed away from the original market-based idea with 
result-based payments toward financing through overseas development aid and attached 
conditionality (Angelsen, 2013). He noted that the result-based payment is as an “aid” by 
several factors. REDD+ governance structures are emerging at global, national and local 
levels primarily about offsetting, which is seen as a way for Annex 1 countries to carbon 
emission at home; governance implications, given the risk of recentralization of forest 
governance (Phelps et al., 2010). However, in December 2013, COP 19 outlined seven 
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decisions on REDD+, which are known as the “Warsaw Framework on REDD+”. These 
decisions addressed a work programs. In December 2014, however COP 20 did not come 
with any new decisions on REDD+.  
A number of actors in the international arena have been raising concerns; REDD+ incentives 
to institute structures are evolving rapidly at both national and international levels. These 
actors represent both buyers and sellers of ecosystem services and markets are also presumed 
to be functional and open to all who are willing to involve in the system. When the idea of 
REDD+ was consolidated at the UNFCCC in Bali 2007, it was initially seen as a cheap and 
easy market based mechanism that would be a path-braking approach to reduce deforestation. 
Later, the REDD+ has engaged as a highly complex mechanism because of the multiple 
objectives and results-based payment (Brockhaus and Gregorio, 2014, Angelsen, 2013, 
Luttrell et al., 2012). REDD+ is a hybrid set of policies, programs and projects at all scales 
(Angelsen, 2013). Adams and Hutton (2007) noted that the possibility of increasing inequality 
and exclusion is also viable when disbursement of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
benefits is separated with conditionality.  
Besides uncertainties about the REDD+ financing, globally, we find limited attention in 
debates and in the literature about actors, interests and power structure, which may pose 
challenges for REDD+ objectives. Basically, foreign policy initiatives are based on particular 
interests and products of human decision makers and seek to pursue what is perceived as the 
state´s interests. Understanding policy initiatives is not only about assessing the outcomes, the 
policies and actions but also looking into the context and motivations of the policies. Policies 
define how it wishes to appear and how it sees itself. In this context, scholars need to analyze 
the various motives behind the engagement of developed countries in efforts at climate 
change mitigation through REDD+.  
There are four main groups of actors involved in REDD+. These are developed and 
developing countries, NGOs and the private sector. These various actors not only hold the 
reduction of emissions but also hold other motivations for being involved in the REDD+. 
Many developing countries have been skeptical towards REDD+ policies initiatives because 
they fear the negative impacts of it on the economy due to land use constraints and 
conservation of forests. There is a loss of sovereignty connected with the implementation of 
internationally negotiated and agreed policies. As a result, there will be established “power 
over” relationships. Globally there are concerns that the potential flow of money may 
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contribute to corruption and private gains and included marginalizing of poor people (TI, 
2011). Therefore, REDD+ finance mechanism is still up to debate.  
Reduction of emissions from deforestation is not controversial, but the reduction of emissions 
from forest degradation has been debated. It is noteworthy that countries like Brazil and 
Indonesia are not traditional recipients of aid but they are in the same category as many 
developing countries. The roles of developing countries were more or less ignored in 
international environmental policymaking. However, Brazil and Indonesia‟s´ enrollment in 
REDD+ has given developing countries more bargaining power in the field of international 
policy making (Brockhaus and Gregorio, 2014). Most developed countries have been positive 
to REDD+ as part of post-Kyoto agreements, they are already underway to support 
developing countries to get ready for REDD+. Many developed countries have not so much 
spoken about offsetting reduction because domestic reductions can be more costly, so they 
want to put the money where the positive effects will be the highest. However, many 
environmental NGOs are critical to REDD+ due to concerns about offsetting and monoculture 
plantations. If these are included in REDD, may have a negative effect on biodiversity and 
global carbon mitigation. Similarly, indigenous and local peoples´ organizations have been 
the most active in opposing REDD+, however there are some possibilities for their own 
people in REDD as safeguards, which can guarantee that their rights are respected in the 
implementation. In the global level, the main remaining aspect of the REDD+ framework is 
the question of financing, where no decision has been made so far. This is the most debated 
aspect of REDD+.  
3.2. REDD+ AT THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
National REDD+ policy process seems slower than people expectations. There are many 
challenges in the policy directions such as conflicting of interests, tension between REDD+ 
and economic development objectives and cost benefit analysis. Realizing REDD+ requires 
policy action and reforms in several sectors such as forestry, agriculture, technology and 
infrastructure development, which may affect many actors´ interests. So the REDD policy 
process requires planning, participation and understanding across sectors and by different 
levels from national to local.  
Many countries started to engage in REDD+ and they have been involved in national level 
policy processes. Three phases are distinguished in the national REDD+ policy processes. 
Phase 1 refers to national policy formulation, phase 2 refers to the readiness phase and phase 
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3 refers to the result based payments. Currently only a few countries such as Brazil, 
Indonesia, and Vietnam have reached phase 2. Nepal submitted its R-PP to the FCPF in 
September 2010 and started developing its national REDD+ strategy in 2013. Nepal´s RPP 
identifies a dozen of drivers of D&D, that both directly and implicitly point to local 
communities as the key culprits, which are rooted in forest tenure and governance issues 
according to Poudel et al. (2015). Both FCPF and UN-REDD are involved in readiness 
activities in Nepal and the United States Agency for International Development and NORAD 
are funding REDD+ demonstration sites. The government of Nepal has established a REDD+ 
institutional framework, where the coordinating agency, (a national REDD+ cell) is working 
under the Ministry of Forestry and Soil Conservation. Moreover, international conservation 
NGOs, including WWF, and international consultants support and shape the development of 
the national strategy. The nature of interactions ranges from principle agent to facilitator and 
cooperation, the spaces mostly function with “power over” and “power with” relationships 
because donors maintain significant control over policy agendas and processes. Donors 
consider the non-state actor as appropriate representatives of the communities and believe that 
they have the scope for providing better services for the communities.  
There are some critics on the ground regarding the REDD+ framework; a few of them are 
going to be covered here. According to Bushley (2014), the long history of community 
forestry in Nepal has resulted in a well-organized and quite influential federated structure of 
community-based organizations. Moreover, REDD+ is threatening to lead to the 
recentralization of the forestry sector. Centralization of forest management decisions and 
restrictions on access and use has not only created an environment of mistrust, insecurity and 
alienation among the local communities but has also induced conflicts in and around 
forestlands (Satyal-Parvat and Humphreys, 2013). Bushley (2014) argue that decentralization 
does not guarantee that local governance and management of forests will be transparent or 
equitable, there are numerous cases in Nepal of exclusion, elite capture, corruption and 
collusion involving community leaders and external actors. Several issues have begun to 
surface, particularly local communities´ access to forest resources, clarity on carbon rights, 
benefit distribution and potential threats to various forest dependent groups (Poudel et al., 
2015). The literature suggests that weak tenure and poor governance decisively contribute to 
deforestation and degradation, which may pose critical challenges to REDD+(Sunderlin et al., 
2009, Persha and Hayes, 2010, Sandbrook et al., 2010). Thus, scholars suggest that 
governance and tenure reform should be at the core of any incentives to both deforestation 
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and carbon sequestration (Sunderlin et al., 2009, Poudel et al., 2015). In terms of social 
impacts among local actors, benefit initiatives have been frequently criticized for failing to 
attain “equity” largely due to elite capture of benefits which entails the monopoly of benefits 
by privileged actors, often resulting in further marginalization of disadvantaged groups 
(Saito-Jensen et al., 2014). Both government-managed and community managed forests, 
allegations of corruption have surfaced from cabinet to communities, along with claims that 
the corruption has led to a spree in illegal timber harvesting and trade, resulting in increased 
degradation and deforestation (Devkota, 2010). Many issues are posing significant challenges 
for REDD+ policymaking and implementation of projects at the national level. Critics argue 
that government officials tend to dominate the key decision-making processes and exclude the 
disadvantaged groups´ participation in RPP development and REDD+ initiatives, even it has 
been said to be multi-stakeholder bodies. In the national REDD+ context, more emphasis has 
been given on technical issues and other has avoided core issue of tenure and governance 
challenges (Poudel et al., 2015). In the literature, it is hard to find the corruption issues; even 
it has established itself in broader context.  
3.3.REDD+ AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
The implementation of REDD+ measures through pilot projects started in 2009 under 
NORAD, who funded the REDD+ project in 104 communities in Nepal. Globally, many 
scholars argue that CF can be both an effective and efficient strategic option for REDD+ to 
generate multiple outcomes (Corbera and Schroader, 2011, Acharya and Dangi, 2009, 
Agrawal, 2007). Despite this, some have argued that REDD+ financial incentives can lead to 
forest management that focus on forest conservation over the use of forest products and that 
REDD+ could pose a potential threat to decentralized forest governance and may diminish its 
contributions to local autonomy (Phelps et al., 2010). Thus, community designed systems for 
forest monitoring; rulemaking and enforcement are influenced, bargaining the objectives to 
meet local needs and potentially demanding external assistance, which is challenged.  
CF operation fit for all actors, and the forestry sector is the hub of interactions between these 
actors. The spaces are hierarchical; the first-rank is most senior officials of state followed by 
DFO and then power holders from donor offices and non-state organizations also participate 
in the space. The chance of participation in this process from communities level is very low. 
Donors interact with the government, non-state actors and politicians mostly in a principle 
agent relationship, conserving or controlling forests, who are manifesting a “power over” 
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relationship. Donors exercise their agency through money, membership in project planning 
and implementation, policy spaces, meetings and consultation with government officials who 
represent their interests. Dalits, women, ethnic groups and indigenous groups from non-state 
actors historically suffered exclusion in the consultation of forestry project design and 
planning processes. REDD+ produce many frameworks to address social inclusion, but none 
of them are well implemented at the local level and there has been increasing conflicts in 
terms of benefit sharing and the decision making process. In the CF, powerful actors often 
exclude the disadvantaged groups such as women, ethnic group, Dalits and indigenous 
people.  
Many scholars argued that most CFUGs perpetuate local power imbalances and corruption 
involving community elites and third parties and there is also uncertainty over carbon rights 
arising from absence of clear government policy (Bushley, 2010, Poudel et al., 2007, 
Pokharel and Byrne, 2009). At the local level, many questions have been raised about for 
shortcomings of current governance and uncertain outcomes for resource tenure, local 
institutions and wellbeing of forest dependent communities. Imposing REDD+ over existing 
CF approaches could generate huge complexities regarding equity and efficiency in benefit 
distribution (Pokharel and Byrne, 2009, Bushley, 2010, Bushley, 2014, Poudel et al., 2014). 
The literatures suggest that there are many social issues that are important to analyze before 
the implementation of any projects. 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODS  
In this chapter, I present the research methodology. The research design is put forward 
followed by the validity and reliability of this research. Next, the methods of data collection 
used and how data were analyzed is presented. Lastly, limitations and challenges and then 
ethical consideration are presented. 
This study is designed as a case study and it uses a mixed method of research, combing both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The reason for this choice is to analyze REDD+ as a 
resource regime, and its outcomes, which is evaluated through its effectiveness, equity, 
efficiency and legitimacy in Ludikhola Watershed in Gorkha District of Nepal as a case study 
for this research. According to Bryman (2008:31), a research design is “the framework for the 
collection and analysis of data.” This means that a research design helps a researcher to 
answer the research questions by collecting various required empirical data, analyzing them 
and draw possible conclusions. In my study, the quantitative data were collected by executing 
a household survey with a total of 109 households, representing at least 20% of the HHs from 
each CF. 
4.1. STUDY DESIGN 
A research design provides a “framework for collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 2008). 
It establishes the structure that connects the research questions to empirical data and make it 
possible to draw conclusions (Yin, 2003). Research questions posed in this study presume an 
analysis of the REDD+ pilot project‟s implications to the existing resource regime, and where 
weak participation, accountability and transparency can directly affect local stakeholders. 
Within the field of environment and development, there are several designs to choose, but for 
the purpose of my study I chose to adopt a case study design. The REDD+ pilot project in the 
form of CF is the case, which I have chosen with the intention of an in-depth and detailed 
analysis of research questions.  
According to Bryman (2008:52) a “basic case study entails the detailed and intensive analysis 
of a single case”. He also says that a case is associated with location, such as community or 
organization, but it can also be about individuals as well as historical events, referring to it as 
an exemplifying case which is either to epitomize a broader category of a case or provide a 
suitable context for certain research questions to be answered. In my research, I used a case as 
an example to be studied and for REDD+ in CF as my case falls under this as it is a first pilot 
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project which may provide experiences on what is required to be done before implementing 
the REDD+ project at the national level and what institutions should be in place to get the 
imbedded outcomes. 
Both quantitative and qualitative methods have their advantages and limitations in exploring 
the existing environmental resource regime, formal and informal institutions, local peoples‟ 
role in collective rule making processes and benefit-sharing mechanism. In this analysis, a 
single method will not be sufficient, so I have chosen mixed methods. Despite some 
arguments against mixed method research, the research will include both “Triangulation, 
Offset, Completeness, Process, and Credibility” to make more acceptable the social research 
(Bryman, 2008). 
4.2. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
In order to assess the quality of the research, certain control parameters needs to be taken into 
consideration, the issue of validity and reliability. Validity refers to how well a research 
design measures what it claims to measure and how well it gives us clear and unequivocal 
evidence with which to answer the research problem (Yin, 2003). Validity is more precisely 
divided into internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to the ability of research to 
deliver credible evidence to address the research problem and more focusing on establishing 
causal relationships. Internal validity is mainly used in causal and explanatory studies, not in 
descriptive and exploratory (Yin, 2003). In this study, REDD+ is descriptive and exploratory 
which identify and map the forest governance structure after the REDD+ implementation.  
External validity is concerned with, whether it is possible to make generalizations from 
research conducted in a sample or if it can be used as a lesson learnt or knowledge added in 
larger contexts. For this case study of REDD+, the major motive to come up with is what are 
the necessary actions before implementing the REDD+ in CF, as this will be useful 
information to Nepal, who is in the process of implementing REDD+. This information is 
important in order to understand the hidden issues of the CF and the nature of implementing 
NGOs when the REDD+ pilot project is implemented in the future. 
Finally, reliability concerns itself with whether the right methods and measures have been 
used for the concepts being studied and whether the operation of study, particularly on data 
collection, are replicable and will produce same results as if used by other researchers (Yin, 
2003). For the case of REDD+ implementation in the Ludikhola watershed, the study was 
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conducted within at a certain time frame in a specific group of randomly selected households. 
In this research I have tried to be clear and consistent in my concept definitions throughout 
my study, triangulating the data as to increase the level of validity as well as reliability. 
4.3. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
Data can be collected from both primary and secondary sources. In this study, I used a 
primary data collection approach, where three different methods were taken: a household 
questionnaire survey, interviews with FUGs committee, and focus group discussions. All 
were designed, based on the concept of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). In the social 
sciences, PRA has been used in gathering information from local communities. The aim of 
using this approach is to understand the people´s perception about governance, power, and 
corruption in REDD+ pilot project at the local level. This approach is used to incorporate the 
knowledge and opinions of rural people in the planning and implementation of REDD+ 
project, which will be fruitful to come in certain conclusion in any issues.  
4.3.1. Focus group Discussion and participation observation 
Participant observations helped us to add depth to our understanding of people, society, and 
culture. Therefore, general group discussions and focus group discussions, which included all 
types of people, were organized. These group discussions were helpful to grasp detailed 
information as people were in position to challenge each other‟s viewpoints and help clarify 
information gathered from questionnaire.  
 
Photo 1: Group discussion in research area 
The focus group method is helpful to generate data through interaction between informants 
and to see how people respond to each other‟s views rather than just the responses themselves 
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(Bryman, 2008). There was one CFUG in each selected village and information gathered from 
this included people‟s perception on REDD+ as a resource regime, benefit-distribution, 
participation, asymmetric power relation, and corruption. Moreover, livelihood-generating 
activities, forest visit and agricultural practices were closely observed during this research. 
4.3.2. Semi-Structured and Structured Interviews 
The research interview is a prominent data collection strategy in both qualitative and 
quantitative research (Bryman, 2008). The household questionnaire emphasized in this study 
was a structured interviews approach, more than semi structured approach. But we did 
elaborations of questions if the respondents didn‟t understand the meaning of it and we added 
some questions if required more understanding. According to Bryman (2008), structured 
interview has a formalized limited set of questions, a semi-structured interview is more 
flexible, allowing an interviewer to bring a new questions as a result of what the interviewee 
answered. In every village level we had primarily structured interviews with key informants. 
We also did semi-structured interviews to get answers to the questions under the objective 3, 
applied to the performance of REDD+ and corruption theme. In addition CFUGs executive 
committee, gave us an overview of the situation in the village and made us aware of the local 
context. Basically, this information is important to triangulate information collected from 
household survey.  
4.3.3. Survey research, site selection and sampling 
Through survey research, I needed to map out what kind of selection of wider population was 
best suited for the investigation of the REDD+ pilot project in CF, precisely related to my 
research question. The choice of method defines the best capture of the population in the pilot 
area, so this study employed two types of methods: purposive and simple random sampling 
techniques for household questionnaire survey. The purposive sampling technique was used 
in selection of study area in the CFUGs in the Gorkha district considering different criteria: 
socio-economic status, cultural diversity, and poor, Dalits, women and indigenous group. 
There were 31 CFUGs that involved in implementation of REDD+ project, where we selected 
3 CFUGs among them (Ludidamgade, Birenchowk and Maha Laxmi) which were 
purposively selected. In random sampling, each unit of the population has an equal 
probability of inclusion in the sample (Bryman, 2008). 
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Then we obtained a list of people who represented all socio-economic class and ethnic groups 
for the questionnaire household survey. Within these CFUGs, following a random sampling 
for the purpose of the questionnaire survey we chose 20% households. In terms of the sample 
size, Bryman (2008) says that if you increase the size of a sample you would increase the 
precision of a sample. Then, we asked the village person to randomly pick 109 people for us 
who are member of the CFUGs and have been living in the three different communities. We 
excluded the people who are not the member of CFUGs and living in the area in hired 
apartments or houses. Before carrying out the household survey, a meeting was held with 
each CFUGs committee. This meeting was conducted to get information about the location 
and to give introduction about the research and its objectives. In order to keep anonymity of 
the respondent, the number was given instead of recording their name. 
4.4. DATA ANALYSIS 
4.4.1. Qualitative data analysis 
The qualitative data analysis was done through collecting information from various sources 
such as interviews, CFUG‟s records, REDD+ coordinating committee, group discussions, and 
field observations. Stakeholder´s views and perceptions about REDD+ as a resource regime, 
CF systems, evolving corruption issues in REDD+ pilot project and its relationship with 
REDD+ project implementing organizations were explained well through qualitative process. 
Four criteria were defined by Vatn and Vedeld (2011), as a basis for the assessment of 
REDD+ governance structures: political legitimacy, effectiveness, efficiency and capacity to 
deliver co-benefits. In my study, theses criteria were analyzed from an empirical data.  
The analysis and the information gathering are partly inspired by grounded theory. The 
purpose of gathering information and the process of analysis are not two separated processes. 
Grounded theories were basically based on systematic inductive guidelines for gathering, 
synthesizing, analyzing and conceptualizing data, include aspects of the interpretative 
paradigm (Bryman, 2008). He argues that theorizing is the act of constructing and integrating 
various concepts in an explanatory scheme from the data. The categories that are constructed 
in the analysis are product of the interaction between the respondents and the researcher, 
which are switching from analytical framework. I started with REDD+ as a resource regime 
with more general research questions about institutions and environmental governance. I had 
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clear analytical framework from the beginning so I collected information and slowly started 
the analysis. 
However, I amended my focus several times to grasp the main contestations in the sector. 
After doing more readings, I realized that there were some processes that were essential for 
this study and I focused on interaction among different actors, issues, policies and theoretical 
relevant concepts with my categorization of the material. I focused on the 1) analyzing the 
resource regime, governance structure and collective rules, 2) on how did the actor presented 
the problems and solutions in CF, and their interactions, 3) what the actors did in practices, in 
local communities 4) analysis of the power relations among the different actors and different 
space for decision making and lastly 5) how the actor presented the corruption problems and 
solutions. Conceptual categories were formulated, from new information. Later, I tried to 
interconnect and establish a more complete picture to understand and explain the complexity 
and the various aspects of CF in Nepal.  
4.4.2. Quantitative data analysis 
The data collected from the questionnaires was first entered into MS Excel, a database 
management system, for the project purposes. Rstudio was used to analyze quantitative data. 
The Chi-square (X
2
) test was used to establish relationships between dependent variables and 
independent variables. Frequency tables and figures were made to present people‟s 
perceptions in various aspects of REDD+ in their village. 
Moreover, evaluation of REDD+, participation and possible sources of corruption could not 
be analyzed through qualification only. Therefore, the data, which were possible to quantify 
were analyzed by using descriptive analysis. In all statistical tests I have used a P = 0.05 when 
measuring significance level.  
4.4.2.1. Livelihood status justification 
To define the livelihood status, 3 variables were considered and result scores were computed, 
which has placed the respondents in three different groups. An explanation of assessing 
method under each weighed questions is explained.  
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Table 5. Livelihood status groups 
Group Label 
3 Poor 
2 Medium 
1 Rich 
 
The household annual income or the income from last twelve months has been used to 
calculate the respondents‟ livelihood status. The size of land that currently has been in use 
over the last twelve months was weighted as more important than the other values for each 
respondent. Furthermore, total number of livestock weighted against the relative value of 
livestock type. This value was compared to the TLU (Tropical Livestock Units) scoring 
method. Taking consideration of importance of different livestock and various local condition 
value and norms. The conversion is shown in table 6.  
Table 6. Wealth classification adapted from TLU 
Animal TLU 
1 Cow/ Buffalo 0.7 
1 Immature cow/buffalo and mature 
Pig 
0.4 
1 Calf, Goat, Poultry and immature pig 0.25 
 
The households which has TLU value less than 4.5 are considered as poor, TLU value 
between 4.5 to 10 treated as medium and TLU value above 10 are categorized as rich.  
Whether the respondents have any source of income attached with them or not was an 
important indicator of livelihood classification. Those respondents who only depend on 
NFTP, they are classified as poor and coding 1= poor. The net income related HHs business 
or income received from income transfers (monthly salaries, remittances etc) were combined 
to find a rating for overall income, as shown in the Table 7 below.  
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Table 7. Income classification and livelihood status  
Income (NPR) 
 
Livelihood 
status  
Size of group Respondents livelihood 
status % 
0-5,000 Poor 42 39% 
5,000-10,000 Medium 60 55% 
Above 10,000 Rich 7 6% 
Total 109 100 
 
In the context of CF, social status and livelihood status matter in the participation and 
decision making process. The assumption is that higher label of groups´ voices are frequently 
accounted in the decision making process.  
4.5. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES 
I encountered quite a few limitations and challenges while conducting this research. Time and 
resources were main limitations. I selected a rural area, with no public transport facilities. It 
was very time consuming task for me to access the areas. In addition, I had a tight schedule 
and I did not get the opportunity to test the questionnaire before starting the data collection, 
nor I was able to crosscheck and verify information as much as I had hoped to. I had 
organized the questionnaire before visiting the study area, which made me difficult to 
understand very complex forest and land tenure system. I rather had to gain knowledge as I 
went along and from there make necessary adjustments and follow up questions. As being a 
higher caste woman, it was also complicated to get the answer regarding power issues. 
Besides that, at the community level, there were many unresolved issues, which concerns 
REDD+ implementation. There were many social issues existing in CFs. This research 
covered some of these existing issues but couldn‟t cover the whole repertoire of the issues 
concerning REDD+. This research took a single REDD+ pilot area, due to the limited 
availability of time and resources. It was possible to collect all the data required with help of 
two enumerators. Moreover, a social worker came to us and said that he would like to help to 
us in collecting data. We thought it was a good opportunity to be familiar with the households 
through his help and we added him in our group. Later, on the same day when we were going 
to collect the data, we informed him about our name list and questionnaires. At the end of the 
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first day, we found out that he was vigilante, was cheating on us in terms of collecting the 
reality of the picture. We came to know that he went to the listed household person and 
convinced him/her that the deliberated massage should be good for their own prestige. On the 
first day, we had collected 13 household surveys but all of the responses were same from the 
respondents. Then, we changed our plan and told that man that we had finished the household 
survey in his community. Later, we cancelled the previous 13 household surveys and after 
two weeks again we collected the data without informing any actors. We went directly to the 
respondent house by random sample number and were able to collect good and unbiased 
materials.  
The major challenges experienced in this research were people‟s willingness to freely 
participate to be interviewed. It was hard to gather local people for the interview, if you can‟t 
offer them something in return, mostly money as a compensation for their time. It took some 
time to convince them to collect data without providing any compensation. Another challenge 
we faced was more of an inequitable benefit sharing mechanism. People were very unsatisfied 
from CFs, both, those who got the benefits and who did not get any benefits. Benefited people 
were unsatisfied because the CF committee made the decision to take back the benefit within 
two years. Those people who did not get benefits were unsatisfied because they did not get 
benefits even when their living standard was poor. In this regard, stakeholders blamed the CF 
committee that the benefit was not given according to the criteria such as poor, Dalits, ethnic 
group and women. They recommended us to solve these problems, which was a challenge for 
us. We convinced them that their voice would be passed to the upper level where the 
decisions were made.  
4.6. Ethical Considerations 
In terms of ethical considerations, the focus on how a researcher should think or he/she is 
supposed to consider and behave while conducting research, which deals with people. 
Regarding this, we followed particularly two ethical considerations: informed consent and 
confidentiality. Informed consent focuses on the right of respondent to know why he/she is 
interviewed, “participants should be given as much as information as might be needed to 
make informed decision about whether or not they wish to participate in a study” (Bryman, 
2008:121). In this study that is exactly what we did. We gave out information of why we were 
there, what we were looking for concerning REDD+ and for what purpose the information 
will be used. In most cases we already had informed the group and they were free to choose. 
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The confidentiality principle focuses more on the identity of the respondent who have been 
interviewed that it will be secreted, as defined by Bryman (2008:118), “the identities and 
records of individuals are not identified and identifiable”. In this study this consideration was 
followed so we just gave numbers to respondent instead of their names. We told them not to 
write down their names in the questionnaire and only identify their social status. This study 
thus takes high confidentiality, as it is not possible to trace the identity of any respondents. 
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CHAPTER 5: LOCAL STUDY AREA 
This chapter describes characteristics of the study site. The pilot project involving 31 CFUGs 
in Gorkha districts have been selected to take part in the REDD+ pilot project. I have looked 
at three of these CFUGs, and as a way of putting them in context; I first present the study 
area. This includes physical location, land and household’s characteristics along with 
geographical condition. 
5.1. STUDY AREA 
Nepal is a landlocked country in South Asia between the borders of China and India at 27-30
0 
latitude and 80-88
0 
longitude, where Nepal covers 141181 km
2
 in a rectangular shape with a 
short edge of 870 km. Nepal is situated in the southern part of the Himalayan range where lies 
some of the world‟s highest mountains. The study area is located in the Middle Hills of 
central Nepal. 
Gorkha is located approximately 140 km South West from Kathmandu, the capital city of 
Nepal. The study site is Gorkha municipality, the district headquarter of the Gorkha district. 
In the Gorkha municipality, there were 33 865 people living in 8800 households, each with 
around 4 people. The municipality covers an area around 60 km
2
 and the population density 
was thus relatively high (562 persons per km
2
) compared to the national average. The study 
area can be seen in the Figure 3 and 5 below.  
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Figure 4. Map of REDD pilot project sites in Nepal 
 
(ICIMOD 2009) 
 
 (ICIMOD 2009) 
In Nepal, three watersheds were encompassed to implement the REDD+ pilot project entitled 
“Design and Establishment of Governance and Payment System for CF under REDD+.” It 
was implemented in 2009 by a joint consortium of International Centre for Integrated 
Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bio-
resources (ANSAB) and Federation of Community Forest Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) with 
financial support from Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). 
Ludikhola watershed represents the middle hill region of Nepal, where 70% of the 
households‟ livelihoods depend on subsistence agriculture and with a dependency on CF. In 
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this watershed, 4,110 households were living found a substantial cultural diversity, and 
heterogeneous groups of people in respect to caste, ethnicity, economic condition and 
occupations. This area was suitable to analyze REDD+ as a resource regime, power and 
corruption according to its demographic characteristics.  
Table 8. Three watershed areas of the REDD+ pilot project 
District No. of  
watershed 
No. of CFUGs Forest area 
under CF (ha) 
Total no. of 
households 
Gorkha Ludikhola 31 1,888 4,110 
Chitwan Kayarkhola 16 2,382 4,163 
Dolakha Charnawati 58 5,996 7,870 
Total  105 10,266 16,143 
Source: all the information of this table was collected during the field visit from ICIMOD, 
ANSAB 
Three CFUGs were selected in this study area: 1) Ludhidamgade CFUG (CFUG 1), 2) 
Birenchowk Deurali CFUG (CFUG 2), and 3) Mahalaxmi CFUG (CFUG 3). CFUG 1 is far 
from the district headquarter. It takes two hours to drive. These three CFUGs share the 
boundary of community forestry. The detailed description of general characteristics of the 
CFUGs and payment services are presented in Table 5. There were 31 CFUGs registered in 
the Ludikhola, all of these were REDD+ pilot project sites. The total number of 4,110 
households (HH) comprised of 23,685 people in watershed. The watershed is characterized by 
social diversity and consists of many ethnic groups such as Magar, Gurung, Tamang, Dalit, 
Brahmin and Chhetri. Gurung, Tamanag and Dalits are known to be the most marginalized 
among the ethnic groups in the community.  
Table 9. Description of field study site, Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015.  
CFUGs Area of 
CF (ha) 
Total 
population  
Gender (%) CFUG registration date 
Male Female 
CFUG1 241.15 2949 52 48 1994 
CFUG2 84 1050 53 47 1992 
CFUG3 58 485 47.4 52.6 1994 
Source: all the information of this table was collected during the field visit from the 
constitution and operational plans of respective CFUGs. 
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5.1.1.Households’ demographic characteristics 
As mentioned earlier, households in the study area were heterogeneous, where socio-
economic factors including HH members, ethnicity, and social well-being status vary. The 
median households were predominantly farming households who are utilizing their limited 
land resources through intensive labour input. A large proportion of very poor households 
were Dalits. Table 10 gives a summary of households‟ demographic characteristics of the HH 
surveyed in three CFUGs. 
Table 10. Demographic characteristics of the households in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 
2015 
CFUGs Number 
of HH 
Social wellbeing status (%) 
HH 
Ethnicity (%) HH 
  Higher Median Lower Brahmin/
Chhetris  
Janajati Dalits 
CFUG-1 508 3 86 11 51 33 16 
CFUG-2 158 11 64 25 25 51 24 
CFUG-3 130 5 60 35 5.4 66.1 28.5 
Total 796 5 77 18 39 42 19 
Source: all the information of this table was collected during the field visit from CFUGs. 
In local communities, a majority of the people lives with their extended families, where grand 
parents, parents and grand children live together in the same house. Of the total people 76% 
HHs were male headed. Culturally, the father is categorized as a head of the family and he is 
responsible for cash income generation. He decides in the family and presents the HH in the 
community. The female is responsible for the household level activities including cooking, 
taking care of children and feeding the livestock. At the local level, in the study area women 
were more responsible for household activities.  
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Figure 5. Education level of number of respondents in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
About 25% of the respondents did not have any formal education at all, while 40% 
respondents had primary education. Generally 24% and 2% had higher level and university 
level education. More than 98% of the respondents were Hindu. There were several castes and 
ethnicities by birth. However, culturally local people were defined structure the caste system 
in three ethnic groups, the Brahmin/Chhetri, Janajati and Dalits.  
 
Forest management:  Community forest management system is a well-established and stable 
forest management system in Nepal. It has remarkably contributed to enhance the forest 
condition. Forest and group management is entirely based on consensus of the forest users, 
where CFUGs constitutions and operational plan should be approved by DFO. Normally, CF 
opens two times in a month to access the resources for local users. The Rest of the days, 
stakeholders are not allowed to collect any forest resources. Timber harvesting is not allowed 
to local people, CFUGs committee members do it. First, the timber products are distributed in 
the community members, it they have more products then it goes to timber contractors. 
However, some of the respondents said that always good and big timbers go to EC committee 
or upper cast people. They have a well-prepared constitution, but this is not applied in 
practice. Practicing new ideas of REDD+ payment system into such a management system is 
25% 
40% 
24% 
9% 
2% 
Education Level of No. of Respondents 
No schooling Primary school Secondary 10+2 University
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difficult. Therefore, this research analyzes how the REDD+ pilot project had introduced and 
implemented as a resource regime in the community forestry and what are the intended and 
unintended consequence of pilot project at the local level and in community forestry.  
5.1.2. Location, Physiography and land use 
The watershed covers an area of 5,750 hectares (ICIMOD et al., 2011). The landscape has a 
rugged terrain, stretches vertically from 318 m to 1714 m. In this watershed, forests cover 
80% area and about 10% of the area has been cultivated and the remaining area is covered by 
water bodies and bared soil (ibid). In this watershed, dense forests cover 1,634.64 ha and 
sparse forests encompass about 252.9 ha of total forest area. The study area is on the broader 
between the central and the eastern botanical region, which is characterized by a mixture of 
European-Mediterranean and Chinese-Malaysian floristic affinities. 
 
Photo 1: Landscape  
In these communities, access to land is of prime importance, while trade and commercial 
activities are less significance for improving people‟s livelihood. Subsistence agriculture is 
limited by water availability and temperature as water availability is determined by climate 
and seasonality. Due to the limited fertile agricultural land, to sustain their livelihoods people 
depend on available biomass. Local people give more priority to livestock, animal husbandry 
and forest products to improve their income generation.  
5.1.3. Vegetation, Climate and Topography 
Due to the differences in climatological characteristics, the vegetation of the watershed area is 
composed of sub-tropical broad. Dominant forest types ranges from hill Shorea robusta forest 
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through Schima wallichii, Castanopsis sp, and Rhododendron sp, where basal area for the 
trees are 18m
2
 and 23m
2
 per hector in sparse and dense forest respectively in the study area 
(ICIMOD et al., 2011).  
 
Photo 2: Topography of the research area 
 
Photo 3: Topography of the research area 
There is variation in climate; we can find sub-tropical climate at lower altitude and the 
temperate climate at higher altitude in the study area. Average annual rainfall ranges from 
1,972 to 2,000 mm and average temperature is 23.1
0
C (ibid). Similarly, microclimate 
condition changes frequently and varies according to the altitude. Average topography of the 
watershed is mostly hilly area, where 61.3% is steep sloping land and 39.57% have less slope 
(Lamichhane and Awasthi, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 6. COMMUNITY FORESTRY AND REDD+ PILOT 
PROJECT 
 
This chapter presents community forestry as a resource regime using a resource regime 
framework. The community forestry process is presented describing the current strategy as 
put forward by the government of Nepal. Secondly, REDD+ governance structures and the 
REDD+ implementation through existing policies, strategies will be analyzed. Its outcomes in 
efficient, effective, equity and social legitimate ways will be evaluated. At the end of the 
chapter, major challenges on the CF and REDD+ strategy will be presented. 
A flash back: deforestation in Nepal 
Before 1960s, most of the forest resources were used by the Shah dynasty to maintain the 
loyalty of local allies. The elected government in 1960 encouraged clearing of the Terai forest 
for infrastructure development and constructed the East-West highway. They invited many 
people to settle on cleared forestland and encouraged landless mountain people to resettle in 
the Terai by clearing the dense forest (Hobley and Malla, 1996).  In 1963, the migrants were 
pouring in, as the malaria had been eradicated. Due to the lack of government control over 
national forest, people felled as much trees as they could in the open access national forest 
and started to settle. Between 1964 and 1979 about 400,000 ha or 7% of the total forestland of 
Nepal was lost. For agricultural purposes, 380,000 ha forest was cleared in the Siwaliks and 
Terai region. This encouraged people to deforest and this also increased the rate of migration. 
Within 12 years (between 1978 and 1991), in Terai, about 90,000 ha of tropical forest product 
Sal (Shorea Robusta) was cleared with a 1.3 percent per year. The total forestland has now 
shrunk from over 6 million ha in 1964 to just 4.2 million ha in 2003. There is an increasing 
deforestation between 1990 and 2005; during these years Nepal lost 1.2 million ha of forest. 
This indicates that Nepal has already lost one third of its forestland since 1960s. 
The downward trend was reversed briefly in the late 1990s due to the new forest policy 
known as CF. After 1994 the social unrest in the country exceed, the clearing of forestland 
resumed along the same trend. In the context of Nepal, we can see that deforestation is 
increasing due to frequent political transitions, weak political will and scarcity of agricultural 
land for redistribution or resettlement. The government of Nepal often resettles the landless 
people in national forests, which are primarily guided by political interests than those of the 
landless or poor people.  
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In the next section, I will analyze what are the reasons behind not to stop deforestation in 
community forestry. Moreover, I will discuss why community forestry is a contingent success 
in the context of Nepal.  
6.1. COMMUNITY FORESTRY 
In the context of Nepal, community forestry is interdependent between rural people and 
forests, which stem from the beliefs of the intimate synergies. In this management system, 
people´s meaningful role in decision making and equitable benefit sharing have strongly 
emphasized to achieve socio-economic well-being and ecological sustainability. Therefore, 
participatory approach has built to function of CF, and assumed that the democratic process of 
decision making gives local forest users a sense of ownership concerning the protection and 
utilization of the forest (Agrawal and Ribot, 2000).  
An increasing number of studies highlighted that devolved model of forest management to 
local communities could be an alternative model of “centralized control” (Ostrom, 1990, 
Agrawal and Ribot, 2000) and determined that forest management by local people is possible. 
Therefore, over the years, emphasizing local people´s right of access to resources and to the 
forest benefits for their subsistence. This right-based participation approach has supported the 
promotion of participatory forestry in Nepal. However, this participatory forest management 
is failed to define clearly to some issues: 1) how participation can be structured- who hold the 
ultimate decision-making authority, 2) who is included and excluded in local context and 3) 
equity- who pays and who gets.  
Basically there are three attributes of community forestry: 1) local people have access to the 
land and its resources, 2) participation in decision concerning the forest, and 3) the local 
people protect and restore the forest. In this section, I present community forestry is not only 
about trees and its silvicultural operation but it also concern people and their access to forests 
and benefit derived from forests. Some advocates assert the community forestry that the 
stabilities of local eco-systems, communities and economies are inextricable linked and 
mutually reinforcing (McCarthy, 2005).  In this section, my assumption is that community 
forestry is a management unit, where local people exercise their power to influence decisions, 
including the rules of access and the benefits of the forests, as a result entails the CF as 
“power shift” from state to the local communities and creates issues of power sharing in order 
to deliver its outcomes. To analyze the assumption, I put forward three characteristics of 
community forestry; 1) the degree of responsibility and authority for forest management, 2) 
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interests of the actors and 3) institutional development concerning the forest management 
policies and participation activities. To understand these characteristics, I present who 
decides, who benefits and how broad-range objectives are achieved by using the resource 
regime framework.  
6.1.1. Stakeholders in community forestry:  
Many scholars argues that forest management in practice is only possible with the cooperation 
of all stakeholders and implementation of regulatory instruments, which means that politician 
and administrative bodies on one hand and associations and individual citizens on the other 
hand. Ostrom (2008) gives a prominent role to forest administration to enforce forestry 
programs. In the institutional processes, CF comprises the collective action of people across 
nested levels of organization from small social groups to large and formally structured 
institutions at different levels.  As a result forest users are targeted by the regulatory 
functions, where both state and non-governmental groups of stakeholders have the potential to 
influence the community forestry management.  
6.1.1.1.Government stakeholders 
Parliamentary committee: It is formed under the chairmanship of a parliamentarian. Being a 
legislative subunit, it directs government action in natural resources and agriculture. This 
committee has the right to give directives and ask for information and clarification from the 
government. There is an elected chairperson from the members of the Constituent Assembly 
of Nepal, who oversee national issues of community forestry and give advices to Ministry of 
Forests and government agencies. National Planning Commission:  It is an autonomous 
government body responsible for formulating development policies. Headed by Prime 
Minister, vice-chairman and six members selected by individual basis but more often 
nominated ex-officer members. It is primarily an advisory body with limited executive 
authority that works for preparing the national development plans, goals, objectives and 
strategies. Moreover, It presents detail sectorial, sub-sectorial and cross-sectorial development 
strategies and program through providing estimate of financial resources allocations to the 
programs. National Planning Commission has established Agricultural and Rural 
Development Division, which is responsible for overseeing and coordinating inter-sectorial 
activities related to planning, program, budgeting and the monitoring of forestry-related 
actions.  
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Forest administration: It is the “state” body that is primarily responsible for forestry activities 
as the owner of the state forest. Forest administration established from Ministry of Forest and 
Soil Conservation, its departments and field offices constitute the forest bureaucracy. They 
are responsible for coordinating, supervising forestry activities including planning, 
administration and monitoring of forestry actions from micro to macro levels. It designs and 
implements forest policies, where the ministry has five departments: Department of Soil 
Conservation, Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation, Department of 
Forest, Department of Forest Research and Survey Center and Department of Plant Resources 
play a leading role in designing and implementing forest related policies. The organizational 
structure of the forest administration is presented in Figure 6.  
Figure 6. The organizational structure of the forest administration, Nepal 
 
Source: (Devkota, 2010) 
District Forest Office: It is the principle-executing agency of all forestry activities. A District 
Forest Officer (DFO), who is responsible for the forest administration and management, 
heads the office. This office also directs planning and implementation responsibilities for the 
district level programs and also has to perform coordinating role with other district level 
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office activities. DFO are supposed to facilitate the process of hand-over, involves in the 
establishment of FUGs, decision-making and preparation of Work Plan. DFO has 
responsibility to monitor development of CF, and highlights issues and concerns. Moreover, 
DFO is assisted by some Assistant Forest Officers, one is based in district headquarters and 
two are based at Ilaka Offices. Ilaka Forest Office divided into Range Posts and management 
section at the micro level that interact directly with the forest users. Range Post is headed by a 
Ranger and Range Posts is assisted by Forest Guards.  
District Soil Conservation Office (DSCO): -it is a line agency of Ministry of Forests, who 
recognize of conserving soil and watershed of the country. It is a team of multi-disciplinary 
professionals such as foresters, agriculture technicians, civil engineers, chemists and 
geologists. More often, both DFO and DSCO have conflicting interests in plantation, soil and 
watershed conservation.  
6.1.1.2. Local government authorities: structure and legal framework  
Nepal does not have a long history of adopting formal local government system in forest 
management. Decentralization has been an important means of distributing benefits and 
promoting participatory democracy. The local Self-Governance Act (LSGA) of 1999 and 
associated rules of 2000 provide clear legislative platform to strengthen decentralization 
governance in Nepal. Nepal has a two-tier system of local governance; Village Development 
Committee (VDC) and District Development Committee (DDC), both of them have the 
responsibilities of governing the public affairs through appropriate mechanism at the local and 
regional level.  
A wide participation of people in development activities is one of the main aim of the LSG, 
however the prospect is not free from challenges. The first and foremost challenge for 
effective local self-governance is the weakness of local bodies, which is greatly restricted by a 
weak absorbing capacity and highly dependence on central transfers. Its autonomy is highly 
control by central and captured by local elites. Local Government Institutions (LGIs) are 
associated with exclusion of local people in decision-making and autonomy in self-
governance involving real devolution of power. LGIs are facilitated with certain power 
bylaws such as raise revenue, carryout spending, employee staff and adjudicate local disputes, 
however the autonomy is weakened by the structure of local authorities, their nature of 
judging power or biasedness causing a “systematic erosion” of the institutions.  
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6.1.1.3. Local government and community forestry 
A wide range participation of local people in development activities is one of the core 
principles of LSG. The LSG formulate a mechanism whereby the activities performed by 
these institutions are carried out through user groups. In many cases, DDCs and VDCs work 
closely with CFUGs and with other stakeholders such as FECOFUN and local NGOs in the 
forest management activities and community development initiatives. When donors were 
active in CF, a new level of coordination committee was established called District Forestry 
Coordination Committee (DFCCs). This is a multi-stakeholders institutional body, where 
different government agencies are involved such as Ministry of Forest, DFO, District Soil 
Conservation Office (DSCO), District Plant Resource Office (DPRO), local government 
bodies (DDC, VDC) and other government agencies such as Women Development Office 
(WDO), political parties, NGOs, CFUGs, Women groups, the chamber of commerce and 
other agencies are the members. In this institution, DDC chairs the committee and the DFO is 
the member secretary, where they perform only advisory services such as discussion about 
development initiatives in the forestry sector. DFCC´s duties and responsibilities are to 
facilitate and coordinate regarding conservation, management and sustainable use of natural 
environment and bio-resource of forest sector in the regional level.  
At the community level, monitoring and evaluation of community forest user groups are the 
key challenge of forest administration. So, in order to make it effective, Range-post level 
networking mechanism is formulated by forming Range Post level Community Forest 
Coordination Committee. In this form, one representative from each community forest is 
member of Range-Post level coordinating committee (RLCC) to perform coordination, 
monitoring and evaluation of the CFUGs. The member of RLCC works as a facilitator or 
bridge between CFUGs and Forest Administration.  
6.1.1.4. Non-governmental stakeholders 
Community forest user groups, forest users and the committee 
Forest Act 1993 and Regulation 1995 made provision of sustainable forest use and 
management through community involvement via community forestry. This process involves 
identification of forest users and form organization of CFUG, which is responsible for 
protecting the forest subject to the DFO oversight. The organizational structure of the CFUGs 
is presented in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. CFUG formation and organizational structure in Nepal 
 
 
Source: (Devkota, 2010) 
The CFUGC organize through general assembly, where 33% women must be included. The 
policy Article 43, the Forest Act 1993 identified CFUGs, as self-governing strong 
independent legal foundations. So that they can acquire, possess, transfer or mange moveable 
or immovable resources. They have de jure right system, they don´t have alienation rights 
because ownership of forestland remains with the government.  
The CFUGs prepare the Operational Plan (OP) according to forest resource inventory and the 
work is done in the presence of Rangers from the District Forest Office. When CFUG´s 
constitution and work plan are approved, the forest is officially hand over to the community, 
which has to be renewed on every five-years basis.  
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The general assembly (GA) guides the executive committee about forest management, 
utilization, evaluation and monitoring the committee´s work, in addition, next committee 
formulates for next two years.  Approving with majority can change constitution and work 
plan. The CFUG executive committees is authorized by the CFUGs and coordinate and 
negotiate with the Forest Administration and other external stakeholders and regulate forest 
product distribution based on the accepted rules.  This committee does not have a legal right 
according to Forest Act, but they have been working as authorized by user groups. This 
process gives more power to executive committee and act as gatekeepers of direct users 
access to resources and capture many of the benefits associated with CF (Devkota, 2010).  
Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal (FECOFUN) 
FECOFUN is an umbrella organization of CFUGs, organized in 75 districts and founded in 
1995. It has established more than 30 institutions, received support from the numbers of 
donor agencies. This organization is active in advocating policy formulation and amendments 
in favor of community forestry and equally vocal in providing rights to the users in decision-
making and benefit sharing. Sometimes, FECOFUN blamed as a highly politically rotted 
institution as they advocate political interests rather than interests of the local forest users 
(Devkota, 2010). Due to its political ideology, it was split up into two committees; Nepali 
Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML).  
Other network also involved to community forestry is Himalayan Grassroots Women´s 
Natural Resource Management Association (HIMAWANTI). Both FECOFUN and 
HIMAWANTI have the same kind of role and activities but HIMAWANTI advocate for 
women rights and represent in resource management also.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been seen as a key partner while 
implementing and introducing forestry related program. More than 30,000 NGOs have existed 
in Nepal. The main focuses of these organizations are community development and provide 
services to development projects. Despite wide range of proliferation of national and local 
NGOs, few of them are involved in CF. While CF expanded their interest with conservation 
to livelihood improvement activities, the involvement of local NGOs in this sector has 
increased.   
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6.1.2. Interaction and negotiation  
The CF regime has been becoming a complex socio-environmental field, reflecting the 
attributes involving a wide array of actors who operate at different scales and shape the local 
level practices of forest management. In the process, local people also begin to see certain 
regimes as belonging to them. At times, this perception emerged through multi-scalar politics 
creating cleavages and conflicts between communities. This means that those who benefit 
from the CF not only follow the rules but also there are politics and relations of power found 
at the cross-scale regime.  
CF has become possible through power sharing which can be found in different types of 
community forestry regimes. Basically, power-sharing issues are not resolved through one-off 
policy decision. It rather shows that power-sharing issue remains a matter of inadvertent 
politics that happen within and between related regimes of CF. In the context of CF; this form 
of politics is reflected in a number of ways. The politics of negotiation of power over forest 
resources has become visible in the streets of Kathmandu when federation activists (especially 
FECOFUN and other social groups) staged demonstrations in the negotiations between the 
donors and the Government of Nepal in the development of new programs. Due to the multi-
scalar politics, the outcomes of CF were determined not so much in outcomes as in expected 
outputs. Through the complex processes of negotiation that impact the CF regime, the actual 
power sharing arrangement between the communities and the state is skewed towards greater 
control by the state; the cross-scale politics has not become strong enough to scrutinize policy 
ideas.  
Because of the wider organizational scope, CFUGs have expanded to undertake a wide range 
of activities aimed at enhancing livelihood opportunities, enhancing democratic participation 
in the governance as well as reducing GHG emissions. The most notable is FECOFUN, which 
has actively guarded the interests and rights of local communities over forests within the CF 
regime; thus influencing the policy decisions and local practices.  
The patterns of interaction derived from choices made by actors are important to look at when 
analyzing a resource regime, such as community forest. In this section, I will primarily focus 
on political actors on national and local levels defining their duties and rights over governance 
regime and analyze how local people influence political actors and their actions particularly 
access to resources. The first challenge can be seen as a national ownership, which will be 
defined briefly in this section. 
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6.1.2.1.Property right 
Primarily, two Acts have the greatest influence on the forest resource tenure: Forest Act of 
1993 and the Land Act of 1964. As explained in Chapter one, the Forest Act provides a rule 
for tenure systems for forest management such as protected, religious, leasehold and 
community forestry, where the ownership title is with the state. The Act 1964 provides for 
ownership of land to legally defined entities. 
The government revises the policies from time-to-time, making it complicated to facilitate the 
local forest users rights. The current PFM regime gives right to forest users under a number of 
conditions; all policies are related to increasing forest revenue through increasing taxation on 
CFs. Until 1990 (resumption of democracy), the government of Nepal had the power to 
acquire all types of land, even the private land with or without compensation, which was 
primarily justified through one´s caste, class and political view. After the democratic 
constitution in 1990, this provision was removed on private property but still in the CPRs, the 
land is based on national ownership, controlling land without providing compensation to local 
forest users who have been protecting and enhancing ecosystem.  
During the Maoist conflict (1997-2006), both the army and Maoists took over forest, land and 
constructed roads, and military barracks without consultation and compensations to 
communities.  These activities heavily influenced forest dependent people and discouraged 
active work to manage the forest. On the other hand, DFOs behave like the forestland is their 
own property and they feel free to possess forestlands from CFUGs. There are communities in 
Nepal who live in forests under their own traditional rules and systems who has not legal 
ownership such as Chepangs and Raute (see Chapter 1). Until the forest decentralization act, 
these communities were living in the forest and they were allowed access forestland. The 
government of Nepal gave some lands to CF and consequently they have established 
settlements in or near national forests.  Lack of forest tenure gives not only a single problem 
to forest users, it also gives problems in cumulative forms such as reduce livelihood 
improvement, customary purposes such as cemeteries, marriage rituals, cultural profession, 
and generally changes people nature relationship.  
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6.1.3. Processes of local forest management  
Figure 8. Distribution of respondents according to their social status, Ludikhola 
watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
N=109  
In CFUG1 (Ludidamgade), we covered N=48 total respondents, where 29% were Dalits, 31% 
Janajati and 40% were Brahmin/Chhetris. In CFUG2 (Birenchowk) we gathered N=33 total 
respondents, where 18% represents Dalits, 55% Janajati and 27% Brahmin/Chhetris. 
Similarly in CFUG3 (Mahalaxmi) total respondents were N=28, where we covered 32% 
Dalits, 57% Janajati and 11% Brahmin/Chhetris. In a total N=109 respondents, we covered 
27% Dalits, 45% Janajati and 28% others groups. In this survey, we covered 67% male and 
33% female HH respondents.  
Table 11 Respondent´s livelihood wealth status in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
Livelihood wealth status of 
respondents 
CFUG1 
% 
CFUG2 
% 
CFUG3 
% 
Sample mean 
% 
Higher 6 6 7 6 
Medium 48 64 57 55 
Poor 46 30 36 39 
Total 100 100 1000 100 
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In these communities we found variations in livelihood status, only 6% of the respondents had 
higher livelihood status, 55% have medium and 39% were poor. In this survey, the CFUG´s 
are categorized according to their income and TLU levels.  
6.1.3.1. Stakeholders participation at local level 
Given an overview of the Forest Act and its related issues is not enough to understand the 
pattern of interaction at local level (CFUGs) so we a presented characteristic of HH more to 
understand participation and reciprocal behavior in CF management as a resource regime. So 
this section will be based on how the CFUGs were organized at local levels to improve 
livelihoods and environmental conditions and to what extent they account the voice of local 
forest users. When the HH survey conducted, only 23% (N=109) reported regular 
participation in CFUG´s meetings.  When put through the Chi-square test, there were highly 
significant relationship between participation and livelihood status and gender with 0.05.  
Table 12. Participation by HH characteristics in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
Variables P-value 
Livelihoods 0.0047** 
Gender 0.0413* 
N=109, * indicates significantly deference between good governance (P<0.05) 
In the context of Nepal, community forestry is not particularly about forest products and its 
silvicultural operation; it combines different groups of people and their “bundle of interests”. 
According to the Chi-square test, it will be fair to note that participation is highly depended 
on livelihood status.  It is also revealed when put test forward with gender. The survey data 
prove that participation has not done systematically, it matters livelihood status and gender. 
The conclusion is that community forestry is a place where different actors exercise their 
power to influence decisions regarding forest management, the rules of access and the 
accumulation of forest products.  
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Table 13. CFUGC account the voice according to their social status in Ludikhola 
watershed, Nepal 2015.  
Social status Respondents   Yes              No 
Dalits 27% 5% 22% 
Janajati 55% 14% 31% 
Higher caste 28% 18% 10% 
Total 100% 37% 63% 
 
Only 37% of the total respondents (N=109) found that local people voice were accounted for 
in the decision making process, while 63% respondents felt that their voice were not heard. If 
we analyze this result from an independent variable (social status), only 5% of the Dalits 
respondents voice were accounted in the decision making process which covers 27% of total 
respondents, while 18% voice were accounted from higher caste which covers 28%. This 
result shows that higher caste people voices were often heard in the decision-making 
processes.  
Although the percentage of respondents who found their voice were not accounted, it may 
still be interesting to look deeper into why they found that their voices were not heard enough, 
in details. So we analyzed the organizational structure of CFUGs and trying to find to what 
extent marginalized groups were excluded in the CFUGs.  
6.1.3.2. Institutional structure 
There are two tiers of organizational structure in CFUGs: the General assembly (GA) and the 
Community Forest User Groups Committee (CFUGC). Basically, GA represents all members 
of the CFUGs, which meets once a year. In addition, CFUGC is known as the executive 
committee of some 11-21 persons, depending on the size of the CFUG. They are either 
elected or unanimously nominated by stakeholders as representatives, who conduct meetings 
once in a month. GA is mandate to make any decision related to forest management such as 
framing rules, sanctions, fixing schedule for forest product access or operation, and managing 
generated funds with simple majority. This is the main decision making body where decision-
making power lies with CFUGs. The CFUG makes the decision regarding fund allocation and 
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put forward their decision to GA for an endorsement and GA makes endorsement in the 
decision of CFUGC without questioning.  
In the study areas, the average size of the executive committee is big (about 22 members 
arrange). But normally it should be 11 to 15 members. In terms of power, CFUGs had 
selected the executive members through consensus and only a few had election for the key 
posts, were they could not reach to consensus. All key positions hold some kind of power, for 
example, the decisions are not considered as final unless the chairperson endorses it. The 
secretary keeps the record by maintaining minutes, schedules executive meeting and general 
assembly with the consent of the chairperson. The chairperson determines the agenda for the 
meeting and the general assembly with the consultation. The treasurer maintains financial 
activities; one cannot get payment unless s/he signs on checks.  
However, according to the CF guidelines, committee membership should be included and also 
purposing that 50% should be covered to women and at least one key leadership position 
(chair or secretary) should be women.  In the CFUG1 key leadership position was not given to 
women and there were no Dalits representatives in the CFUGC. In CFUG2 and CFUG3 had 
followed some guidelines but not all.   
6.1.3.3. Outcomes 
The presented data shows that exclusion from decision-making process continues and 
marginalized groups were deprived of equitable participation in decision-making process. 
Lack of participation and inequity result from political domination by “elites” higher caste 
people, where very low numbers of respondents were accounted. This situation remains even 
worse in the case of Dalits and Janajati, who were not only deprived from executive 
committee positions but were also poorly represented in the committee meetings. Enforcing 
the provision of exclusive forest use rights for the poor does not appear to be as easy as has 
been outlined in an any projects. The major trend is that elite users are accumulating forest 
use rights. As a result they were disappointed about the project and were not found to be 
interested in the management of forest. 
Who benefits within the community are not solely determined through the people´s behaviors, 
it is prominently shaped also by the forest governance regime, which is sustained not just 
through local actions. It is increasingly expanding through deliberative politics and public 
ideas, debating issues and rights of marginalized groups. Local forest users are influenced by 
the forest governance regime, which referred to how existing policies are interpreted and 
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implemented. Practically, community rights are negotiated by underlying power relationships 
among state officials and local groups, which may reinforce the existing power structure.  
To sum up, there is a great challenge in being able to coordinate all forest related activities at 
hand, and being able to disseminate the right information to the local forest users. When the 
coordinating responsibility falls on FECOFUN, as a result of the multitude of stakeholders 
and activities, a lot of information and knowledge will be created through research and project 
oriented have which is supposed to influence the future structure and implementation of other 
forest development project. If this information does not reach the relevant actors, it will have 
severe affect on further forest related projects. For example; the CF might affect REDD+ 
implementation if it is adapted by same policies and guidelines. This issue will be analyzed 
briefly in next section (REDD+ as a resource regime). If there is no communication and 
information sharing mechanism in place, one can not know in which area, activities or 
knowledge is lacking, which in turn affect the overall resource regime, as knowledge gaps 
might result in the failure of certain activities. If the HH characteristics have not considered 
enough in the participation mechanism, it‟s skeptical to improve the livelihood status of poor 
and marginalized people.  
The importance of taking into consideration of the various actors involved in a resource 
regime, only negotiating power and their interests have come into effect rather than creating 
good forest governance. There is a huge gap in resource governance, which can be fulfilled by 
all stakeholders‟ interest and preferences taking into consideration. So the next part is 
concerned with the institutions governing the policy process and the policies itself onto 
another important aspect of our resource regime framework.  
6.1.3.4. Institutions governing the policy process 
In this section, I will look at how different actors influence the policy process and what are 
the barriers to flow of information to marginalized people, equitable benefit sharing and 
sustainable forest management. Our assumption is that the policy making process takes local 
people into decisions and actions about forest management, according to the participation 
guidelines such as constitutional decisions, designs concerning rights of use and ownership of 
forest products and decisions about forest management and activities.  
6.1.3.4.1. Policy and governance process 
Policy-making process in forest sector has historically been influenced by the political power 
of the predominant regimes due to the high value of timber and land. Since the 
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decentralization of forest sector, a number of new actors have become keen to influence forest 
policy formation. This is primarily politicians, civil society and donors. Since the resumption 
of democracy, a new array of organizations and instructions have established and acted as 
lobbying bodies such as forest users networks and the civil society. However, in many cases, 
the formal policy-making process stakeholders are ignored, it lacks a consultative and 
inclusive process.  
Donors have also influenced by the policy-making process. The alarmist theory of 
“Himalayan Environment Degradation” attracted strong donor support for forestry with an 
emphasis on forest conservation and reforestation. As a result, in 1990 about 60% funds were 
distributed in forestry sector´s Master Plan.  
District-level actors such as DFO and donor supported PFM projects continue within policy 
and legal framework set at the national level and to some degree they include their own 
interest and strategies for implementing PFM. In this process, District Development 
Committees (DDCs) and Village Development Committees (VDCs) can also frame their own 
concern and schemes, as facilitated by the 1998 Local Self-Governance Act.  
Community forest is dominated by a self-governing behavior with a high degree of 
integration of social and cultural values and included the characteristics of “excludability” and  
“subtractibility” (Ostrom, 1990). The assumption is that a collective action or distribution 
systems that can promote reciprocity and mutual support with substantive communal 
ownership, which rely on informal rules, knowledge and information systems. But in many 
places this led to exclusion of marginal groups because the CF policy was not clearly 
presented at the local level.  They have limited knowledge about the policy, the new system 
that completely ignored the indigenous and traditional knowledge and created two legally 
distinct categories of people: CFUG members in power and the powerless.  
In the community forestry, collective action is one of the core solutions of institutional 
governance processes. Often scholars define its related overarching points and suggests as a 
way of creating robust institution. In next section, I would like to analyze to what extent 
collective action function in the community forestry and how it facilitate to community 
forestry outcomes.   
6.1.3.4.2. Collective action at local level 
Conjoined with the widespread knowledge CFUG rules, 65% of the respondents were 
satisfied with rules and believed that their livelihood improvement was possible. The results 
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from these criteria come under Ostrom´s success principles for long enduring CPRs, of 
clearly defined boundaries of resource. So we have conducted a chi-square test to understand 
the relationship between good governance and Ostrom´s design principles. I found six 
variables out of nine highly significant. It means, in some level, collective actions and 
environmental governance are correlated. Table 14 shows the detail picture, which is 
presented below.  
Table 14. Modified Success Principles for long enduring CPRs, Ludikhola watershed, 
Nepal 2015.  
Success Principles CFUG1 
% 
CFUG2 
% 
CFUG3 
% 
Sample 
mean % 
P-value 
Clear boundaries/ 
outsiders are kept out 
100 94 96 97 0.005*** 
Equal distribution of use 
and benefits 
56 64 71 64 0.291 
Fairly distributed rules 
and right 
50 82 57 61 0.264 
Cultural value are well 
taken into account 
42 42 39 41 0.010*** 
The local community is 
involved in making rules 
56 64 71 61 0.054** 
Proper enforcement of 
rules/sanction 
92 73 71 84 0.000*** 
Conflict resolution 
mechanism are 
appropriate 
69 82 57 73 0.000*** 
Avoids opportunities for 
corruption 
35 55 57 47 0.010*** 
Everybody felt free to 
take whatever position 
they wanted concerning 
establishing CFUGs 
committee  
29 27 18 25 0.092. 
Total average 55 63 56 61  
N=109, * indicates significantly difference between good governance (P<0.05) 
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In Nepal, each CF has rules or regulations for their forest organized through CFUGs as a 
resource regime. In the above table (table 14), there are several things of interest. The first 
category, “clear boundaries/ outsiders are kept out”, tells us to what extent neighbors or 
competing users are kept out. The CFUG1 scores highest here are as expected since they have 
gone through land use planning exercise as opposed to the rest. However, CFUG2 scores the 
highest on all the other points comparing with CFUG1 and CFUG3. In general these CFUGs 
does not have in place a functional resource regime based on well-established social 
institutions and structures and are in acute need of a CF management scheme to manage its 
forests in a sustainable manner. According to the result, these CFUGs are not able to 
implement any project in future. If they want to get projects for the future, they need to fulfill 
essential formalization processes through PFM policy.  
In addition, if the system in place is not seen as legitimate, the villagers will most likely not 
feel assured by the rules and thus tend not to follow them. So these three CFUGs seem strong 
in rules making and implementing to conserve the forest but appear very poor in fair 
distribution of rules and benefits and inclusiveness in decision-making process and reducing 
opportunities for corruption.  
The government of Nepal promised to reduce the corruption activities in all sectors, but it 
seems failed to fulfill their promises. In the piloting CF, villagers were quite sure that there 
was wide range of corruption regarding fund allocation and carbon monitoring. For instance, 
where only 35% in CFUG1 55% in CFUG2 and 57% in CFUG3 answered that they felt 
corruption was avoided. This issue will be analyzed and discussed in chapter 8. 
Of those not follow the rules; the most prominent reasons given were that there were not 
inclusive policymaking process and equitable distribution of rights and benefits. There were 
too strong limitations on the use of forest products and their interests were not fully taken into 
account when developing policy, so the governance processes itself creating opportunities for 
corruption.  
Reasons are such as; inequitable benefit sharing practices, lack of accountability and 
transparency, illegal use of forest resources, lack of conflict resolution mechanism, excessive 
use of forest resources from particular groups while, at the same time, other users were denied 
and required certain fees access to resources.  
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Of those who wished to elaborate further on this question, the reasons for their contentment 
with CF governance were among the following. Activities of reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation are done at a communal level, use and access to forest resource depends on 
the livelihood status. Reducing deforestation and forest degradation is positive in that there 
was financial support from different international project for the welfare of the forest as well 
as users. Therefore, there was frequently held tree planting and fire line events by the CFUGs. 
Strong sanctions reduced of cutting of raw trees and other raw forest resources; the rules are 
in affect for reducing deforestation.  
Overall there were not any functional resource regimes, if we follow the design principles of 
Ostrom, CFUG2 has 63% scores it is quite higher than the CFUG3 with 56% and CFUG1 
with 41%. I found two obvious reasons 1) lack of clearly defined authority, rights and duties 
and 2) lack of availability of alternative source of fuelwood. 
  
 
Photo 9. Livestock grazing, fuelwood and fodder collection in Ludikhola watershed 
We were told about people coming from outside the village to extract timber or to collect 
fuelwood. For instance one respondent told the story about a woman coming from Gorkha 
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town to collect fuelwood for her hotel business and saved money in terms of buying a gas 
stove. In the CFUG1, one respondent said that a timber contractor was getting a contract for 
timber extraction for long period of time, which was not accepted for local forest users. Then 
local forest users decided to withdraw his contract because he was not a community member 
and requested the CFUGC to process their appeal. But CFUGC took the favor of timber 
contractor and suggested him to buy some land in the community. As a result, the timber 
contractor bought some lands in the community and became a member of CFUG and got 
timber contract from CFUGC. These practices are not keeping outsider out, indeed 
welcoming in. CFUGC were not only excluding voice of the local people but also exercising 
their asymmetric power relation in environmental governance. This is basically occurred by a 
lack of clear authorities, rights and duties. 
There has been a steady rise in the price and inaccessibility of LP (Liquefied Petroleum) gas 
making the people fuelwood dependent not only in the rural areas but also in the city.  On the 
other hand, higher prices and demand for timber have been influencing many timber 
contractors. For instance CFUG1 is located far away from Gorkha city and depends heavily 
on forest resources rather than alternative sources of fuelwood. The size of the forest and HHs 
are wider than in the other CFUGs. As we have seen they also have access to less agricultural 
land and, on an average, has a less output than in CFUG2, which is quite near to city. CFUG3 
is widely influenced by politics and some CFUG´s candidate visits to public houses to get 
vote in their favor. From this perspective, local people might have frustration about their false 
promises. As a result, it impact to people´s participation in CF management, where 82% of 
the total respondents believed that there was not opportunity to poor and marginalized people 
to take any position in CFUGC.  
Lastly, it appeared that the lack of alternative income opportunities, lack of irrigation and 
difficult conditions for agricultural production was put the main reasons. So, people increase 
their livestock to improve their livelihood condition and collect fuelwood to compensate their 
expenses.  
6.1.4. Resource regime: institutions governing access to resources  
CF as a resource regime does not make specific provision for the historically excluded groups 
and people living in poor condition to gain full access and participation in CF policy design 
and implementation process. In this process, CF policy and legislation ignore the 
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marginalized group in three ways. First, it focuses on the scientific forestry ideology, where 
environmental restoration is the priority. Second, from the perspective of power, the real 
power lies with the DFO and CFUGs need to follow instructions of the DFOs when utilizing 
forest resources. Third, it has not specified any priority to combat Nepal´s exclusionary social 
structure. Policy and legislation only recognize an instrumental form of participation but 
Hickey and Mohan (2005) remind us that only a transformative form of participation can 
create space to address inequalities and inequities embedded within social structure in a 
particular society.  
Why this is continued in community forestry is interesting some issues have identified from 
this analysis. The First is that the flow of information to marginalized people is lacking 
because government staff generally contact village elites, on whom they depend for advice 
and information when planning forest management activities. This gap is always created in 
CF, as a result developing planning account the elite interests rather than towards the needs of 
the majority and marginalized group. Furthermore, the government official gives the 
information in written format, which makes access difficult to illiterate people and increase 
cause of exclusion. Primarily, government staff, NGOs and donor agencies consult with 
CFUGC rather than trying to understand local people´s needs. So, the dominating pattern of 
this interaction process does not only exclude information sharing but also leads to 
marginalized access to equitable benefit sharing.  
Second is the lack of bundle of property rights. Primarily, marginalized people have been 
excluding from access to equitable benefit sharing and their role in decision-making process 
is low because there is not provided any mechanism to ensure rights for forest users even it is 
singing as a self-governance process. At the local level, CFUG is controlled by community 
elites, politicians and higher caste and class people and these actors create persistent barriers 
to poor and illiterate people standing for positions in executive committee. Similarly, 
marginalized group threatened in different ways and reduce their household capital assets and 
they changed options for livelihood activities. The state is the sole owner, manager and user, 
but does not provide any space and opportunities for inclusion and equitable benefit sharing 
across different actors and groups.  
On the basis of the information I have been able to create picture of how community forestry 
works as a resource regime. By employing the resource regime Framework created by Vatn 
(2005) the regime as I see it is presented below.  
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Figure 9. Community forestry as a resource regime in Nepal 2015 
 
Source: Adapted from Vatn (2005) 
6.1.4.1. Main opportunities and constraints to achieving PFM 
However, CFUGs have directly or indirectly been supporting protection of the forest and 
other overriding management objectives. There are two contradicting views regarding forest 
management between the forest administration and donors and non-governmental 
organizations. The forest department wants to prioritize forest conservation and a livelihood 
objective, which is jointly incompatible, where donors, civil society and other stakeholders 
challenge this hypothesis and trying to focus on forest policy as a means to improve hill 
people´s livelihoods and improve the forest condition.  
The interference of various actors involved in CF at different roles and responsibilities at 
different levels vary widely. Staff from the District Forest, from NGOs, from INGOs and 
local CFUGs often has different arguments regarding CF, especially about its strategies 
implementation. Structurally, forest bureaucracy and technical forest management (forest 
protection, yield regulation and timber production) have been holding the major positions and 
their ideas and interests have had more influence in practice and with the field. Therefore, a 
new type of professional trained bureaucracy has entered in CF in 2005 called Participatory 
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Forest Management (PFM). In this scenario, NGOs and the Federation of Community Forest 
Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) prepared extension material related to forest policy, governance 
and process. However, they did not seen well prepared to influence the CF implementation 
process.  
The district forest office and its related staff have given the primary responsibility for 
protecting forest and have not mentioned livelihood improvement or rural development in 
their paper descriptions. They have imposed conservation-oriented policies and practices on 
CFUGs which is basically calculation regarding the deforestation and forest product 
extraction by adding the term “participation”.  Again, the DFO has given power to control 
people´s use of the forest with local participation. In this scenario, local forest users have 
problem with system, not with particular person. When CFUGs and DFO have problems, the 
state try to reduce grievance by replacing another DFO with same the system, coming few 
problems.   
After a gaining such knowledge, it will be fair to note that before 1990, the government was 
unable to meet higher administrative cost from forest revenue it generated a significant 
investment in development. As a result, in 1993, the Forest Act was organized according to 
the government interests and determined to increase both in control of CF and its revenue, 
particularly in Terai CF but this act was equally affected in the hill CF as well.  
The state set ups the institution under the framework of a Weberian model of bureaucracy, 
which is characterized by routine formal procedures, specified roles and tasks which are 
evaluated using “objective criteria”. Usually, state agencies form community-based 
organizations, policies, legislations, extension programs, support systems and the conditions 
of partnership to ensure that state agencies fulfill its own specific objectives. Here the 
argument is that the CF is a tool, which in real terms is the expression of the state agencies 
and their interests. 
I question the overall ability to increase ecological sustainability, livelihood improvement, 
equitable benefit sharing, and establishment of good environmental governance. In addition, 
transparency also comes in-between these issues. Many powerful actors networks within the 
community forestry sector have been undermine the effectiveness, more often they put their 
interests rather than local people livelihood improvement and ecological sustainability. I also 
question the CFUGs ability to carry out all the planned activities in systematic manner. They 
plays uneven power relation network, which is reducing the charm of effectiveness of the 
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community forestry in Nepal. In terms of efficiency, a long list of institutional process 
horizontally and vertically takes more time and expensive matter. This process can increase 
transaction cost and corruption because you have to full fill the interests of all long listed 
actors. Concerning equity, the main challenge is elite capture. Elites are more active in the 
communities. Participation has seen as a function of power network rather than creating social 
well being. I did not find any source of creating equity in the community forestry, so I have 
questioned in equity outcomes. Social legitimacy is used only in theory, but practically 
policies and programs has provided from the national level. Lack of people participation, 
exclusion of marginalized groups in decision-making process does not support to social 
legitimacy, it enhance conflict and power relation in the society. Nepal´s community forestry 
does not seem like participatory approach, it is more likely partnership approach. 
Source of gaining extra money from forestry is seen the main propose of actors‟ involvement 
in community forestry. The legacy of poor governance and corruption has remained in the 
forestry sector even it has titled as “self-governance approach”. Practically, a self-governance 
approach has been reflected in the form of exclusion, domination, exploitation, inequity, 
injustice, non-transparency and inadequate participation and poor rule of law.  
The importance of taking into consideration of the various actors involved in a resource 
regime is only negotiating power and their interests have come into effect rather than creating 
good forest governance. The characteristics of “excludability” and  “subtractibility” are not 
function well to create good governance in Ludikhola watershed.  
In the next section, I will analyze how REDD+ pilot project was realized under CF and to 
what extent it delivered its desired goals. In addition, I will look what changes were occurred 
in CF in the process of REDD+ introduction and implementation in Nepal.  
6.2. REED+ AS A RESOURCE REGIME IN THE COMMUNITY 
FORESTRY 
The second sub-objective specifically attempts to define the basic understanding of REDD+ 
in community forestry and its nexus outcomes. The outcomes will be based knowledge of the 
REDD+ project, policies and the principles, which are then perceived by local people.  Before 
presenting its outcome, it will be analyzed what changes have been done in the REDD+ 
implementation process in notion CF. Later, REDD+ will be evaluated through the local 
people´s relationship and attitudes and analyzed to what extent REDD+ pilot project was able 
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to deliver environment efficient, cost effective, social legitimacy, and fair on benefits. These 
activities will be viewed in connection with REDD+ policies, the local context and livelihood 
outcomes.  
6.2.1. REDD+ implementation 
The project was entitled “Design and setting up of a governance and payment system for 
Nepal´s community forest management under reduced emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation”. The main feature of the project was the establishment of an equitable 
REDD payment mechanism. The total budget of the project was conceptualized to about US$ 
1.7 million; out of the total budget US$285,000.00 was set aside as a “seed grant” and 
distributed in the pilot area.  
REDD promised an affordable means of reducing deforestation and forest degradation, as 
well as the possibility of generating substantial funds for local income generating activities 
and community development. Therefore, it is combined with multiple objectives such as 
national development, national forest programs, poverty reduction strategies and livelihood 
improvements as well as achieving effective utilization and conservation of forest resources.  
The REDD+ pilot project is determined to improve local governance operational guidelines 
by including the marginalized groups; women, poor, Dalits, ethnic and indigenous people in 
decision-making, benefit sharing and capacity building to harness the experience of CF into 
REDD+ policy in future.  
6.2.1.1. Activities 
REDD+ pilot project accomplished different kind of activities in the Ludikhola watershed. 
Some of the activities are listed in Table 15. 
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Table 15. Summary of activities implemented through REDD+ pilot project in 
Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
Activities Years Output 
Payment 
mechanism 
2011, 2012, 
& 2013 
Payment criteria developed and US$79,86.00 distributed 
to 31 CFUGs in Ludikhola watershed in Gorkha. 
Technical 
guidelines 
2012 Forest inventory guidelines and carbon measurement 
guidelines were provided.  
Forest inventory 2010, 2011, 
2012 & 2013 
Forest inventory reports and carbon stock reports were 
provided 
MRV 2011, 2012 
and 2013 
FCTF guidelines developed and some of the CFUGs 
were involved in the monitoring and reporting activities 
to help the technical staffs. 
Inventory 
trainings 
2010 & 2011 CFUGs were trained to do basic forest inventory. 
Income 
Generating 
activities 
2011, 2012 
&2013 
Biogas was planted for supplementary to firewood and 
improved stoves provided to efficiently utilize firewood 
and to reduce smokes at home. To improve livelihoods, 
money, goats and pigs were given to local people.  
REDD 
awareness 
program 
2011, 2012 & 
2013 
Through media, training, workshops several programs 
were organized. 
Empowerment 
activities 
2011, 2012 & 
2013 
More focus was given to poor, Dalits, Janajati and 
women in the empowerment activities. 
Source: Information is collected from CFUG´s achieve.  
Table 15 shows that what activities were carried out to fit the resource regime in the in the 
community forestry. The FCTF was outlined the REDD+ payment according to the number of 
pilot projects. The total fund assigned for the FCTF was US$376,373.0, which was 
distributed. The sum of US$ 95,000.0 was given each year to the project areas as a “seed 
grant” or “carbon payment” since 2010 to 2013 (ICIMOD, 2012). When we asked to the 
project staffs about the accurate amount of seed grants and administration cost, they did not 
disclosed but they reported that the remained money was kept by Project Management Unit 
(PMU). The PMU has not yet clarified why and how much money was kept during the 
project.  
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The project was completed when the research was carried out. Their existence beyond the 
pilot project was questionable in terms of financed distribution, duties and responsibilities.  
The project established the FCTF to pilot the REDD+ payment mechanism for community 
forestry and prepared Operational guidelines and specified the structure and system of 
REDD+ payment. The structure of the FCTF crafted different level of governance by a multi-
stakeholder task force including project partners, REDD-Cell, HIMAWANTI and other non-
state stakeholders. The FCTF Operational Guidelines had provided the basis to CFUGs for 
the utilization of received funds, some key points are presented here. 
 Activities that reduced deforestation and forest degradation (including indirect 
activities that helps in reducing forest degradation such as alternative energy 
promotion) 
 Activities related to the conservation of forest carbon stocks and sustainable 
management of forests and biodiversity conservation (as used by UNFCCC) 
 Activities that enhance forest carbon stock and livelihood improvement 
 Forest carbon monitoring, awareness raising and capacity building activities on 
REDD+ and climate change 
 Auditing of the FCTF and the verification of data.  
Above-mentioned FCTF provisions indicate that CFUGs can earmark a small proportion of 
the fund to be used for biodiversity conservation. 
The FCTF Operational Guidelines are organized in hierarchical manner that determine the 
REDD+ payment and benefit sharing process, which is shown in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10. REDD+ MRV and payment systems under pilot project, Nepal  
 
Source: (Bushley and Khanal, 2012)  
As shown in figure, the FCTF structure consists of center level body called FCTF Advisory 
Committee, the committee comprised of representatives form the REDD Cell, the project 
partners and CSOs. The structure had strong representation from CSOs and project partners 
but the government is represented by only REDD-Cell and there were no representatives form 
private sector and academic and research institutions. The project had some logic behind 
representation of CSO in the Advisory Committee because REDD+ could not be implemented 
without meaningful participation of rights-holders like NEFIN and FECOFUN. The structure 
primarily included representation from stakeholders related to CF and other stakeholders who 
related to other forest management regimes including government-managed, protected area 
and collaborative forest management.  
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6.2.1.1.1. Payment system and good governance 
Governance is critical for the success of meaningful REDD+ interventions because it 
demands an appropriate mechanism to fulfill the REDD+ objectives while minimizing the 
risk of mismanagement. In this regard, REDD+ seems more aware about avoiding leakage 
and improving transparency. So, REDD+ established different institutions from national to 
local level to create transparent REDD+ payment mechanism. The money from FCTF was 
paid to Watershed REDD Networks (WRN) and then WRN distributed the money to 
individual CFUGs. 
At the community level, benefit distribution system was designed based on number of guiding 
principles, which deemed crucial to the delivery of pro-poor REDD+. The payment criteria 
were based on various socio-economic status of local people such as climate change 
awareness, capacity building, livelihood improvement, in addition to forest management 
activities but the pilot project did not generate any Certified Emission Reduction (CERs) 
credits. These adopted guidelines were meant to safeguard the interests and rights of some 
marginalized groups for benefit distribution. The payment distribution (Table 16) shows that 
40% of the payment to a participating community was based on their achievements in terms 
of carbon stock and enhancement. The payment of 60% weight was given to social safeguard. 
However, a little amount of US$ 100 was provided to all CFUGs each year and the remaining 
amount was calculated after this payment. The presented criteria (Table 16) assumed to 
include the marginalized group and exclude elite capture.  
Table 16. Seed grant payment criteria in the REDD+ pilot project in Nepal  
Payments Criteria Weight (%) Total weight (%) 
Based on Performance 
 
Carbon stock 24  
40 Carbon increment 16 
 
Based on Socio-economic 
conditions 
Indigenous HHs 10  
 
60 
Dalits HHs 15 
Women  15 
Poor HHs 20 
Source: (ICIMOD et al., 2011) 
A well-designed and targeted local REDD+ payment distribution system is vital for the 
success of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation. Practically, a weakly 
designed benefit distribution system may undermine the incentives for actors and increase the 
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risk of failure to act in accordance with a wish or designed objectives. During the field visit, 
some questions were asked to the executive members of CFUG1, CFUG2 and CFUG3. We 
asked them how local people were categorized to facilitate the REDD+ benefits? All the 
executive members of the CFUGs said that the process was occurred according to assets or 
wealth they have and categorized the size of the household, land and number of income 
activities. They had been giving more priority to poor, large family size and illiterate people. 
Primarily they focused to Dalits, Janajati and women (widow). The stringent administration 
of carbon data and REDD+ payment and the multi-layer monitoring system proved that 
REDD+ governance is creating change in the CF governance. The chairperson of CFUGs said 
that they have increased the frequency of meeting after implementing the REDD+ pilot 
project at community level. Table 17 is presented to clarify the REDD+ payment distribution. 
Table 17. Total payment in three years and breakdown according to different criteria 
Payment according to different criteria (US$) 
Watershed No.
CF 
Total 
(US$) 
Carbon 
Stock 
(ton) 
Carbon 
Increment 
 IP 
HHs 
Dalits Women Poor Basic  
Kayarkhola 16 72,255 16,573 11,049 6,905 10,359 10,359 13,811 3,200 
Charnawati 58 132,879 28,939 19,293 12,058 18,086 18,086 24,116 12,300 
Ludikhola  31 79,866 17,679 11,787 7,366 11,050 11,050 14,733 6,200 
Total 105 285,000 63,192 42,128 26,330 39,495 39,495 52,660 21,700 
Source: (Shrestha et al., 2014) 
These payments were distributed to each pilot community to obtain its objectives. These 
carbon fund expenditures were disbursed through CFUGs level to the households in the form 
of efficient cooking technologies and improved community infrastructures. Capacity building 
training were based on technical forest inventory techniques and included forest sampling, 
GPS survey and other technical stuff to measure carbon sink to local people. Awareness 
program was about REDD+ and forest management, which was conducted through local level 
workshop, interaction, pamphlets, FM radio program and seminars. Empowerment and 
income generating activities were provided to marginalized group such as Dalits, Janajati, and 
women. In the HH level many trainings were provided such as candle making training, 
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mushroom farming, sewing trainings, improved stove making trainings, leaf plates making 
and fixed share in carbon payments.   
Above-mentioned institutional development, actors and activities define that REDD+ is 
mainly trying to improve transparency, equity, efficiency, effectiveness and social legitimacy 
through providing different kinds of mechanisms. However, our inquiry is at what level such 
mechanism was facilitated at local level to reduce deforestation and livelihood improvement. 
So next section will be REDD+ evaluation, where we have mainly covered actors, activities 
and outcome through perceiving local people knowledge and opinions.  
6.2.2. REDD+ policy 
In evaluating the outcomes of the project, it is important to present to what extent users 
understood the rules and mechanisms and further to what extent the users are aware about the 
project existence. Here, the project will be evaluated on the fundamental knowledge of the 
REDD+ project and the principles, which are perceived by local people to establish good 
governance.  
During the REDD+ project implementation, the CFUGs were trained and supported to carry 
out annual forest measurements to reduce the MRV cost. Many scholars and researchers said 
that CFUGs have been able to measure carbon stock using standard forest inventory methods 
and mapping techniques. They could carry out diameter measurements, boundary delineation 
and to carry out species identification more effectively than outsiders. In this regard, people 
assumed to enhance transparency and REDD+ responsibilities. The REDD+ pilot project was 
people oriented; the assumption is that if people change their behavior regarding forest use, 
forest conservation is possible.  
6.2.2.1. Users´ general forest related awareness   
First, a general assessment of the relationship between forest users and livelihood 
improvement is presented. Then the user´s awareness of forest rules and regulations will be 
described. Finally, look at how users perceive the rules regarding forest conservation; 
inclusiveness of marginalized group in REDD+ pilot project and information sharing 
mechanism.   
6.2.2.1.1. Users´ perception about the REDD+ pilot project 
When asked whether the respondents belonged to any CFUG, 99% said that they did; in fact, 
all respondents by default do belong to a CFUG. Only one respondent said that he was not 
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because he was separated from his father 6 months before and he was planning to be a 
member in CFUG soon. The positive response from respondents shows that all the 
respondents are aware about this. When asked about the property right, there were some 
confusion but after explaining the definitions, 93% believed that common property rights 
defined the access to forest resources with certain restrictions.  
When asked for their perception on the relationship with REDD+ pilot project, 72 % (N=109) 
of respondents say that it was a good project, 5% say bad and 23% respondents did not have 
any information about this project so they were unable to answer. When asked to the 
respondents why they had bad impression about the project, we found quite reliable answers. 
They said that they were excluded from REDD+ benefits and access to forest products. One 
of the respondents from CFUG2 said, “ …so many times I met to CFUGC and requested to 
provide livelihood benefit. For this, I had presented documents but they did not provide both 
REDD+ benefits and access to forest resources. Even they had not organized any open group 
discussion for this process. Later, we knew this information from the neighbors”. 
It is puzzling why some respondents say that they were unable to answer the question. Here 
we found some kind of skepticism; we assume that local people know about the 
implementation of REDD+ in their local area, but they were pretending like they do not know 
anything about it. If we look at this from the community perspective, social norms teach us to 
protect ourselves in complicated issues.  “Unable to answer” is a product of social norms and 
convention. For instance, if you cannot say anything good to anyone, then never say anything.  
To identify the drivers of deforestation and degradation, what roles implementing 
organization in the local level played is important. So we questioned villagers as “how do you 
rate your knowledge about the REDD+ pilot project”? We found that 43% of the total 
respondents did not get any information about REDD+, a project implemented within their 
local area. 57% of the total respondents got information and were able to define what REDD+ 
means and what was the purpose of project. The skepticism also reflected to some extent 
when various awareness and capability programs were provided but we found half of the 
respondents were unknown. 
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 Figure 11. Respondent´s opinion about REDD+ pilot project in Ludikhola watershed, 
Nepal 2015 
  
N=109 
It is crucial to emphasize that according to plan, meetings and consultations at village level 
was not conducted enough to provide information. Only 57% of total respondents were 
known about REDD+, while 43% were not.   
6.2.2.1.2. Users´ observations of rules for reducing deforestation 
This section describes to what extent users are content with the existing forest rules and 
regulations in terms of reducing deforestation and forest degradation. In theory, we found 
many of the rules significant but here we see how do local forest users rate the effectiveness 
of the rules in reducing deforestation in their area, the pie-chart below illustrates the results 
from this inquiry.  
43% 
57% 
Unknown Known
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Figure 12. How respondents feel towards the effectiveness of the rules to reduce 
deforestation in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
N= 109 
The pie chart indicates that 58% of the total respondents believed in reduction of deforestation 
by community forest rules. But they have been informed and updated on current forest 
regulations and a practice is also important. Therefore, an analysis was conducted to how 
updated users were on the existing rules and regulations of their particular CFUG.  
6.2.2.1.3. Users´ awareness of community forest rules 
When questioned about their knowledge on the REDD+ activities, only 57% (N=109) of 
respondent were aware about activities that govern the use and management of the 
community forests but 43% were unaware.  
The most prominent reasons given by the unaware were that they were not included in 
policymaking process and equitable distribution of rights and benefits during REDD+ 
introduction and implementation process. There were too strong limitations on the use of 
forest products and their interests were not fully taken into account when developing policy. 
Reasons for dissatisfaction were inequitable benefit sharing, neglect cultural management, 
lack of transparency, and illegal use of forest resources, forest fire, and lack of conflict 
resolution mechanisms. Illegal and inequitable use of forest resources is seen as 
misinformation. For instance some users use forest excessively while, at the same time, other 
users were denied access. One of the respondents from CFUG1 said, “…Sometimes CFUGC 
11% 
21% 
10% 
58% 
No impact
Low impact
Somewhat
impact
High impact
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select the forest resource and do harvest according to their interest. First they distribute the 
resources among CFUG EC members and later call to the users. We have experienced these 
issues so many times”.  Against it must be noted that these complaints were found in CFUG1 
and CFUG2. People perceptions are shown in Table 18. 
Table 18. People´s perceptions about the REDD+ pilot project in Ludikhola watershed, 
Nepal 2015 
REDD+ governance Strongly 
Agree  
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Unable to 
answer 
Actively involved to reduce 
D&D (%) 
20 70 4 2.5 3.5 
Involving Actors were 
knowledgeable (%) 
15 55 15 6 9 
Providing equitable REDD+ 
benefits (%) 
9 57 24 7 3 
Distribution of rights and rules 
was fair (%) 
7 54 25 7 7 
Respect culture and Identities 
(%) 
1 40 25 12 22 
Involved marginalized group in 
decision making process (%) 
- 50 37 4 9 
Very low amount were 
provided in livelihood 
improvement  
16 40 26 7 11 
Sample mean (%) 10 52 22 7 9 
N=109 
Of those who wished to elaborate further regarding this question, reasons for their satisfaction 
with REDD+ governance are among the following. Activities of reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation are done at a communal level, so it is positive that there was financial 
support from REDD+ pilot project for the welfare of the forest as well as users. 90% of the 
respondents knew that the REDD+ pilot was actively involved in reducing deforestation and 
there was frequently held tree planting and fire line events by the CFUGs. Strong sanctions 
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reduced of cutting of raw trees and other raw forest resources. The rules function to reduce 
deforestation.  
The overarching responses with contentment regarding the involving of actors are shown to 
be positive. The reasons might be increased carbon and forest density, which is shown in 
ICIMOD (2012) progress report and more optimistic view.  
Of those who do not agree, the most prominent reasons given were that their cultural 
management was not taken into account, they believed that there was not involvement of 
marginalized group in decision-making process, very low amount of money or benefits were 
distributed on the livelihood improvement. Some of the reasons for disagreement are; lack of 
traditional (cultural) knowledge, strong rules and regulation, lack of transparency, asymmetry 
power, gender and caste differences. About 6% respondent reported that transparency has not 
been seen in terms of benefits. For instance, some CFUGs provided pigs, goats and even 
sewing machines, but which were overpriced compared to the normal existing price.  
Regardless of what changes may have been made during the REDD+ introduction and 
implementation it is here apparent that not everyone can be right. The majorities of 
respondents are satisfied with the rules and believe that it reduces deforestation. Still it has 
not given more focus on livelihood improvement and inclusion of marginalized group in 
decision-making process. The fact is that people´s confusion about rules and regulations 
indicate that the process of information sharing/communication is functionally ineffective.  
6.2.3. REDD+ evaluation 
The goals of the REDD+ pilot project are to reduce forest related climate emissions, avoid 
leakage, include of marginalized group through providing financial initiatives and create 
social legitimacy. In this study, climate effectiveness refers mainly to two points: ability to 
target the key drivers of deforestation and degradation and capacity to reduce leakage. 
Similarly, cost efficiency explains the low cost of REDD+ actions, setting distribution of 
environmental resources and MRV. Equity deals with equitable benefit sharing of REDD+ 
financial flows and channeling resources. Social legitimacy refers to local people participation 
in decision-making process and benefit distribution mechanisms. Here, co-benefits refer to 
poverty reduction, alternative livelihoods, biodiversity, adaptation and protection and 
improvement of rights. These 3E+ criteria will be used to assess the REDD+ pilot project in 
Ludikhola watershed.  
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First, the REDD+ action should be appropriate to address the drivers of deforestation and 
degradation in local level technically and politically. For effective REDD+ actions, there 
should be strong involvement and support from local communities (forest users). We were 
trying to cover all types of villagers such as Dalits, Janajati, and Brahmin/Chhetris in 
Ludikhola watershed. 
There will of course be trade-offs between these different criteria and we cannot expect 
quintuple win-win situation and hard decisions may have to made at some points. But here I 
did not attempt to make such trade-offs; outcomes will merely be presented in a clear way, 
what was found in the results. Based on the pilot project activities, these sections will be 
based on REDD+ outcomes. Though overall findings from the project would be an important 
input for future project and the development of national REDD+ strategies. A focus of this 
section is the current strategy to examine 3Es at the local level.  
6.2.3.1.Ecological or Environmental effective 
Although REDD+ is widely assented through its multiple objectives, we should not lose sight 
of its primary goal, which is to mitigate climate change. Ecological effective was in the 
context of REDD+ pilot project would be achieved when it results in high performance in 
carbon sequestration through reducing deforestation and forest degradation. Effectiveness 
concerns how well the policy and processes are acknowledged to meet its overall goals. It 
concerns the capacity to raise funds, the ability to avoid leakage and to ensure additionally 
and permanence (Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). This process defined by capacity to coordinate 
across different sectors and reducing risk of certain issues such as corruption, fraud 
monitoring and reporting. 
From the reports published by the pilot project data center, carbon stocks from year 2010 to 
2012 shows that all CF´s carbon stock has been increasing every year. Table 19 indicates that 
there was less harvest compared to the growth of the forest in area.  
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Table 19. Carbon changes and stock in the CFUGs in Ludikhola watershed 
CFUGs Total CF 
area (ha.) 
Total Carbon stock (tC) in CF Difference in total 
carbon (tC) in 2011-
2012 2010 2011 2012 
CFUG1 270.70 55919.44 57337.03 58138.68 801.64 
CFUG2 83.57 1743.18 17783.11 18028.80 245.70 
CFUG3 63.96 12452.98 12766.21 12972.20 205.98 
Source: (ANSAB; et al., 2012) 
Local peoples´ perceptions regarding forest conservation were recorded in order to understand 
reduced deforestation. While 94% of the total respondents believed that forest density and 
area had increased, the remaining 6% respondents mentioned that the forest resources and 
area were reduced. Of those who wished to elaborate further regarding this question, the 
reasons for their discontentment gave the reasons of; increased forest fire, illegal use of forest 
resources and faulty monitoring and evaluation.  
Similarly, 83% of all respondents answered that there were not land clearing activities during 
the project implementation period. The remaining 17% of the respondents believed that land-
clearing activities had continued. The most prominent reasons given were that people have 
been migrating in their area and increasing land clearing activities for their settlements. 
Increasing price of the land is attracting business people and landowners to accumulate the 
land. However, during the project implementation period, there were conservation measures 
to control illegal forest use. Conservation activities are summarized in Table 20.  
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Table 20. Forest conservation activities in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
Conservation activities CFUG1 CFUG2 CFUG3 
Clear boundaries Yes Yes Yes 
Forest guard No No No 
Rotational forest guard by users Yes  Yes Yes 
Fire lines in the CF Yes Yes Yes 
Grazing and browsing allowed No Yes No 
Annual forest clearing Yes Yes  Yes  
Provision of fines Yes Yes Yes 
Fence bordering CF area No No No 
Certain amount of money should pay access the 
forest product 
Yes Yes Yes  
Plantation in 5 years Yes No No 
Incidents of forest fire in REDD+ implementation Yes Yes Yes 
Any sawmills in the CF area Yes No No 
Roads constructed recently through CF area Yes No No 
Recently any illegal activates in CF area  Yes No Yes  
 
Contradictions were observed between provision and practice regarding forest management. 
According to the forest operational plan, local forest users are allowed to harvest NTFP 
without paying any fees or charges. CFUGs were found to be following more forest 
conservation oriented forest management strategies. The conservation oriented forest 
management was initiated to increment of carbon and other forest products. Poor HHs has 
been excluded from access to forest resource and carbon benefits simultaneously. They thus 
have either carbon benefits or forest products.  
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To benefit from environmental projects, in the long run, CF´s need to plant bare lands to 
compensate for forest products. CFUGs need to be empowered in terms of forest plantation 
and utilization. Most importantly, illegal forest use and inequitable resource distribution must 
be stopped.  
6.2.3.2.Cost efficiency  
Cost efficiency refers to the cost per ton of carbon saved through reducing the transaction 
costs. REDD+ carbon benefits consider that transaction, implementation and some 
opportunity costs should be compensated, but not profits. The carbon payments in REDD+ 
come along with a reduced used of forest products (fuel wood, fodder, timber, charcoal) and 
perceived opportunity costs. A more direct linkage to beneficiaries can create more efficient 
alternative sources of forest products since it could reduce transaction costs and transfer more 
benefits to actors on the ground but the approach required to address leakage concerns. In the 
context of Nepal, the REDD+ benefit sharing mechanism require more administration and 
higher overhead costs in terms of measurement of carbon, verification of data, provision for 
dealing with grievances and will be more expensive to run.  
Cost efficiency depends on actors´ involvement in REDD+. The actors should develop better 
understanding of the potential benefits and costs associated with REDD+ implementation and 
need to be aware of all the relevant elements such as addressing drivers of D&D, emission 
reduction and expected additionality, good governance and institutional arrangements, 
reference levels, MRV, transaction costs, financial arrangements and international carbon 
markets. All the relevant elements require scientific analysis and communication among 
international actors, which seems slow and poor in context of Nepal.  
The REDD+ process has not yet prescribed the authority, rights and duties regarding the 
REDD+ mechanisms and carbon rights. Primarily, secured carbon tenure is required to be a 
successful project in CF. Nepal has been using two decades old forest acts and regulations 
where there has not any provision for sequestrated carbon as a forest product. Carbon 
sequestration is a relatively new concept, which is important to formulate in the forest act and 
clearly define the ownership of the carbon stored in the CF. There low chance to get carbon 
rights for CFUGs. If the government holds the ownership, there will be no guarantee that 
there will be livelihood improvement and active participation of local people.  
Field observation showed that local people were not aware about carbon rights, very few of 
them known about this, which make difficult in payment criteria. The REDD+ payment 
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mechanism gave a 40% weight to carbon increment, as if the carbon tenure is secured in the 
regulatory mechanism. According to cost efficiency metrics, the transaction cost seems higher 
and a benefit does not go directly to the beneficiary because of the insecure carbon rights. The 
funds were channeled through NGOs or other organizations, there would be a higher 
transaction costs and administration cost. On the other hand, if the funds are channeled 
through CFUGs, there might be possibilities of elite capture and corruption.   To have cost-
efficient solution, one first have to build a benefit sharing mechanism, which can stop 
politicians, elite captures and involved marginalization.  
6.2.3.2.1. Community based MRV mechanism 
A few local people were trained and involved in the carbon measurement, which was 
technically and financially supported by the pilot project. Community based monitoring and 
evaluation are seen as cost effective and reliable in the long run but is this possible to 
continue in the actual REDD+ process and who will bear MRV associated cost will be the 
monitoring and evaluation data trustworthiness. To cover the leakage, local people can create 
“power over” relationship with local people.  
Local people were only trained to carry out limited measurements, they need an external 
support for the carbon measurement, forest inventory and reporting the measurement. Project 
report claimed that CFUG could carry out carbon measurement only with expertise.   
6.2.3.3. Equity 
Equity can mean different things. The notion of what is “fair” is very subjective. However, it 
defines which different groups of people get to participate in the decision-making about the 
program or project as well as to the outcome of project. “Distributional equity” especially 
measure who benefits from the project when it was carried out. In the case of marginalized 
group, it implies equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities. In the case of carbon 
payment, how REDD+ creates regional equity if one region performs well while another does 
not, the carbon finance available to the first will be covered by the losses in the second.  
Metrics for Equity: clear and transparent choice as regards the underlying principles, robust 
ways of dealing with variations in regional performance, participation in decision making 
processes and access to natural resources.  
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Table 21. Socio-economic indicators and benefited local people from REDD+ pilot 
project in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
Socio-economic 
indicators 
CFUGs Benefited people (No.) 
Ethnic 
group 
Dalits Brahmin/
Chhetris 
Total 
Employment in the pilot 
project activities 
CFUG1 1 0 6 7 
CFUG2 1 0 2 3 
CFUG3 3 0 0 3 
Self Employment created 
by the pilot project 
CFUG1 2 1 3 6 
CFUG2 2 1 1 4 
CFUG3 2 1 0 3 
Improved stoves due to 
pilot project 
 
CFUG1 18 12 43 73 
CFUG2 10 18 38 66 
CFUG3 27 7 1 35 
Support to bio-gas plant 
construction  
 
CFUG1 2 4 10 16 
CFUG2 1 3 10 14 
CFUG3 4 2 2 8 
Support to livelihood 
improvement  
 
CFUG1 6 7 6 19 
CFUG2 3 3 3 9 
CFUG3 6 2 0 8 
Total  88 61 125 274 
 
As we see for Table 21, the respondents were asked in the HH survey about whether they had 
received any benefits through the REDD+ project. We found that they were supported 
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through different activities. The individuals received 60 USD for biogas plantation and 30-50 
USD for livelihood improvement per household. The livelihood improvement fund is like a 
micro finance project. For instance, respondents use the money for certain period of time and 
have to pay back to CFUGC. Since the REDD+ implementation, 36 respondents were 
benefited in the three CFUGs. The total benefited HHs shows that more than 50% HHs were 
from other groups or higher castes.  
The table indicates that the selection of stakeholders for various benefit purposes was not 
inclusive and unanimous. When comes to the selection of participants for forest related 
activities, workshop and benefit distribution, 75% of the total respondents said that CFUGC 
decided. There is a higher chance to get benefit to the committee members and to their close 
ones and they make the rules for themselves. Where as 25% of the total respondents believed 
that the selection of participants occurred through group discussion and general meetings. As 
Table 21 shows more benefits were distributed to Brahmin/Chhetris. However, as discussed 
earlier, there was not open discussion about REDD+ purposes and fund distribution therefore 
many lower caste people were unable to benefit from project. There was one interesting 
inquiry; why others group took less benefit in livelihood improvement and in other activities 
took more. There might be one reason, the livelihood improvement benefit should return after 
certain time period with some interest rate or grants depends on agreement. Except livelihood 
benefits, other benefits were grants. In this process, CFUGC took advantages of their job 
(power) and pushed the poor people into more complicated situations through implementing 
strong rules and regulation access to forest products. Before concluding this issue, however, it 
is important to look a little bit more and analyze what was happened during REDD+ 
implementation and introduction.  
6.2.3.1.1. Income generating activities and benefit distribution 
Concerning the establishment of the Income Generating Activities (IGA) in CF, main purpose 
was achieving the REDD+ pilot project objectives of improving the local people‟s livelihood. 
However, REDD+ is not primarily a poverty reduction program. But to reduce the forest 
dependency of the local people, livelihood improvements and alternative sources of fuel wood 
must be met first. Therefore, the REDD+ funds were used to give poor households some 
additional opportunities for income generation. The establishment of IGA was to provide the 
potential benefits that the local people were promised to get by implementing the REDD+ 
pilot project. These activities include the use of improved stoves, improved agricultural 
practices, animal husbandry (goat rearing, pig-farming, and poultry) and vocational skills 
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(tailoring). These activities were carried out through well being ranking to identify poor and 
marginalized forest user groups.  
Table 22. IGA information and benefits in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
IGA information REDD+ Benefits 
Yes 26% 17% 
No 40% 83% 
Little know 34%  
Total 100% 100% 
N=109 
Table 22 shows that 26% of the total respondents were informed about IGA, where 17% were 
benefited from it. While, 40% of the total respondents were not informed, while 34% had 
heard about these activities. In the community, 83% of the total respondents did not get any 
benefit from the REDD+ pilot project. In the study area, there were, however, no respondents 
who got the information clearly about the REDD+. These responses indicate that there is a 
general negative inclination towards the REDD+ information. One respondent said that 
“CFUG EC don´t want to share any information with lower caste people. They never 
informed us about any group meetings and discussion. Sometimes they send their wife to 
participate in the seminars in our quota. They are using our benefits in the name of 
marginalized people”. 
During the field visit, the respondents mentioned that the watershed networks used the 
REDD+ payment as micro-finance. In these activities, two kind of contradictions occurred; 
villagers were involved in IGA but a majority did not seem to have benefited from those 
activities and the other was that the benefited people have to return the payment at low 
interest rates. Here, various reasons were given as why they haven‟t yet benefited and why 
people have to return their REDD+ benefits? It is important to note, in this context how the 
local people will improve their livelihood through IGA when the fund did not reach the 
targeted groups such as poor, women, Dalits and ethnic group? What will be the result if their 
livestock husbandry is not a success?  
In addition, why villagers did not get enough information about REDD+ could be referred to 
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as skepticism. Either there should be power exercised or facilitated corruption activities. 
Practically WRN committee should do this work so we were trying to analyze how social 
legitimacy was established.  
6.2.3.4. Social legitimacy:  
Social legitimacy means that the benefit-sharing scheme is perceived as being fair. According 
to the REDD+ principles, a history of deforestation in the past may be able to earn large 
benefits by controlling their practices, while those who have been conserving forest have no 
opportunity if they have low carbon store capacity. This can be seen as unfair (not legitimacy) 
in the case of Nepal from a geographical point of view. On the other hand, Nepal has 
heterogeneous cultural identities and a patriarchal system, where women and Dalits have less 
power in public resources. It is difficult to create social legitimacy because elites or higher 
caste people dominate convention, norms and rules. Women, poor and Dalits have been 
excluded over many centuries, sometimes they can not get right in their own property so how 
can REDD+ create social legitimacy in such conditions is questionable?  
Metrics for social legitimacy: participation, community define rules, over-all quality of social 
order, transparency, access, accountability, information sharing aspects are crucial factor for 
introduction and implementation of REDD+ by legitimate actors.  
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Table 23. Users evaluation the overall REDD+ outcomes in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 
2015 
Response Strongly 
Agree 
(% 
Agree 
(%) 
Disagree 
(%) 
Strongly 
disagree 
(%) 
Unable to 
answer (%) 
Increased forest area and 
density  
35 59 4 2 0 
Improved local people´s 
livelihoods 
13 58 22 4.5 2.5 
Avoid land clearing 8 74 10 3 5 
Improved transparency 3 43 40 4 10 
Local people are well-
known to monitor carbon, 
species and forest area 
16.5 64 13 2.5 4 
Local people are equally 
involved in decision 
making process 
9 62 24.5 4.5 0 
Providing equitable 
REDD+ benefits 
9 55 25 7.5 3.5 
Established good forest 
governance through 
avoiding patron-client 
networks 
15.5 59 9 0 16.5 
Sample mean (%) 14 59 18.5 3.5 5 
N=109 
Above table shows that overall 73% of the total respondents were satisfied with REDD+ 
activities while 22% were not. This means that local people´s expectations were high from 
REDD+ pilot project activities. Local people believe that in the future there will some 
changes in REDD+ activities, which will guarantee their livelihood improvement, carbon 
rights and equitable benefit sharing mechanism. Previous REDD+ experience shows that local 
people´s belief was completely neglected; it could not match their expectations. Not all the 
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Dalits, ethnic group and poor were involved in social legitimacy process and carbon payment, 
which emerged a lot of grievance that why they did not involved in the REDD+ process when 
the projects was targeted to them. On this issue, CFUGC members defended this by saying 
that they had a limited fund and they distributed those fund who needed the most. In this 
process, we had provided fund according to guidelines such as Dalits, ethnic group, women 
and poor. In some cases, we had distributed fund to higher caste people who was categorized 
as poor.  
In the village general assembly, villagers should agree to the formation of REDD+ to revenue 
sharing, committee, formation of income generating activities groups and rules and 
regulations. During the introduction and implementation of the REDD+ pilot project, they did 
not properly follow their guidelines what it requires. The majority of the peoples‟ 
participation can be seen as legitimate decision to accept the REDD+ but this was not done.    
6.2.3.5. Pro-poor potential 
In the design of REDD+ mechanisms, more concern has been given to the pro-poor for 
benefit sharing. In the case of Nepal, poor people fear to demand monetary values without 
formal rights over resources and they would be kicked out for accessing forest resources.  
Therefore, REDD+ developed for pro-poor REDD+ benefit sharing schemes and indicated 
that the poor are those who have become landless and have no rights to the CF. In the case of 
Nepal, poor people collect only NTFP but average incomes people have a greater tendency to 
deforest.  
Metrics for Pro-poor schemes: local non-carbon outcomes, which benefit to pro-poor. Allow 
employment of non rights-holders, which changes in poverty gaps, providing social services 
such as school, health and capacity building activities.  
Table 24. Villagers´ livelihood after implementing the REDD+ pilot project in Ludikhola 
watershed, Nepal 2015 
Livelihood CFUG1 % CFUG2 % CFUG3 % 
Good 54 73 75 
Worse 46 27 25 
N=109 
How forest users especially pro-poor feel towards REDD+ and to what level REDD+ 
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improved livelihood is also an important inquiry, respondents were asked to rank how they 
felt their livelihood improvement after REDD+ implementation in terms of pro-poor benefit 
schemes. The respondents from CFUG1, 46% found the livelihood improvement was worse, 
while 54% found it was good. CFUG2 and CFUG3 had quite maintained their status where 
we found 73% and 75% felt good respectively in terms of livelihood improvement.  
Nepal has been implementing CF since 1990s, and now has about 17,000 CFUGs under such 
regime. Some of the CF project has been recognized to empowering local communities and 
establishing “good governance”. However, at the same time a major reason for why many CF 
project have not reached its potential of benefits for local people is due to a lack of proper 
accountability and transparency, asymmetric power relation and lack of taking into 
consideration the marginalized group in the CF. How these issues are tackled by REDD+ pilot 
project when establishing project in 105 communities in Nepal, seriously affects the success 
of the pilot project both in terms of forest conservation and ensuring equitable benefits to 
marginalized groups.  
6.3. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING AND RUNNING THE PILOT 
PROJECT 
There is no doubt that there were many challenges when implementing and introducing the 
REDD+ pilot project in CF. First, the nature of a pilot project itself is new approach, which 
have little experience and knowledge to ensure the success of the project. In addition, REDD+ 
have its own challenges, besides that it merged in the existing CF regime that had already 
many issues included.   
This section is based on information that has been available freely, and largely grounded in 
our findings from the field. As we indicated in the previous section, there were some 
challenges, which might undermine the success of the project. Current challenges observed 
through this study are lack of participation of local users in decision making process, social 
exclusion of users especially marginalized group in CFUG and EC, inequity in benefit 
sharing, improper allocation of REDD+ fund, lack of transparency, leadership´s monopoly, 
less acceptable personal behaviors of CFUGC, strong monopoly in collection of levy, poorly 
accounted user´s voice, caste and gender discrimination and elite capture. These challenge are 
observed particularly at two levels: the CFUG´s level and the policy level. In terms of 
REDD+, a number of challenges are identified such as ability to carry out MRV, avoid 
leakages, financial mechanism and benefit sharing as well as the transparency and rights of 
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local community. If we disregard these issues, is may pose substantial risks for REDD+. This 
section discuss some of these aspects and show how these would determine the prospect of a 
successful implementation of REDD+ in Nepal in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, social 
legitimacy and equity.  
6.3.1.  Participation 
The first challenge has found that of participation, which come in different forms and settings. 
CF policy is not robust since it has no legal standing or tenure security, which has been 
impacting poor people in relation to forest protection and utilization. Participation has been a 
major topic in Nepal´s forestry sector since its establishment. Many scholars argued that CF 
has positive effects on communities and on forest governance. However, the CF policy and 
the associated policy process have not fully embraced the value of participation and instead 
contributed to continuing exclusion in CF management process and outcomes. Many scholars 
argues and our finding also shows that social status matters in forest management have been 
institutionalized in instrumental forms such as poor and Dalits were sidelined in CF policy 
structures and policymaking process (Baginski and Blaikie, 2007).  
The information we have gathered shows that the REDD+ pilot projects regulated a variety of 
participation tools and benefit streams at local level. Through CF, traditional forest 
management and informal institutions have been enforced under which village chiefs or 
community elites are authorized. This was clearly seen in the REDD+ pilot project, where the 
Watershed REDD Network  (WRN) committee did not consult with poorer and marginal 
groups, they made contact only with the CFUGC. Such practices enhance the elite group´s 
control over forest management decisions, thereby making the access to forest products 
disproportionately. It excludes the marginalized group from the decision-making process. 
From the information we have gathered, we found that is varying according to livelihood 
status and social status in regards to participation.  
REDD+ seem very aware of the Nepalese caste system. That is why they attempted to 
consider all user groups‟ viewpoints. However, they did not realize that powerful actors and 
their lifestyle have been seen to bring about change (Vedeld, 2002). In CF, participation is 
seen as “means” like in an instrumental and goal oriented process, whereas they do not 
conform to what Vedeld have pointed out as key actors in implement a particular resource 
regime and bring about local change for their individual gain. Participation has seen as a false 
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assumption of CF management system, which can pose a great challenge to the success of the 
project. A good example of this within the study area was the exclusion of Dalits both from 
the villagers and CFUG executive committee. One of the Dalits respondent from CFUG1 said 
“..So many times I went to the temple near by village but higher caste people never let me go 
into the temple. We prepared the costume for God, built a temple, later we are not allowed to 
enter the temple”.  
There are persistent barriers to poor and illiterate people standing for positions for executive 
committees because the prevailing view in community is that only educated, wealthy, and 
confident people should be selected in responsible positions since they are more competent to 
talk with outsiders. The existing unequal social and political structure that keeps the poor 
people powerless and disempowered remains a major challenge. REDD+ pilot project focused 
such issues in this area, however the majority of CFUGs and DOF staffs do not seem 
responsive to their needs and priorities. It is fair to note that without decision making power 
and information, poor and marginalized people exclusion will be continued. Participation 
should be used as a “right” and power should be given to make appropriate policies to 
themselves.  
However, participation is crucial not only in village level but also in district level. According 
to Vedeld (2002), as an aim for participation, one may talk of a “broad unending, inclusive, 
reflective and open dialog” between authorities and civil society. By this, it can suggest a 
project approach where politics is more than a strategy to achieve the outcomes. We found 
that REDD+ pilot project included local authorities from the start, which was mainly done 
through FECOFUN but we did not find impressive information sharing mechanisms. The 
REDD+ project should be able to include existing institutions. Participation of district staff is 
needed to tackle the political elements of forest extraction. District staffs are often included in 
the corruption networks and might work against the establishment of strict forest management 
systems and can also drag out the legalization process of CFUG by law.  
Above-mentioned issues can be defined as the “relationship” concept in the Resource Regime 
Framework. At the district level, there are many political actors. Their interests, preferences, 
actions and interactions directly have an impact on the institutions governing the policy 
process. In this case, DFO can directly hamper the local forest resources; in turn they can 
have direct effects on the resource regimes on the ground. It is also shown that these political 
actors often mange to by-pass forest patrols and check points taking heavy dose of bribery.  
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6.3.2. Governance and institutional capacity 
In the study area, deforestation involves an insecure tenure, poor governance, migration, 
technology and widespread conflicts around resource access and control. Our result shown 
that strong rules and regulation to some degree control to the local forest users access to forest 
product but misguided policy measures that would weaken the prospect of reducing D&D. In 
order to REDD+ work in communities, well functioning management system has to be put in 
place. But we can see that the over-use of forest resources and declining forest cover has not 
changed much. The initial activities of involved organization, such as rising awareness, 
participation and information about REDD+ have not been adequately done to establish 
REDD+ as a legitimate project. Introducing a new management system and establishing new 
institution in an area is not problematic, the problem is deliberation of fair information, such 
as what is the purpose of REDD, how much money is going to distribute, who will be 
benefited and what is the role of local forest users. Lack of information and misinformation 
regarding these questions create conflict between forest users and CFUGC.  
Pre-established CFUGs in the communities, which was overall seen as the good option by 
forest users, when asking them to evaluate the chance for possible external condition in 
relation to REDD+ resource regime. Some issues were still seen as being of particular 
concern, which can be seen below in Table 25 
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Table 25. Issues associated with REDD+ in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015.  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Unable to 
answer 
Community elite pose risk 
to forest governance 
10 34 33 5.5 17.5 
NGOs, INGOs and donor 
agency often make their 
own rules and regulation 
11 43 19 3 24 
Government´s economic 
policy impact the CF 
resource regime 
5.5 34 5.5 0 55 
Frequently changing law 
can create conflict 
8 35 1 0 56 
Political influence 16.5 49 16.5 9 9 
Sample mean 10 39 15 3.5 32.5 
N=109 
Concerning the relations between external condition and CF management, 32.5% of the 
respondents were unable to answers. That means there were not reliable interaction 
concerning forest related issues. Surprisingly there were no big differences in opinion 
between the issues, where for instance 34% of the total respondents thought there might be 
external conditions that influenced in resource regime. When asked whether they thought 
there would be elite capture 44% of them gave positive answers. From the very beginning we 
have mentioned that there is high influence of politician in CF, with 65.5% thinking there 
might be political influence in community forest management. In addition, lack of 
participation in the REDD+ process cleared that all village members had not equal chance of 
participating in decision-making system, with 54% of respondents thinking there might be 
REDD+ own rules and regulation to capture the carbon. In regards to the government‟s forest 
policy, most of respondents were unaware, about 55% answered that they don´t know any 
things about the established rules in CF.  
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Overall, people felt that most of the representatives of the users group were from elites people 
and local politicians and they have higher chances of mismanagement of forest resources. 
Communication was only the way to solve the problem of elite capture and patron-client 
network. A few respondents also mentioned that there were no watchdogs where people could 
register complains. In this regard, REDD+ can face many challenges such as elite capture, 
political influence, asymmetric power relation among users, and corruption, which seems 
quite difficult to avoid if issues of governance and institution capacity is weak. To improve 
governance and institutional capacity, first we have to avoid external influence in REDD+ 
through providing accountability and transparency. Knowledge about REDD+ should be 
incentivized and promoted to aware the people through providing equitable authority, rights 
and duties.  
Forest tenure is one of the issues in the REDD+ debate because the rights to obtain benefit 
and participate in the decision making process of REDD+ pilot project is often determined by 
tenure rights over forestland. Many scholars and researches argued that lack of clear tenure 
arrangement, roles and responsibilities in the REDD+ implementation is unable to provide 
equal benefit sharing and reducing deforestation and degradation. Secure title needs and 
access rights are viable for an effective REDD+ design, which would enable forest dependent 
communities to use forest conservation incentive payments to improve their livelihood. 
6.3.3. Leakages 
The issue of avoiding leakage is the most important to achieve the emission reduction. 
Therefore, carbon payment has been given there to reduce the emission in the area, which 
should be measured. Avoiding leakage is not simply reducing D&D in the piloted area, it also 
concern the same activities in a nearby forest.  
In terms of dealing with diverse of deforestation, primarily indicated to the local forest users 
and in order to try to minimize the leakage. The main focus was creating awareness, 
providing income generating activates, and facilitating alternative efficient technology to 
reduce fuelwood collection. In addition, some plots were indicated to monitor the carbon in 
accordance with the Voluntary Carbon System (VCS) guidelines and also a few villagers 
were involved in the monitoring. FCTF was focused on policy issues through advocacy and 
awareness rising. In their progress report published in 2012, education and training was 
provided to local people on forest conservation and environmental issues.  
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A lot of work to avoid leakages was concerned with activities in community forestry, where 
REDD+ pilot project was located. The main purpose of the activity was to educate the local 
people in dealing with illegal timber harvesting and charcoal production.  However, except 
the CFUG1, two other CFUGs have been able to access NTFPs without any restrictions. In 
terms of CFUG1, they open the forest two times in a month for local forest users and they are 
only allowed to collect NTFP. We also found that many of the HHs with higher income was 
heavily involved in forest product use.  
The presence of livestock grazing in the area might also have an effect on leakage. If pilot 
villages are unable to change forest user´s behavior regarding fuelwood collection, harvesting 
fodder and livestock grazing, there will not have any chance to avoid leakage. This is an 
important issue, which should be taken up nationally, in terms of putting a limit to livestock 
numbers per HH.  
Such challenges has seen in Ludikhola watershed between forest users and pastoralist might 
potentially posed risk for the project overall effectiveness and its outcomes. The introduction 
of REDD in the two decades old version of Forest Act has most likely the land use conflict 
become explicit, which could constraint the goal of reducing deforestation and forest 
degradation. For REDD to work in Nepal, mechanism must be in place to prevent this.  
In terms of recognizing other land uses a CFUG1 emphasized the need of including other 
types of land in REDD, including private forest and grasslands. The effort is needed to create 
a unified approach, which can include all types of land in terms of carbon storage and 
payment. This argument can be dismissed according to the simple definition of REDD as 
mitigating emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, which has only focused on 
dense forest. In Nepal, shrubs and bushes in fact covered a lot of land and much of the 
fuelwood and fodder were collected from there for their daily purposes. REDD+ in Nepal has 
completely neglected such land use issues, which potentially not reduce any emissions, if not 
recognized, after degraded these area, people might attempt into the forest again. This 
challenge we found was extremely important to reduce.  
In order to motivate the communities to participate and to mange CF sustainably the future 
carbon payment will work as an incentive. In terms of a performance based payment system, 
if the issue of leakage is not resolved, communities will get very low returns for their efforts.  
 117 
6.3.4. Opportunity costs  
The opportunity costs of forest production in Ludikhola watershed are high, particularly in the 
areas close to Gorkha town. Fuelwood and charcoal making and businesses are relatively easy 
and very profitable. The reduction of accessibility to LP (cooking) gas and long hours load-
sheading on electricity make fuelwood and charcoal even more demanding. Some people 
prefer to do other activities such as agriculture but there is very little fertile land available, 
which is also belongs to elite groups.  
However, it is a concern that in some pilot project areas, the incomes from forest products are 
much higher than the revenue from carbon. CFUG2 is an example of such areas, which is 
close Gorkha town. Somehow, fuelwood and charcoal production are reduced because of the 
fear of being caught and punished by forest officers.  
As we see, there are many challenges and issues that need to be taken into consideration in 
order to REDD+ pilot project to efficiently and effectively reach its goals. For the equity and 
social legitimacy, people should be coupled to the projects. On the basis of the information, 
we were able to create a picture of how REDD+ as a new resource regime was worked in the 
piloted area. By employing the Resource Regime Framework organized by Vatn (2005), the 
regime as we saw in Ludikhola watershed, Gorkha.  
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Figure 13. REDD+ as a resource regime in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
Here, some of the main challenges will be outlined specially on the basis of 3Es. This is 
presented in table 26.  
Table 26. Main challenges of REDD+ pilot project, on the basis of the 3Es.  
Efficiency:  
 High opportunity, transaction and administrative costs 
 Complexity of program to conduct inclusiveness in awareness rising, income 
generating activities, work shop and training 
 Can not believe to local community because of their asymmetric power, and 
lack of technical knowledge, local people need to depend on external expertise 
 Lack of hands-on accountability, transparency and land tenure measures 
 NGO driven- lack of coordination with local users 
 Limited alternative sources of fuelwood  
 “Big question” How carbon sequestration increased, if forest users had been 
accessing the forest resources?  
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Effectiveness: 
 Reduced emission only from piloted forest, other forestlands are oversight 
 Insufficient inclusion of marginalized groups and “outsider” view on village 
leakage strategy 
 Insufficient market consideration and political power networks 
 NGO driven- lack of broad based government involvement 
 Lack of knowledge about MRV report in local level 
  
Equity: 
 Lack of special consideration of marginalized group in benefit-sharing 
mechanism 
 Lack of measurement against elite capture, local politician and payment 
distribution criteria 
 Lack of consideration of socio-economic status of local people 
 Lack of consideration of cultural management 
Social legitimacy: 
 Lack of local people involvement in decision making process 
 Lack of open discussion regarding project´s payment criteria  
 Lack of information sharing mechanism specially about actors, activities and 
fund mobilization practices 
Co-benefits (pro-poor approach): 
 Biodiversity conservation  
 Poverty reduction 
 
In terms of effectiveness, we analyzed the overall ability to reduce emission only in the piloted 
forest, while other forest landscapes are avoided. In addition, what we found an insufficient 
consideration of marginalized group and local forest users who could play crucial role to 
avoid leakage but lack of their role undermine the effectiveness of the project. Insufficient 
market considerations and power structure within the CF might also challenge the 
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effectiveness of the project. Relatively low inclusion of government roles will not improve 
this situation, and we also question the projects ability, accountability and transparency.  
Concerning equity the main challenge is the lack of consideration of marginalized group in 
benefit-sharing mechanisms, we see mostly that higher caste (Brahmin/Chhetris) were 
benefited from it. This kind of unequal distribution of benefit system can create conflict and 
become more challenging to the project. Another challenge might have about cultural 
management, which was completely regardless through pilot project. Before create any 
problem, future project will attempt to include them as much as possible both in decision-
making, participation and ensuring that benefits also reach to them.  
In terms of efficiency, there are many challenges. While CF is seen as a prerequisite for the 
pilot project, many awareness raising program, analyzing socio-economic condition of HHs, 
measurement of forest resources and forest area and land use practices were conducted, which 
was very time consuming and expensive. At present, the complex issues of REDD+ have 
resulted mostly about efficiency, which encompass MRV and financial management. The lack 
of overall government involvement might also hamper the efficiency, such as lack of 
legitimacy; land tenure, coordination of activities might persist. The efficiency of the forest 
area in general increased the transaction costs, however they have clear boundaries and strong 
rules and regulation is less able to control forest product use and land clearing activities, 
which again resulted in insufficient carbon payments.  
Concerning social legitimacy the main challenge we found in term of decision-making 
process, the development of constitution has been done by leadership elite. However the 
operational guidelines of the REDD+ pilot project improved traditional forest management 
governance structures by providing equitable opportunity to marginalized groups including 
women and poor, these activities has seen only in the paper from involved organizations to 
get the project rather than creating social legitimacy. Primarily, CFUG is the approval body of 
all the issues in the village such as REDD+ revenue sharing, committee formation of IGA and 
project itself but majority of the people´s participation has not seen in the social legitimacy to 
accept the project, lack of information sharing, participation and coordination of activities 
might persist.  
Finally, while considering the pro-poor approach, we found both positive and negative 
condition of livelihood improvement through the activities they were planned. First incentives 
was “avoiding leakage” and secondly was carbon payment, these activities could motivate the 
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community to manage forest in a sustainable manner, thus increased the biodiversity. 
However, we were wary of returning benefits payment to CFUG. Lack of appropriate benefit 
sharing mechanism neither, help to increase biodiversity, nor livelihood condition. So many 
challenges are in the ground as we discussed in this section. In the context of Nepal, reducing 
emission from deforestation and forest degradation seems not so easy to achieve its 
objectives.  
Concluding remarks: The project was entitled “Design and setting up of a governance and 
payment system for Nepal´s community forest management under reduced emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation”. The main feature was the establishment of an 
equitable REDD+ payment mechanism, where conceptualized about US$ 1.7 million. Out of 
the total budget US$285,000.00 was set aside as a “seed grant” and distributed in the pilot 
area. It determined to improve local governance operational guidelines by including the 
marginalized groups; women, poor, Dalits, ethnic and indigenous people in decision-making, 
benefit sharing and capacity building. The FCTF established the REDD+ payment 
mechanism, where 40% of the payment was based on carbon stock and enhancement and the 
payment of 60% weight was given to social safeguard.  
In evaluating the outcomes of the project, I found very little people were aware about the 
REDD+ pilot project and its related benefit sharing mechanism. On the other hand, CFUGs 
also not properly followed their guidelines in the REDD+ implementation processes. New 
array of institutional development did not function well to provide information about REDD+. 
Benefits were not properly distributed to marginalized groups. More importantly, I found that 
CFUGC have been using REDD+ fund as a micro finance business. They are forcing to local 
people to pay back the benefits. In terms of REDD+ 3E+ evaluation, the finding shows that 
reducing emission from REDD+ is not so easy in Nepalese context. There are many 
challenges in the ground, so as a whole I have questioned overall REDD+ regimes.  
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CHAPTER 7: POWER AND THE REDD+ GOVERNANCE 
PROCESS 
This chapter analyzes how powerful actors exercised power in the REDD+ processes. This 
chapter is presented in four sections. Firstly, the role of formal and informal institutions in 
REDD+, secondly, identify powerful actors and their activities and interests in the national 
REDD+ policymaking process and thirdly, analyze different sources of power at local level. 
Finally, space, participation and power will be analyzed in the context of the REDD+ linking 
to exclusion of marginalized group from access to resource and REDD+ benefits along with 
some concluding remarks. 
We found (in chapter 6) that there are many actors involved in the community forestry, who 
have constituted powerful forces in putting forest management on political agenda. Now I am 
going to analyze what changes occurred specially in the actor structure in the process of 
REDD+ implementation, were they able to meet certain goals or not. I look three goals as 
Vedeld (2002) outlines: 
 To secure the biodiversity resource better than before 
 To increase local economic and social values added 
 To improve the relationship between “rulers and those ruled” 
7.1. REDD+ IMPLEMENTATION: FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN REDD+ 
In 2009, NORAD appeared the REDD+ pilot projects by various non-governmental 
institutions. Since then, a lot of changes have occurred in the environmental governance 
processes. A large number of governmental and non-governmental organizations are involved 
in the development of community forestry in Nepal. Following the implementation of the CF 
program, many issues have evolved such as equity, distribution of benefits, transparency, 
inclusiveness and good governance (Poudel et al., 2007, Bushley, 2010). Despite such issues, 
the number of registration processes of CF has increased. To establish effective forest 
governance, donor agencies and civil societies have focused on CF issues by formulating new 
strategies and policies during the introduction and implementation of REDD+ pilot project. 
To support their initiatives, Nepal government established a REDD-Cell institution in 2009 
and also analyzed the overall REDD+ activities. As a result, the national level forest 
governance approach shifted to local and focus of REDD+ activities.  
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Figure 14 indicates what changes occurred in the governance structure through the process of 
REDD+ introduction and implementation in CF. We can see that dozens of formal and 
informal organizations were involved and a wide range of actors participated. So, I have 
modified the Structural Process Model (SPM) in REDD+ process within. In the figure, 
governance structure-A defines the CF´s governance structure and governance structure–B is 
the REDD+ pilot project´s governance structure.  
Figure 14. Actors and structure in REDD+ pilot project implementation in Nepal 2015 
 
Source: Adapted from Vedeld (2002) 
Before the concept of REDD emerged, there were a long discussion about climate change 
mitigation and adaptation measures and a handful of organizations were established and 
Ministry of Environment were working on issues related to climate change connected with 
livelihood of local people. Later as REDD emerged as a new concept, many organizations 
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emerged as new actors in REDD discussion and implementation, which can be seen in Figure 
14.   
As suggested above, REDD+ promises an affordable means of reducing deforestation and 
forest degradation, as well as provides the possibility of generating substantial funds for local 
income generating activities and for community development. So, how and to what extent 
different actors were included or excluded in the process is important. Before implementing 
the project, different stakeholders and their various “bundles of interests” were emphasized. It 
is therefore important to identify who was doing what and where and what interests and 
commitments were made to participate in the REDD policy. Here it is also important to 
identify how policy makers and managers used their interests and knowledge to develop a 
REDD policy. The process of policymaking leads us in the direction of power as policy 
making is inherently conflictual, involving an uneven distribution of power creation and 
influence between different institutions and societal actors(Berger, 2003). 
The central issue in REDD+ is how the REDD+ pilot project funds and benefits were 
managed and shared. Since REDD was established on an existing CF scheme, the 
management of funds and asymmetric power relations are important to understand. The 
governance process of REDD+ in CF will thus be analyzed to understand “bundle of interest” 
and power relationship at play in the process and in outcomes.  
7.1.1. Organizations and Actors 
There were various organizations and actors involved in the process of REDD+ pilot project 
(Fig 14). A consortium of three agencies: International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMOD), Asian Network of Sustainable Agriculture and Bio resources 
(ANSAB), and the Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) 
implemented the policy from 2009–2013, with financial support from NORAD‟s Climate and 
Forest Initiative. ICIMOD is a regional intergovernmental learning and knowledge-sharing 
center. It was responsible for the coordination of the REDD+ pilot project and reported to 
NORAD on all project related activities. In addition, it facilitated technical support to other 
involved organizations such as ANSAB and FECOFUN.  
ANSAB is a non-governmental organization, involved in several projects focusing on natural 
resource management, biodiversity conservation and livelihood improvement. In the REDD+ 
pilot project, ANSAB was responsible for all technical activities from the national to the local 
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level and they providing technical support to FECOFUN regarding REDD+ issues. 
FECOFUN is a representative organization of all the CFUGs and assists mainly in 
coordination with CFUGs and partner organizations. At the national level, it is also a 
representative for the CFUG is in making operational guidelines regarding FCTF and 
payment mechanisms within the pilot project.  
Both ICIMOD and ANSAB were responsible for planning and designing technical 
frameworks for the pilot project. They formed a Project Management Unit (PMU) in 
Kathmandu. The PMU responsibilities were to monitor all the pilot project activities, carbon 
recording and made recommendations to FCTF advisory committee for payments. PMU had 
worked as a focal point for communication, coordination and support to partner organizations.  
7.1.2. Institutional development  
In the REDD+ pilot project, organized through several multi-stakeholder institutional 
structures, few new arrays of institutions were developed to guide the CF institutions. After 
the selection of pilot project sites, a National FCTF Advisory Committee was formed to be 
the highest level of authority to make guidelines and operationalize FCTF. The FCTF 
committee was a main body of the pilot project partner organizations, NGOs and the 
government authorities. It played an important role and had responsibilities for review of 
carbon data, verification reports, planned activities, information sharing with WRN in three 
watersheds and provided decisions about grant distribution based on guidelines. Similarly, 
FCTF was also responsible for forming operational guidelines at the watershed level and put 
provision to verify the outcomes independently. In the study area, new institutions were 
established; watershed level FCTF advisory committees and a WRN. At the Watershed level, 
FCTF advisory committee was organized through combining five members from different 
organizations such as the District FECOFUN, Project field staff, WRN, District Soil 
Conservation Office (DSCO) and DFO. In the project introduction and implementation 
process, many representatives also participated from FECOFUN, CFUGs, ethnic group, 
women group, District Development Committees (DDC), PMU, media, journalists and 
environmental researchers. WRN was formed as messenger to facilitate communication 
between involved organization and CFUGs. The WRN established an office in the Gorkha 
municipality.  
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Figure 15 shows that, PMU was the main unit with all the management responsibilities of the 
FCTF. It was a central level structure that had responsibilities for the flow of seed grants on 
the basis of the annual carbon inventory from the WRN to the local CFUGs. This unit was in 
regular contact with FCTF Advisory Committee to advice on strategy, policies, guidelines 
and fund management activities. Beside that, PMU shared carbon data with the National Data 
Center proposed by the government. The fund management structure of the project reaches 
interaction between all actors (Fig 15).  
Figure 15. Fund management structure and representation in the REDD+ pilot project, 
Nepal 
 
Source: (FCTF, 2011) 
7.2. ABILITY TO AFFECT THE COMMUNITY FORESTRY 
STRUCTURE-POWER ASPECTS  
Above-mentioned figure 14 indicates that through REDD+ in CF, many powerful actors want 
to meet their specific interests, some of them are included into the REDD+ and some are left. 
The actor´s structure shows that there are two distinct type of interests; firstly, the formal 
interests and secondly informal interests. Formal interests do not contradict each other, 
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however, legally defined “authority” is the most dominant source of power that the forest 
administration enjoyed in community forestry process. The informal interests are not 
compatible with each other; they are interested to extend their control on forest and people. 
These processes can be perceived as “control by forming intermediaries” or patron-client 
relationship, which formed a hierarchical network and control of patrons over their clients and 
resources.  This is quite similar with Vedeld (2002) arguments, he mentions that, “local 
participation and institutional building deals in particular with the distribution of power, 
resource, right and duties”.  
In the REDD+ processes, local forest users have fairly a low participation in decision-making 
and awareness rising programs but at the same time in most of the studied presents that 
community forests condition are improving. Some scholars (Ostrom, 1992, Agrawal, 2007, 
Vatn and Vedeld, 2013, Young, 2009) argue that strong institutional arrangements are strong 
indicator of successful management of common pool resources. If it is, for rules to be 
effective the resource claimants must be aware of those rules; this means that REDD+ 
guidelines (rules) were effective even though many users were not aware of them. Simply, 
this tells that REDD+ is not able to improve livelihood needs of forest users even though 
forest is in good condition. There is alliance between committee elites; Forest Administration, 
local political leaders, and civil society groups make regulative access rights, and also create 
administrative hurdles through different instruments. As Vedeld (2002) defined, policy 
instruments have certain type of both power use and to certain types of response. If I compare 
this in REDD+, I found, REDD+ guidelines as coercive power and increasing carbon stock as 
a response. Normative power is also seen in the project, when powerful actors organized 
FCTF Advisory Committee and excluded the CFUGs in the decision-making processes. As 
Vedeld (2002) mentioned, often some actors are excluded or forgotten, whereas others may 
be wrongfully included. What I found in REDD+ is, the notions of “ecological rationale” had 
effectively employed by these actors to legitimize and capture benefits while excluding direct 
forest users in the REDD+ processes and the highly regulative access practices had blocked 
the opportunities of livelihood potentials.  
In the REDD+ pilot project, main goal of maintaining and enhancing biodiversity were not 
met, there were a lack of distribution of benefits to local people. Whatever benefits were 
transferred, they were low, inequitable and higher cost found. Local people were completely 
deprived from their cultural management practices. Third goal also failed to achieve in the 
CF, when REDD+ institution disregarded the existing institutions and complex power 
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relationships forwarded. The civil society groups deteriorated in the eyes of donors and local 
people, contrary to what one had hoped for. It has seen that carbon stock ambitions have 
increased in this processes but added to the potentials for conflict and the challenges for 
management. Actually, REDD+ benefit is not a benefit but it is a loan. It also depends on how 
close you are with community elites. If you are close with them, you will get loan otherwise 
you will be rejected. It is not a self-governance approach; it is more likely “techno-autocratic” 
approach.   
Concluding remarks: The above-mentioned processes of actors‟ structure (Fig 14) found 
different types of power relation. The goals of project are climate change awareness, 
livelihood improvement, benefit sharing and local people´s empowerment but the results are 
poor because REDD+ categorized the forest users as “subsistence-oriented” and labeled 
community forest as an “environmental crisis”, which are common discourse of power in 
community forestry processes. These discourses does not improve the livelihood of the locals, 
it only deals how forest use and management rules are accomplished. Thus neither “fortress” 
conservation nor unrestricted access is likely to be a helpful solution to the problems of the 
rural poor people(Kamanga et al., 2009).  
The assessment of outcomes has demonstrated that REDD+ generating benefits at local level 
are not penetrate down to the direct forest users because of asymmetric distribution of power 
among the community forestry stakeholders and their vested interest on it. As defined in 
chapter six stakeholders in CF networks have different capacities to influence the processes, 
which, in this chapter, are defined as “power features”. Through power elements, powerful 
actors try to change the behavior of other actors in order to determine the expected outcomes 
in their own favor. During the REDD+ pilot project implementation, different stakeholders 
had gained power from different sources such as legal authority, technical knowledge, 
information, representativeness and inclusiveness and various incentives, who had the right to 
take final decisions or coerce to make decisions are considered as powerful stakeholders in 
the network. REDD+ benefit is “gasoline in the fire” rather than solving the social and 
environmental problems. 
In the next section, I analyze how different powerful actors influence interaction and policy 
processes. I also study how different actors and interests are used to mobilize and support to 
shape the national REDD+ policy outcomes.  
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7.3. EXERTING POWER AT THE NATIONAL REDD+ POLICY 
PROCESSES 
Policy-making processes are inherently linked to power struggle, where a long list of actors 
are involved. A wide range of actor´s involvement may imply that there was a high level of 
political legitimacy and it thus has a potential to induce transformational change that 
generates a resource regime. A transformational change is understood here as a shift in 
deliberate policy and action, which directly or indirectly may support REDD+ ambition. Such 
change does not only affect a narrow set of regulations but it also finds into a broad range of 
institutional patterns and serve the interest of particular actors. While REDD+ governance 
structures encompass interaction between different actors and institutions (Vatn and 
Angelsen, 2009, Vatn and Vedeld, 2011, Vatn and Vedeld, 2013), governance is about 
defining rules and building structures that guide, regulate and control social life and economic 
incentives and create the essential elements of power. The REDD+ architecture involves 
structure, institution and actors. Primarily, the governance structure define the capacities and 
responsibilities of different actors involved and the rules of their interaction´(Vatn and 
Vedeld, 2013). Different types of actors involved in the interaction can be characterized by 
their power and resources, which influence the outcomes and it affects the capacity of the 
overall system (Vatn and Vedeld, 2011). 
It is important to identify which preconditions are necessary at the national level for REDD+ 
to achieve such transformational change. Vatn and Vedeld (2011:3) identified two main 
elements aspects of actors involved and their pattern of interaction in the governance 
structure: 
-Type of actors involved, characterized by their capacities and competencies. Core issues 
concern actors defined by their power and resources, rights and responsibilities 
- The structures facilitating the interaction/coordination between the actors.  
The policy arena encompasses two different processes; the institutional settings and actors-
related processes. Institutional setting is defined as “ the formal and informal regulations, 
norms, conventions and rules that are established overtime, which is not easy to 
transformed”(Vatn and Vedeld, 2013). On the other hand, the policy arena is viewed as 
framed by institutions but shaped by actions of actors. This process is a less hierarchical or 
inclusive process, involving a large number of powerful actors, which can promote or 
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counteract certain policies and influence policy formulation. The importance of involvement 
of different actors was only to handle their various “bundle of interests” to legitimize the 
process. Our assumption is that in the national implementation process of any international 
program, powerful actors are involved to resist a formal change to protect individual interests 
and a business-as-usual practice.  
Here we present actor´s involvement in the national REDD+ policy process based on three 
actor characteristics; knowledge of the REDD+ policy, interests related to it and the ability to 
affect the policy process. The REDD Readiness Preparation Proposal (RPP) used the existing 
multi-stakeholder mechanisms such as Forest Sector Coordination Committee (FSCC) or the 
REDD Working Group for REDD+ implementation. Government officials perceived that the 
FSCC or the REDD Working Group can facilitate the central level multi-stakeholder 
governing body and the REDD Cell as the secretariat of the fund, however, CSO have 
reservations over the government dominated structures such as FSCC.  Here we can analyze 
the power elements, when the CSO-led mechanisms such as FCTF provided the marginal 
representation of government officials in the REDD+ pilot project, government took revenge 
and provided limited space for CSOs and right-holders. To initiate national policy process, a 
national REDD Working Group organized the Apex Body for policy coordination and 
developing a strategy for REDD+ implementation and investments through piloting REDD+ 
activities. Short summary is presented including interests, roles and relationships of key 
actors in Nepal´s REDD+ readiness process. 
7.3.1. A short summary: actor´s interest, role and responsibilities in 
national REDD+ 
Perceived influence:  Different actors are identified as having the most reputational power in 
the national REDD+ policymaking, the government including REDD Cell, DoF, Ministry of 
Environment, civil society groups especially NEFIN, FECOFUN and INGOs (WWF, 
ICIMOD). Most of the influential actors 50% are government entities and 22% from CSOs 
and 22% from INGOs. The government reflects in-degree centrality values for perceived 
influence, while CSOs and INGOs perceived as least influential.  
Policy domain: With the expansion of the role of civil society and international actors in the 
national REDD+ policymaking processes, broader range of consultation have been 
institutionalized. There is no longer exclusive domain of the actors in policies processes. This 
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multi-actor policy domain reflects especially in the REDD+ safeguards and it is also good 
opportunity to do something for their constituents. This multi-sector institutional landscape is 
characterized by strong influence by these three groups of actors resemble neither a purely 
state-centric nor a market-oriented model. There is a limited influence of CSOs in information 
sharing and collaboration, so it does not seems like “polycentric” (Ostrom, 2008) governance 
either. The limited influence of market in policy networks seems to be wavering between 
state-centric and polycentric. With the government-dominated policy process, an 
INGO/donor-driven agenda, narrow and token involvement from civil society, and the 
exclusion of many important constituencies and stakeholders, the practice of REDD+ policy 
making in Nepal threatens to push the pendulum back toward a more techno-bureaucratic, 
centralized mode of forest governance (Bushley, 2014).  
Capacities: National REDD+ policy progresses have so far been slower than expected 
including conflicting interests, perceived tensions between REDD+ and economic 
development objectives, tenure issues and considerations of distribution of costs and benefits, 
which have been identified as a major challenge. National policy networks reflect past power 
distribution, at the same time they shape the current political outcomes, which reveals the 
institutionalization of power relations of actors in the policy network (Brockhaus et al., 2014). 
There is considerable disparity in the influence; connectedness of actors in representing 
policy-making processes, there is a lack of interaction among and within groups.  This 
unevenness negatively reflects the normative idea of polycentric governance and undermines 
the capacity for many actors to participate in and benefit from REDD+. It only hinders the 
development and implementation of effective policies rather than crating good governance.  
Exclusion: The government has failed to include other influential government stakeholders 
effectively such as Ministry of agriculture, Land Reform, and Energy, presents a challenge for 
addressing forest related issues. Though there are multi-stakeholder bodies, government 
officials tend to dominate the key decision-making bodies, which appears that a relatively 
small circle of professionals working with the government at policy level (Poudel et al., 
2015). International agencies and NGOs play the dominant roles in defining problems for 
D&D, however it requires all management regimes that could help to realize reductions, 
besides community forestry. Other regimes have been excluded including private and 
government-managed forests, participatory forestry schemes such as collaborative forest 
management and leasehold forestry. It also widely excluded the poor, women and Dalits in 
the REDD+ processes, which can pose a huge challenge to implement the program in the 
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inclusive way at the local level. 
Interest of state: Looking at the institutional design processes of REDD+, Nepal has prepared 
two policy documents: the R-PIN and the R-PP.  The R-PIN was prepared by staff at the 
Department of forests and the R-PP prepared through an inclusive consultation process, 
involving multiple actors and broad public participation. According to MoFSC (2013), 3,180 
individuals were consulted through meetings, 57 workshops were held at the national, 17 at 
regional level and 13 at community levels. In this process, 105 individual expert consultations 
were carried out throughout the R-PP preparation, 17 of the consultation events and 91 of the 
expert consultations were held in the capital city of Kathmandu, involving many of the same 
participants (Bushley and Khatri, 2011). This favoritism has reinforced concerning the 
interest of powerful actors while marginalizing other group particularly community-based 
organizations and locals. The REDD Cell used to be the dominant actor in the policy 
document. The organization drafted the Interim REDD Strategy through a certain group of 
consultants. But the civil society groups questioned Interim REDD Strategy and the 
legitimacy of the process. As a result the REDD Cell rejected the policy documents and 
developing a new long-term strategy for REDD+ implementation beyond 2012 through multi-
stakeholder participation processes.  
To combat the diverse causes of deforestation, it is important to fit with existing management 
regimes based on their effectiveness in enhancing forest conditions. The carbon benefits 
might have not yet been clearly defined in laws but the government argues that since it owns 
the land, the carbon benefits should accrue to the central government. On the other hand, civil 
society groups especially FECOFUN argues that the rights to carbon benefits should remain 
with local communities. Such controversies have developed in the process of REDD+ benefit 
sharing mechanisms. Primarily, the forestry sector is governed by an existing legal and policy 
framework, which is developed over past two decades and have strong influences also on the 
emerging REDD+ architecture because new forest conservation and management strategies 
should conform to existing laws and policies. These activities have not defined visibly in the 
national level because government wants to continue business-as-usual process in the future.  
Power: Many research shows that external actors (INGOs and donors) have more impact on 
REDD+ policymaking, although government and CSOs have more reputational power. This 
might be true because with the power of INGOs and resources of donors, can creates strong 
influence, which is not surprising. If we look the past experience, international organizations 
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have played a major role in Nepal´s forestry sector for decades (Ojha, 2011). In fact, it has 
been continuing due to technical and financial support from different donors since 1970s-
1980s. However, heavy influence in policy making could have detrimental effects on the 
long-term financing and implementation of REDD+ in Nepal and could adversely affect its 
flexibility and competiveness in participating in global carbon markets. Moreover, some 
researchers claim that the strict guidelines imposed by WB-FCPF for the R-PP process 
reinforce a techno-bureaucratic approach and limit the nature and degree of participation in 
this process (Bushley, 2010).  
CSOs in the national REDD+ policy: Some CSOs are closely involved in REDD+ dialogs but 
they have little direct influence in policy making and less communication and collaboration 
with other national actors than INGOs and donor organizations. Consequently their impact on 
policy making is limited, in contrast, INGOs and donors exercise power behind the scenes 
through direct consultations and advice given to REDD Cell. The REDD Cell is at present 
“hanging” as a separate wing of the Ministry, largely isolated from the vertical institutional 
structure of the forest bureaucracy that works with forests and the local communities (Poudel 
et al., 2015).  
The active engagement and ascendancy of FECOFUN in the REDD+ readiness have great 
influenced the process and for this gaining support from donor agencies and other NGOs. 
When FECOFUN assembled a responsibility for implementing the REDD+ pilot project, it 
intentionally excluded other management regimes on the ground that would be too 
complicated to include them along with other management regimes. During the project 
implementation FECOFUN maintained a narrow focus on a national approach, only account 
for its own interests.  
The policy dialogues have involved only handpicked institutions and individuals rather than 
conducting public meetings and open discussion. In some cases, FECOFUN also play “power 
within” relation, when government increased tax to 50% on all forest products sold by 
CFUGs national wide. After one year of pressure from civil society led by FECOFUN, the 
government decided to withdraw the proposal. The paradoxical role of FECOFUN, the 
consultants in the REDD+ policy design process and advocates for the rights of local 
communities, could put to FECOFUN at odds with their constituents, they allegedly 
accounted their interest in the name of right´s of local people, however, they are getting 
support from donor agencies. Civil society have been playing contradictory roles in the 
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institutional design process and they have not yet discussed at the local level what local 
people want in their community forestry. There have only been rumour about the plans and 
the policies, no one actually informed them. Villagers are skeptical to powerful actors, they 
told me “ the forest is deforesting and forest land is degrading” and “powerful actors do not 
care about our needs”. Many have also responded that “civil society cannot distribute benefit 
to the communities, it influences the powerful actors to accumulate the benefits”.  
Ambiguities in the international REDD+: Some ambiguities in the emerging international 
policy and financial mechanisms have shaped the national REDD+ polices such as:  1) it has 
moved from market-based mechanism to ´development aid budget´ (Angelsen, 2013), 2) it 
has moved from carbon focus to multiple objectives, 3) it is unclear who are the beneficiaries 
of REDD+, 4) and there are uncertainties about financial mechanisms and modalities, and 5) 
REDD+ money is labeled as `aid to help donors´(ibid). However, there is a general consensus 
that REDD+ should be market-based but other involved actors have argued for the 
establishment of national “carbon trust funds”. 
Moreover, a lack of clear international guidelines about what type of resource regime is 
required to benefit from REDD+ led Nepal to follow an approach based mainly on 
community forestry. International rules and standards regarding forest management, 
measurement and verification can create problems to the local institution because it 
completely excludes local norms, conventions and rules of community-based forest 
management. If this has been done in the REDD+ readiness process without involving local 
institutions, lack of awareness about REDD+ within the locals can create problems in the 
process and implementation stages.  
Challenges: There are host of institutional challenges inherent in REDD+ that must be 
resolved to guarantee for its effective, efficient and equitable implementation(Vatn and 
Vedeld, 2013). The externally driven, state-centered REDD+ agenda has privilege, whereas 
major social, institutional and ecological concerns have been largely overlooked. For instance, 
critical issues as securing carbon tenure, ensuring protection of biodiversity, promoting 
benefit-sharing systems, increasing awareness and obtaining free, prior and informed consent 
have hardly been addressed, where external actors are also complicit in the failure to address 
these issues. Recent forest policies and REDD+ national discourses have chosen to keep silent 
on forest tenure issues; through there is persistent emphasis on procedural rights in the 
REDD+ readiness process (Poudel et al., 2015). 
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Conclusion: The assessment shows that decentralization forest management has become 
completely exclusive and centralized nature, however it is failed to involve many important 
stakeholders in REDD+ policy-making. The government seems more concern on technical 
aspects of governance and disproportionate influence of state and external actors, along with 
institutional uncertainties and incentives for the state to capture benefits from carbon trading 
(Bushley, 2014). There is a risk of being neutral policy mechanism, however there are few 
powerful government, INGOs, donors and civil society actors to dominate the policy process 
while excluding the roles and voices of many important stakeholders. The omission of tenure 
as a theme in the REDD+ process is a challenge in relation to accountability, transparency 
and responsiveness which will ultimately threaten the efficiency, effectiveness and equity in 
REDD+ implementation (Poudel et al., 2015).  
The REDD+ policy processes clearly shows that the government wants to account only for 
their interest in policy where civil society has been used to legitimize their policy decisions. 
Besides that the civil society groups were collecting experience from various piloting 
activities to support REDD+ readiness or efforts to build institutional architecture to engage 
in REDD+.  
We asked the respondents about what actions and activities they expected from REDD+ to 
establish a good governance system?  
Table 27. Local people and good governance in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015. 
Suggestions Respondents (%) 
Before implementing the project, clear information is 
required 
74 
After implementing the project, the project manger should 
come and discuss with HHs regarding project activities and 
outcomes 
81 
During the project implementation, at least one 
administrative office should be established at local level 
68 
N= 87 
According to Table 27, 74% of the total respondents suggested to provide clear information 
about the project before establishing it and 81% requested for project evaluation through 
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involving local people and 68% wished to have an administrative office locally where they 
could give their feedback about the project. The reason of such a suggestion could be a felt 
lack of participation of marginalized groups such as Dalits, poor and landless, while civil 
society reflect the interests and voices of only a couple of powerful stakeholder groups. 
 In the next section, internal inequities in access to benefits and decision-making within 
CFUGs will be presented, continued by powerful actors. In addition, local powerful actors 
will be identified and analyzed through what roles they have been playing to exclude poor, 
Dalits and women through more a less invisible power relations.  
7.4. COMMUNITY FORESTRY, REDD+ AND POWER 
7.4.1.Community forest management system 
First a general assessment of the relationship between community forest management and 
establishing CFUGs is presented from the perspective of local people´s awareness of 
participation and self-governance systems. Finally, review how local people perceive of 
actor´s deeply vested interests in the control and use of resources, their relationship with other 
actors as well as the self-governance approach of local “power sites”.  
7.4.1.1. Local people´s participation in self-governance system 
To understand the power relation we asked to the respondents; do you think everybody felt 
free to take whatever position they wanted concerning the establishment of CFUGs? 26% of 
respondents report that everybody felt free to take any position they wanted concerning 
establishing CFUGs and 74% of the respondents says that they were not.  
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Figure 16. Local people´s participation in self-governance system, Ludikhola watershed, 
Nepal 2015 
 
N=109 
We found quite similar opinions in the three pilots CFUGs. Respondents report that politics 
can affect both possibilities of carrying out inclusive participation activities as well as posing 
a direct threat to individual´s right to access information and benefits. Some of the 
respondents say that a self-governance system is functioning through key actor´s interests 
rather than their own interests and have been playing different kinds of roles and imposing 
strong rules and regulations to avoid these regulations influences in forest governance.  
7.4.1.2. Powerful actors in the community forestry  
Local people‟s activities towards powerful actors are important. Respondents were asked who 
hold the major position in CFUGs. A majority of the respondent (40%) answered that the 
higher caste people hold the major position in CFUGs, which is followed by local politicians 
(29%), local elites (17%), wealthy people (9%) and educated people (6%). The Table 28 
shows the local people´s opinions about powerful actors in the study area.  
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Table 28. Powerful actors in CF, Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
Actors Respondents % 
Higher caste people 40 
Local politician 29 
Educated people 5 
Local elite 17 
Wealthy people 9 
N=109 
In the study sites, there were many examples of uneven distribution of power in the 
community forestry. Among 105 CFUGs, five were women organized CFUGs. In our study, 
CFUG3 chairperson was a woman, she said that women want to participate and speak in the 
environmental and social issues, but the patriarchal society don´t support this activity, they 
think men should be head of the department. Women are trying to be active in the public 
issues but the neighbors and family members criticize them by saying pothi baseko ramro 
hudaina (it is unfortunate when a hen cries). This means that our social norms, convention 
and social rules produced “power” and people acted according to it. Due to the patriarchal and 
patrilineal system, women have been excluded over right to resources management access. On 
the other hand sociocultural norms banned to the lower caste people to access the public 
resources. One of the Dalits respondent said that they are not allowed to enter into the temple 
and access to pubic water resources. If they use it, it becomes impure. These processes are 
still continuing in the study area, where higher caste, educated and wealthy people also 
believe on it. Therefore, women and lower caste people experience poverty and inequity to a 
greater degree.  
Regardless of what changes may have been made during this time, it is apparent that 
asymmetric power relations can be found and expected in CF management. Different kinds of 
power are exercised through powerful actors with self-governance system. The fact is that the 
local users´ participation is not seen as a right; it has used just for means and creates spaces by 
powerful actors to reflect only their interests.   
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7.4.1.3 Interests  
Different actors in natural resource management may have different interests and also 
different power resources. If we look at the overview of REDD+ from an international 
perspective, WB, UNFCCC and donor agencies have constituted power resources in 
economic forms. At the national level, the legal formation of community forestry defines the 
economic power resources to avoid environmental conflicts. “Resource grabbing” is the 
consequences of poor ownership and use of rights systems, where often influence over 
policies, laws and money. In the community forestry, the executive committees of CFUGs 
form the rules for other actors to fulfill their interest. This kind of power is invisibly 
distributed between the parties in the community forestry. At the local level, the CFUG´s 
executive committee has power resources and they use the local people as a power agent to 
achieve their own interest and goal.  
In this section, I present how power works in the field and what interest they have to 
accumulate the common resources. In the community level, there is a mandatory provision to 
have at least one annual assembly of HHs to make or change operational rules. Such kinds of 
practices have performed poorly. When we asked the respondents, 45% say that it is the 
higher caste people that make the rules regarding forest management. Similarly, 30% believed 
that rules were made by CFUGs and 25% answered that powerful actors have been making 
rules over the community forest resources. Then we asked the respondents about their opinion 
of why powerful actors highly influenced in policymaking process. Table 29 shows the 
reasons of powerful actor´s involvement in policymaking process.  
Table 29. Actor´s interest in policymaking process Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
 Respondents % 
Personal benefit 19 
Communal benefit 6 
Fraud monitoring and reporting 62 
For power and prestige 13 
N=109 
When we ask the respondents why powerful actors exclude in the decision making process, 
19% of the total respondents answered “for the personal benefits”, while 6% say for 
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communal benefits. Similarly 62% believed that fraud monitoring is the issues, while 13% 
power and prestige as reasons. After implementing the REDD+ project in the community, 
respondents felt that powerful actor did fraud monitoring and reporting in terms of equitable 
benefit sharing. One of the respondents states, “We were not that much benefited from the 
project, but our executive committee reported differently. If 10 people benefited, they reported 
as 100 people. This kind of activities is normal at the local level”.  
A similar question was posed to the respondents about powerful actor´s influence in REDD+ 
pilot project and its related rules making process. 82% of the respondents believed that 
powerful actors influence REDD+ processes. While, 18% answered that there is no influence 
of powerful people in REDD+, which is shown in figure 17.  
Figure 17. Users opinions about powerful actors and implementation of REDD+ pilot 
project, Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
N=109 
According to our data (chapter 6), 69% of the total respondents said that powerful actors did 
not take account of their voice during the formation of rules and regulation. Only 37% of the 
respondents believed that their voice were accounted for. We found that from such actions, 
conflict, forest fire, corruption and illegal resource accumulation occurred. This is the 
consequence of inequitable participation of local users in CF management. Table 30 shows 
the user´s opinion about the activities of powerful actors. 
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Table 30. Users opinion about powerful actor´s activities in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 
2015 
Activities of powerful actors Respondents (%) 
Takes more forest right 66 
Misuse of REDD+ benefits 56 
Monopolies in rules making 60 
Misuse of power 71 
Restricting to people access to forest resources  91 
Bias or exclude to users from information or agenda  74 
Restricted lower caste people access to public resources 59 
N=109 
Several question were posed to the respondents to understand power dynamic in the 
community forest management, where 66% of the respondents believed that powerful actors 
often take more forest rights for themselves. For instance, powerful actors allowed accessing 
the resources according to their interests and preferences but users have to wait for a long 
time. Sometime it is also not sure whether users will get access to resources or not, it all 
depends on the rule makers.  
56% of the respondents answered that the REDD+ benefits had misused by powerful actors. 
The benefits were not equally distributed; more benefits were distributed to higher caste 
people. Lack of information sharing with local users also supports that there were less 
equitable benefit sharing mechanism. Also the REDD+ benefit used for micro finance 
purposes is a further example of “power over” poor people and natural resources.   
Monopolies in rule making are highly dominating in the CF, moreover 60% of the total 
respondents agreed to this. In terms of carbon stocks, forest users were excluded from their 
traditional practices, cultural management and ritual belief systems. Clear boundaries, 
collective-choice arrangement and graduated sanctions not only help to exercise the power but 
also create poor environmental governance. Ostrom´s design principles are formed on how to 
control forest-based resource upon notions and structure of power. The principles have a 
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flavor of “the rationalist approach gives a functional perspective on institution”(Vedeld, 
2002). The strongest and prominent argument is the legal pluralism “the hybrid nature of 
governance”(Cleaver, 2012).  
In conclusion, increasing deforestation and forest degradation is the result of power misuse. 
People do more corrupt activities why they gain certain power. 71% of the respondents 
believe that the executive committee of CFUGs misuse their powers (responsibility) and 
allow some accessing the resources (relatives and close friends). People ask, why only certain 
groups of people have to pay money to access the resources while other groups do not. Why 
one group of people has more forest rights. This may be a result of normative power relations, 
where Dalits, women and poor people have been suppressed by powerful elites.  
Restricting people´s access to common resources and bias or exclusion of poor people from 
information or agendas create a poor governance system, a lack of transparency, a lack of 
social legitimacy and it creates asymmetric power relations. 80% of the people believed that 
exercising power in CF results in the omission of the poor people in decision-making 
processes and reduces equitable benefit sharing.  
In conclusion, although the community forest management is focused primarily on a self-
governance system, it does not create good REDD+ environmental governance. Asymmetric 
power relations dominate the community, which impact on the REDD+ funds and its 
designed outcome. Communities are used coercively to create local resource surpluses but it 
does not empower local people because a variety of group affiliations obscure access or 
control of the resources. According to the characteristics of Nepali society, community 
forestry seems ineffective; it does not meet the needs of the poor people and cannot interact 
with the informal social norms established in Nepali society.  
In the next section, I will discuss how power, space and participation and have been exercised 
to encourage democratic self-governance and its implications to Dalits, ethnic groups, women 
and poor people. The process of exercising power reflects the inability to influence rule-
making and decision-making process and creates different types of spaces to account for 
collusion groups‟ interests.  
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7.5. POWER ANALYSIS  
7.5.1. The REDD+ pilot project and powerful interest 
In this section the various actors are largely referred and realized that actors have 
heterogeneous interests, with differences within and among them, but some simplification is 
important to facilitate the analysis. I treat the actors as a collective or with common interests. 
Having a common interest such as introduction and implementation of the REDD+ pilot 
project has become less significant their guidelines and mechanisms in the community 
forestry. Since the project implementation, we have seen that actors are not only politically 
heterogeneous: they are also hybrid and transposal. Important to note is that the views and 
interests of the “actors” may in fact reflect those actors who were involved in project.  
Powerful actors can be seen as old and monopolies ways of expressing agencies in 
development arenas. I suggest that the organization of powers to REDD and other projects has 
served as a process of “power over” for many villagers. Participation is here seen as the 
exercise of power of popular agency in relation to inclusion of marginalized groups. CFUGs 
can be defined as a set of practices with particular rules and regulation that express a person 
as a competent member of society, which as a consequence shape the flow of resources. In 
this process, CFUGC can create political and class spaces where they can play a part in 
making and shaping the decisions that affect the powerless people´s livelihoods and their 
preferences. As a result, villagers may create new spaces to occupy existing spaces or 
rearrange the system to revalorize negatively labeled spaces(Cornwall, 2002) or transform 
spaces. 
7.5.1.1. Convincing the state and the locals 
In this section I explore the various ways in which the involved organizations seek to exert 
control over the community forest and of other actors and the resources they mobilize to 
implement their interests. This will be looked by their practices and how those were linked to 
the asymmetric power relation.  
As I mentioned earlier, FECOFUN is a representative organization of all the CFUGs, which 
assists particularly to coordinate CFUGs and partner implementing organizations and it is the 
biggest organization in terms of membership. NORAD provides financial support to 
formulate strategies, policies and implementation of REDD+ primarily focusing on its 
designed goals. This project basically seems buying and selling approach between FECOFUN 
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and NORAD. In this process, main issue is that the forestland is belongs to the government of 
Nepal, CF has only land use right. With this information, FECOFUN started the design and 
planning of a project, and the undertaking of studies of forest conservation and inclusion of 
marginalized group. In the planning phase the organization get support from the Ministry of 
Forest and Soil Conservation (MoFSC), involved as a watchdog and provided information 
about the areas and the legal framework. The organization needed some permits to start the 
project. The regulatory process includes; 1) obtaining temporary permission from the MoFSC 
to access the areas above ground and under ground biomass to conduct studies; 2) the project 
performed special attention to socio-economic criteria to get a positive feedback to national 
and international audiences that REDD+ could safeguard the rights of marginalized groups 
and forest dependent villagers. And 3) through participation decision making process, 
provided some initiatives to those CFUGs who were socially marginalized.  
In the regional level, established new array of institutions to show that their initiations was 
transparency and include all types of stakeholders, which easily motivated to the donor 
agencies and get a reasonable amount of money and keeps them optimistic towards REDD+. 
After obtaining final authorization from the government, obtaining a final permission from 
CFUGs was not difficult. In addition to this, FECOFUN needed to prove that the forest 
properties were taken to conserve to reduce the emissions, for this process, the organization 
motivated to forest users by using CFUGC and saying that project provides efficient 
technologies and initiatives for livelihood improvement.  
Parallel with the initial planning phase was the process of establishing trust in the 
communities or with the district forest office, to get the social and legal acceptance for the 
projects. With the limited role of the state, much is left to the FECOFUN. The important part 
of the project phase is a payment criterion, which was carried out before the project 
implementation was begun, under the REDD+ guidelines.  
7.5.2. Space and participation 
More powerful actors create spaces, to exclude or include certain actors and transformed as a 
consequence of actor agency. The various actors involved in the REDD+ policymaking 
process have different motivations and interest for creating particular spaces.  
These spaces for decision-making or negotiations regarding the national REDD+ strategies 
affect the local communities and can be of particular importance where democratic systems 
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have failed to include local people, mainly indigenous people, Dalits and women. The 
electoral systems offer a limited and exclusionary aspiration of democracy, which Nepal is an 
example of, where the procedural democracy and the party system largely exclude the poor, 
Dalits and women.  
7.5.2.1. Invited spaces 
With the FCTF guidelines, the Project Management Unit (PMU) has provided one-invited 
spaces for “users participation”. These spaces were the processes where the Watershed 
REDD+ Network (WRN) team with arranged focus group discussion in the local 
communities to gather the opinion of the local forest users. The WRN presented the 
guidelines for environmental control and follow-up as a space for participation, but there were 
no formal procedures for how these were to be conducted. In the process of the REDD+ pilot 
project, FECOFUN established different institutions or consultants groups to carry out the 
REDD+ project. A consequence was that FECOFUN used these spaces a means to promote 
their own interests, and users participation merely become a requisite to be fulfilled in the 
process of getting the authorization to implement the project. FECOFUN also invited 
meetings with other organizations to present their projects; these meetings had been labeled 
“communitarian consultations”, which could show how the FECOFUN were using a concept 
to achieve credibility and acceptance by other organizations, utilizing a form of invisible 
power.  
A common strategy employed by the WRN and CFUGC was to present a package of benefits 
to the forest users, and the villagers were to decide whether they wished a project in their area 
or not. Some NGOs did this in more subtle ways, first by gaining trust from forest users and 
then identifying their needs and interests. This stands in stark contrast to the principles of 
prior informed consent. Socially beneficial projects were pushed in the form of invisible 
power where forest users were not given a proper change to make informed decisions. 
Instead, FECOFUN took advantage of local people´s vulnerable position with few other 
options to improve their livelihoods.  
In Nepal, NGOs can freely decide how to phrase the questions asked to the villagers regarding 
their perception of the projects. The questions posed to forest users by the consultants were 
often biased or misleadingly formulated implying that the villagers would receive benefits 
from the project, and by that, affecting the answers given by the locals. Some questions are 
presented here were directed to villagers by the project consultants. 
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 Would you like more jobs in your community? 
 Do you think you would have a better livelihood status if there were offered more 
jobs? 
 Can you reduce fuelwood collection if there were more efficient technology provided? 
 Do you think that providing money will change your livelihood conditions? 
 Would you like development in your village through conserving forest? 
The first question implies that there will be more jobs with project, and the final two 
questions meant that money would be provided, efficient technology (reduce fuelwood 
collection) and development. Then, villagers answered positively and consultants conclude 
that the user groups agreed with the project.  
Furthermore, the direct negotiations between the CFUGC and the WRN Advisory Committee 
regarding the forest conservation can also be placed here, representing asymmetrical power 
relations. In terms of getting benefits and livelihood improvement, villagers enter into the 
project without any legal support. FECOFUN have “power over” the forest users in the 
negotiations, where it largely controlled access to information and the forest resources. In 
general, access to and distribution of information about the projects were weak resulting in 
marginalizing poor people and excluding them from REDD+ benefits. There were no 
functional mechanisms to ensure the information regarding REDD+ pilot project was widely 
disseminated amongst the concerned villagers. 
7.5.2.2. Closed spaces 
Several arenas can be characterized as closed spaces, where some actors were participated and 
other were excluded. For example, in the national REDD+ policymaking process, only 
FECOFUN, NEFIN, government agencies and donors participate. The community based 
organizations, locals, Dalits and women actors are largely excluded from these spaces. The 
negotiations between the FECOFUN and state agencies could also be defined as closed 
spaces. In this case, no other organizations know about the discussions and decisions that civil 
society groups and the government agencies carried out. The example is; REDD+ cell and 
FECOFUN denied disclosing the upcoming REDD+ policies when I asked them during my 
field visit.  
7.5.2.3. Claimed and created spaces  
The formation of alliances and local capacity building has given the local forest users “power 
with” and “power within”. The method of capacity building is a channel for mobilizing 
invisible power for resisting or shifting social norms and beliefs internally among the local 
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forest users. However, the claimed and created spaces can be affected by local politician and 
community elites within the system of power relations. As noted, the communities are not 
homogenous entities at all and they reflect possible conflicting interests. Some groups may be 
more powerful than others within the communities, with greater capabilities to influence the 
other forest dependent people. Then, there will be power relations between the local 
communities and the accompanying organizations. As Lukes (2005a) has noted, power can 
also be exercised unconsciously, which is the example of CFUGC. The claimed and created 
spaces empower the people about their rights but the closed spaces largely contribute to the 
inequalities in the CF management, where poor, Dalits, ethnic groups and women are 
excluded from the arenas. 
By analyzing the data, I have drawn a figure of the role of different social groups in 
community that have been categorized in hierarchical order, where higher caste people are in 
front and Dalits are in at last position, women and ethnic groups are in-between. 
Figure 18. Participation of different social groups in decision-making process in 
Ludikhola watershed, Nepal, 2015  
 
Number of social status 
7.5.3. Three dimensions of power in the REDD+  
In the REDD+ implementation, a highly technocratic outlook dominated the field of 
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also found different forms of power relation on it, where powerful actor exercise the power 
according to their interest.  
On the basis of the information, I have been able to crate a picture of how different actors 
exercised their power according to three dimensions of power. 
Figure 19. Three dimensions of power in the REDD+ implementation in Ludikhola 
watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
In Figure 19, first dimension of power is seen when FECOFUN ordered its constituents to 
exclude forest dependent people to access the resources and increase the carbon stock. As 
Lukes (2005g) define, power as something that some individuals and entities have and other 
do not, this type of power match to FECOFUN as a single actor gained a potential ability to 
select, to change and to obtain the goals. Excluding marginalized groups in the process of 
decision-making, benefit sharing and rules making are its interconnected indicators to 
measure the power.  
Second dimension of power is found in the REDD+ implementation when it neglects the 
social norms and values and kept certain issues out of the agenda and thus worked for the 
advantage for certain groups. The FCTF create the guidelines accordingly to constrain the 
action of forest users and exclude from the information or agenda because they ensured there 
would not be any issues because FECOFUN was involved in pilot project. Lack of awareness 
about REDD+, lack of transparency, lack of information sharing and lack of open discussion 
are the major indicator of the second dimensions of power relation.  
Third dimension of power is viewed when FCTF Advisory Committee recommended 
implementing their guidelines in the structural form in the community forestry without 
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consultation of forest user groups. Advisory Committee did not understand that society is a 
heterogeneous and based on social norms, values and ritual belief. In the study area, 
marginalized groups are dominated by third dimension of power directly; where upper caste 
people have been taking more benefit, authority and rights to control and use of REDD+ 
benefits. Caste has historically been a prominent determinant of access to power, Scott 
described as “the ultimate in ideology of hegemony” (1995). The caste system is removed the 
legal code of discriminatory acts but it has still been practicing in the study area. It is still the 
dominant form of social organization, where social, economic and political inequalities are 
compounded by the caste system. These results are similar to others who have found Dalits, 
women and poor have been affecting through asymmetric power relation in formalized system 
of forest management (Gurung et al., 2011, Gurung and Setyowati, 2012, Lachapelle et al., 
2004, Agarwal, 2001, Devkota, 2010).  
7.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A consortium of three agencies: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development 
(ICIMOD), Asian Network of Sustainable Agriculture and Bio resources (ANSAB), and the 
Federation of Community Forestry Users, Nepal (FECOFUN) implemented it from 2009–
2013, with financial support from NORAD‟s Climate and Forest Initiative. We also found 
different kind of new array of institutions in regional and local level in the process of REDD+ 
implementation.  
In the REDD+ readiness process, three sets of powerful actors have been influenced in the 
process of policy development and institutional design; government agencies, civil society 
organization (NGOs) and donor agencies. These actors have a strong alliance especially for 
developing the REDD+ strategy. The policy dialogues have involved only handpicked 
institutions and individuals rather than conducting public meetings and open discussions. 
Civil society have been playing contradictory roles in the institutional design process and they 
have not yet discussed at the local level what local people want in their community forestry. 
At the local level, CFUG´s executive committee has power resources and they use the local 
people as a power agent to achieve their own interests and goals. From our research we 
conclude that powerful actors have misused REDD+ benefits. Monopolies in rules making 
highly dominate the CF, the executive committee of CFUGs misuse their power 
(responsibility) and they allow access of the resources for their relatives and closest friends. 
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This may be the result of normative power relations, where Dalits, women and poor people 
are being suppressed by powerful elites. 
 Although the community forest management is focused primarily on a self-governance 
system, it does not create good REDD+ environmental governance. Asymmetric power 
relations dominate the community, which again impacts the REDD+ funds and its designed 
outcome. According to the characteristics of Nepali society, community forestry seems 
ineffective; it does not meet the needs of the poor people and cannot interact with the informal 
social norms established in the Nepali society. 
The various actors involved in the REDD+ policymaking process have different motivations 
and interests for creating spaces. These spaces for decision-making or negotiations regarding 
the national REDD+ strategies affecting the local communities and can be of particular 
importance where democratic system have failed to include local people. FECOFUN were 
using a concept to achieve credibility and acceptance by other organizations, utilizing a form 
of invisible power. The formation of alliances and local capacity building has given the local 
forest users “power with” and “power within”. The method of capacity building is a channel 
for mobilizing invisible power for resisting or shifting social norms and beliefs internally 
among the local forest users. However, from the analysis of our result we can say that claimed 
and created spaces are affected by local politicians and community elites within internal 
power relations.  
The assessment shows that through community forestry, many powerful actors want to pursue 
their specific interests. I found that the community forestry was not properly conducted 
participation mechanism; it is functioning through key actor´s interests. At the local level, 
class, caste and discrimination is adversely affected women and Dalits, where power reflects 
according to socio-cultural and economic status.  
Power is socially constructed but it is very difficult to define precisely. Power is capacity to 
realized one´s interest and values but also make us confuse what someone´s interest is. 
However, I have analyzed three dimensions of power through understanding REDD+ creates 
intended and unintended effects in the community forestry and local people´s livelihood.  
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CHAPTER 8: CORRUPTION 
This chapter analyzes how corruption is exercised in the REDD+ pilot project and community 
forestry. This chapter discusses different forms of corruption and analyzes the involvement of 
powerful actors in corruption. Secondly, it identifies where corruption arose during planning 
and implementation of REDD+ and investigates its implications for local people. Finally, 
linkages between institution of arrangements and corruption will be presented.  
8.1. CORRUPTION IN NEPAL: A FLASH BACK 
The issue of corruption is an old tradition, which has been recognized as one of the main 
cause of Nepal´s underdevelopment. After the constitutional democracy (1990), corruption 
has been spreading in all sectors and even consumers and clients are also responsible for this. 
It can be in various forms and functions according to the contexts. Fundamentally, corruption 
takes the terms of “misuse of power and authority” in the national institutional context. At the 
local level, corruption seems as a private wealth-seeking behavior of powerful actors who has 
the authority to manage the resources. It is often a misuse of common properties for private 
gains. Not only public officials carry out corruption, there might be other actors who are 
actively involved in the corruption, such as elites, politician, NGOs and civil society groups. 
At the national level, corruption takes place between the government and the administrative 
and bureaucratic institutions because of overlapping and conflicting authorities, political 
power struggles over access to scarce resource and personal relationships of dependence and 
loyalty (NORAD, 2000, Subedi, 2005). There are several possible factors leading to 
corruption, such as heavy influence of political parties in the civil service, lack of 
professionalism in bureaucratic institutions, and lack of accountability, transparency and 
auditing, where corruption becomes likely.  
8.1.1. Series of corruption 
Some examples of series of corruption are presented here. The Kathmandu Post (a daily 
national newspaper) on 21 June 2010 published that more than 100,000 ha of forests were 
destroyed in 2009/10 and 88,000 ha in 2008/09, which clearly demonstrate rent seeking 
interests and activities related to community forests.  
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Box 1. Rent seeking interests of the foresters form CF 
The ministry suspends “corrupted” forest officials - The ministry of forest and 
Soil Kathmandu- Conservation (MOFSC) on Friday suspended four senior officials 
of Sarlahi and Panchthar for their involvement in timber smuggling and promoting 
deforestation and corruption at the local level.  The ministry has also banned all 
sorts of forest related trade in community and national forests until the investigation 
committee finalized field investigation. 
Source: Kantipur news, (Sharma, 2010) 
 
Box 2. The forest officers found guilty of deforestation 
Banke- forest officials and rangers in Banke District have been found guilty of 
causing deforestation in various government and community forests. A panel called 
Natural Resources and Means Committee (NRMC) accused DFO of arbitrarily 
registering community forests and condoning deforestation. The duo jointly okayed 
registration of 34 CF in one year, thus providing leeway for deforestation. The 
connivance of senior officials at the Forest Ministry and Forest Department is also 
suspected in timber smuggling racket. “The silence maintained by the ministry at a 
time when the forest officers were on a deforestation rampage suggests that high 
level government officials are also involved” said another member of the panel.  
The local said that forest officers and timber smugglers colluded in a massive tree-
felling drive for the past nine months. Nineteen community forests at Kasum region 
were denuded. The DFO had permitted 74 community forest groups of Banke to cut 
trees. Nearly two-fold the permitted numbers of trees were cut, yielding around 
500,000 cubic feet of timber. The panel is preparing to initiate prosecution against 
the guilty ones. “This is huge crime and no one, not even the forest officers will be 
let off the hook”, Sharma said.  
 
Source: Kathmandu post, (Pandey, 2010) 
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Box 3 Chure disaster   
Nagarik News published a series of in-depth investigative reports about erosion of 
Chure Hills; the news has hinted the apathy of the police to control rampant illegal 
activities in the Chure area. According to the articles, around 0.75 billion Nepali rupees 
have been misused under President´s Chure Conservation Program (PCCP). 
Source: Nagarik News, (Gautam, 2014) 
8.1.2. Structural features of resource sectors and corruption 
This section follows three structural preconditions outlined by Kolstad and Søreide (2009) to 
be met for there to be corruption in a sector:  
 Rents: the extent of corruption in a resource sector is influenced by both structural 
factors and the agency of the main players,  
 Authority: corruption requires influence on decisions.  
 Opportunity: the quality of institutions determines the risk of being sanctioned.   
Rents: The rents from natural resources constitute windfall gains to the economy. In Nepal, 
the natural resource market has not been widespread. There are very few intermediate 
companies. A lack of competition in resource markets accumulates profits, which may 
thereby huge rents to be reaped. This inspires corruption acts from agents eager to appropriate 
part of the rents; they may create a market for transactions. Institution-related corruption 
derives distorted property-right assignments and monitoring obligations. In the forestry 
sector, the government tries to appropriate part of the rents, and other agents such as 
FECOFUN strive to reduce the discretionary power of the policy makers. There are two 
categories of corrupt behavior arenas: market transaction and discretionary power within the 
state, regional and local.  
Authority:  The forestry sector is considered as one of most corrupt sectors, where politicians, 
bureaucrats, technicians and local leaders don´t hesitate to take any steps to use this resource 
for their personal benefits. Illegal logging, revenue leakages, false measurements, 
authorization bribery, and poor transparency are major causes of corruption in the forestry 
sector. Several forest officers and management have been suspended, while the government of 
Nepal typically pointing to the local people as culprits. Poor governance refers exclusion, 
domination, exploitation, inequality, injustice, non-transparency, fraud monitoring and 
evaluation and inadequate participation and poor rule of law. There are triangulated deep-
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rooted corruption alliances in the forest bureaucracy, community elite and private business 
groups. Often there is a nexus between forest smugglers, corrupt government officials and 
corrupt local leaders that have resulted illegal timber extraction from the CF.  
To some degree, continuing these processes define the reciprocal behavior, legal pluralism 
and social stratification. Institutions basically define norms, convention and legal rules and 
we believe that citizen act according to these institutional forms. Norms is based on reciprocal 
behavior, which insist corruption activities in the society. Citizens follow those norms, which 
has established from generation to generation, authority do not processed the documents 
without getting some benefits from consumers. So the norms as a corruption has established 
from both side authority and consumers, where consumers have been helping to sustain 
corruption activities in institution to process their documents in time.  
Legal pluralism is another factor which nourishing corruption because authority or power has 
given to certain actors and use and access right has given to other actors. This system creates 
unequal benefit distribution and corruption among the actors; they bargain the percentage of 
benefit to get right from authority. So DFO is known as a corrupt officer in CF because the 
government has provided full authority to them that rottenly misuse their power for their 
private gain.  
Opportunity: In the community forestry, institutional norms dominate decision-making 
procedures, where a legal formal framework is being normally ignored. In the REDD+ pilot 
project, there are strong incentives for different players to collaborate in their influence, make 
secret agreements, boost their bargaining powers and find hidden ways to get a better 
“package solution” and facilitated by a larger set of players than those directly involved. The 
players´ possible involvement in corruption can be understood by identifying their interests 
and incentives and consider their opportunities in the light of various cost and risks (Kolstad 
and Søreide, 2009).  
8.2. PICTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY    
Civil society organization established and dedicated to solve the social problems and fight for 
poor people´s rights to access resources and benefits. However, the roles of civil society 
groups have not been adequately discussed in both academic writing and policy analysis but it 
can be hoped that these organizations could play a complimentary role in the promotion of 
good governance. Still there are confusions associated with the nature and functions of civil 
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society, various expectations attached to them by political leaders, NGOs, donors and rights-
based activists, as they are capable to create good governance and resolve the social problems. 
Politician identify CSO leaders essentially as politically motivated activists whose job is to 
give pressure to the government on the policy issues (Uprety, 2011). Despite longtime 
involvement in governance sector, CSO continue to rely on donor-driven “dollar harvesters” 
and urban-based “dollar earning groups”(ibid). International organizations has been 
supporting of CSO. As a result, an explosive growth of CSO has established as they are 
supposed to articulate people´s sentiments both at the policy making lead and its 
implementation. In general, CSO is expected to be more innovative, less corrupt, less 
bureaucratic, more efficient and more reliable than government, but we found various factors 
such as lack of effective coordination, weak financial bases, lack of professionalism, lack of 
monitoring and evaluation, lack of transparency, lack of commitment among the NGO 
activists and also absence of public surveillance. These issues have been dominating in the 
CSOs, which affect obviously efficient management, resource mobilization, policy advocacy 
and local people´s livelihoods who depend on natural resources.   Before presenting possible 
sources of corruption, it is important to put short characteristics of national institutions and 
civil society groups. These actors and institutions played a diplomatic role to implement the 
REDD+ pilot project in community forestry. Principally, CSO pushed the local forest 
dependent people into more vulnerable positions through accumulating benefits and resource 
right. They have established as “elitism” in community forestry to exercise their power. 
8.3. LOCAL PEOPLE´S PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION 
Asking about corruption was not as sensitive as expected. I spoke openly about corruption as 
a serious problem within the forest sector. Most of the respondents also believed that 
nepotism and favourism were negative aspects. Many examples were given, mostly, about 
people from outside the village bribing the village leader or CFUGC in order to harvest 
timber. Sometimes villagers were also accused of illegal forest access activities; even CFUGC 
members go and harvest themselves without telling others. Some examples were found of 
nepotism, which is widespread in Nepalese society, almost seen as a “natural” phenomenon.   
A respondent who had earlier been working with the forest related projects claimed that 
corruption was a big problem in the CF and that it still exists. He explained how elites paid a 
fraction of the real value for timber, how logs were hidden away from inspection and how the 
timber companies colluded with local authorities. 
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We asked the respondents about mismanagement of fund in the process of the REDD+ pilot 
project in their community forestry. 51% of the total respondents believed that corruption 
occurred during the project implementation. Most of there problems were Dalits and other 
ethnic groups, while 49% of the total respondents ignored this issue, where majority of the 
respondents were Brahmin and Chhetris. The results showed that there was corruption. So, we 
tried to know more about it and asked who did such activities. 55% of the respondents freely 
answered and claimed that CFUGC REDD+ related organizations and community elites were 
the main actors who involved in corruption. The chi-square test indicated that there was a 
significant relationship between corruption and powerful actors p<0.05 (p-value = 0.000). 
They explained more why they were blaming to these actors, one of the respondent said “They 
did not discussed with CFUGs about REDD+ information and fund. CFUGC did not tell us 
how much money we received from the sale of forest products and from other organizations. 
They have been excluding us from the notification of forest meetings and forest related 
projects”. Some forest users also described that the Executive Committee members misinform 
or withhold information to them. Again we added the question who helped them to do such 
activities. Respondents said that they were unknown about this and they did not like to tell 
freely about this issue. One respondent said that if he took a name, he would have problem to 
live in the communities and he added that it was not a single person activity, all-powerful 
actors were involved on it.  
Again we enquired how often such illegal activities occur in the community forestry.  
Figure 20. Frequency of corruption in CF in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
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The figure 20 shows that 8% thought there was always corruption in the CF, while 20% 
believed that there was intermittently corruption issues were raised and 72% felt that it 
occurred rarely. Those who thought that there were always and sometimes, they were mostly 
talking about REDD+ fund allocation and transparency issues. The chi-square test indicated 
that there was a significant relationship between corruption and their social status p<0.05 (p-
value = 0.04). Again we analyzed by chi square test to identify the most corrupt actors. The 
test showed that higher caste and government officials have the most significant relation with 
corruption in community forestry. 
8.3.1. Different forms of corruption  
During the project introduction and implementation, three possible forms of corruption were 
identified. 
 Embezzlement 
 Bribing 
 Fraud monitoring and reporting. 
Embezzlement and bribing is occurred in the national and district level to get the legal 
permission to implement the project. Fraud monitoring and reporting is found at the local 
level, influencing REDD+ performance. 
Figure 21 shows that 47% thought that there was fraud monitoring and reporting, 42% 
embezzlement and 11% bribing.  
Figure 21. Different forms of corruption found in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
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Embezzlement: defines as a theft of public resources. One of the CFUGC member said that 
FECOFUN had stolen funds from the REDD+ project. They were unaware this issue before, 
but when project completed some rumors were widespread.   Corruption arose between 
FECOFUN and CFUGs in the REDD+ process. FECOFUN went beyond the limit of the rule 
and regulation in order to secure an individual benefit in the form of a bribe. This process 
define as “theft” because it did not involve the forest users directly in the process of 
introduction and implementation of REDD+ pilot project, as a result the local forest users 
deprived and had no legal right to present themselves as forfeited. In Nepal, embezzlement is 
one of the tools of economy accumulation, in fact many political leaders and bureaucrats 
agencies and some CSOs collecting money by this method. Otherwise, how is it possible to 
earn multi million rupees within a few years? This forms of corruption is more serious than 
bribing.  
Bribery: bribe is something valuable (such as money) that is given in order to get someone to 
do something. This is a common practice in Nepal to make the job done. The officials expect 
it as “gifts” from clients, which is called ghush in Nepali. In the community forestry ghush 
(bribery) occurs when elites pay-off certain percentage to the forest officer, local 
governments, and CFUGC to get license of timber harvesting. Local government election has 
not been carried out for more than a decade in Nepal and centrally appointed bureaucrats run 
local councils. According to Banyan (2011), political interests capture (60 to 90)% of all 
funds and (25 and 50)% of all development funds are misused in Nepal.  
Fraud monitoring and reporting: is also a form of corruption of the study area. Fraud is a 
serious crime where actors involve dishonesty, cheating and false reporting about project.  We 
found two types of fraud in the area; benefit sharing and carbon monitoring and reporting. 
According to K C et al. (2013) the total carbon stock of the forest was calculated as 122.29 
ton/ha, which was less than estimated by ICIMOD, FECOFUN and ANSAB. In terms of 
benefit sharing, few marginalized people had benefited and more benefit had distributed to 
higher caste and rich livelihood condition people.  After completed the project in the sites 
CFUGC started to collect benefit back, this is completely fraud activity.  In the benefit 
distribution, favoritism had seen, which is a mechanism of power abuse implying highly 
biased distribution of REDD+ fund. One of the respondent said, “ according to safeguard 
guidelines, I was qualified to get benefit and I tried many times to get it and met to CFUG´s 
chairperson but he denied to provide me fund. Later, I knew that he gave to higher caste and 
not poor one. It is ok I did not get benefit but why he gave to Brahmins, why not the poor”. 
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When he was talking, he was so angry and requested me to go with him to talk with 
chairperson about unequal fund distribution.  
We asked to the respondents “how much are you satisfied with forest monitoring and 
evaluation incentives” (Figure 22). 
Figure 22. Respondents perception about forest monitoring and evaluation in Ludikhola 
watershed, Nepal 2015 
N=105 
Figure 22 shows that 12% were strongly satisfied and 47% were satisfied, while 35% 
dissatisfied and 4% were strongly dissatisfied in the forest and carbon monitoring and 
evaluation system. Surprisingly there were no big differences in opinions between the wealth 
groups in all three CFUGs but we found quite big differences among CFUGs. CFUG1 and 
CFUG2 respondent answered that 31% disagreed, where CFUG3 found only 8%.  
Besides that, different significant factors affecting forest governance and its effectiveness of 
regulatory controls such as, dualistic concept of forest policy (formal and informal), social 
norms, institutions, political instability, lawlessness, and bureaucratic control. In the CF, 
illegal cases were rarely resolved because it was linked to powerful actors and institutions. 
One of the respondent said, “ First, such cases are never published if powerful actors are 
involved in it. If poor people have done this, it comes out and makes him/her restricted to 
access the resources for certain month or year. There cases basically are solved by CFUGC. 
If they are not able, the case goes to DFO or Village Development Committee”.  
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Favoritism: is a mechanism of power abuse where a highly biased distribution of public 
resources put in place no matter how these resources has been accumulated. It is a tendency to 
favor family, friends, relatives, class, caste, gender, members from the same party and 
anybody closed and trusted. In the REDD+ pilot project, it is linking of CFUGC and villagers 
who have access to common resources and the power to decide upon the distribution of these, 
to give preferential treatment to certain people such as higher caste groups in CF. It will be 
fair to note that favourism had seen as a natural process in the REDD+ benefit distribution. In 
addition, CFUGs has the constitutional right to appoint all members in executive committee, 
customary rights that extend exceedingly the possibilities for favoritism. In the national 
REDD+ policy making process, adds up several positions, diplomatic organization and other 
line agencies to exceed the possibilities for favoritism.  
Nepotism: is a special form of favourism, where an authority prefers his proper kinfolk and 
family members to facilitate benefits. In Nepal, many political leaders have tried to secure 
their power position by referring their family members to various public positions in the state 
apparatus. Nepotism does not looks qualifications, skills and efficiency; it looks only the 
kinfolk and posted in public positions where have possibilities of corruption and extractive 
practices. Favoritism can secure these groups. In the process of REDD+, nepotism had highly 
occurred in benefit distribution and capacity building activities. In the study area those people 
were benefited who were closed to CFUGC and half of CFUGC was organized in same 
family members.  
After the restoration of democracy in Nepal, these possible forms of corruption have been 
spreading. This seems not solely a lack of enforcement of law; it is more likely depends on 
social structure; norms, convention and rules. Legal pluralism is a main factor of facilitating 
corruption in the community forestry.  
8.4. DO RULES AND REGULATIONS PROVIDE FOR 
TRANSPARENCY?  
8.4.1. Governance related provisions 
Nepal´s Interim Constitution (2007) and various legal provisions enacted by the government 
aim to ensure transparency and public accountability in all sectors but transparency provisions 
are scattered through many legal documents, which is making difficult for the public to 
understand and use them. In 2003 Nepal´s parliament ratified the United Nations Convention 
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against Corruption after considerable international donor pressure but political leadership and 
bureaucracy were reluctant to ratify this (Paudel et al., 2011). If they did so, own involvement 
in corruption processes and bureaucratic control over public decision-making processes will 
be reduced.  
The Right of Information Act (2007) was enacted by Parliament after many years of struggle 
by human-right related NGOs. Under this law, all citizens have a right to information and 
concerned agencies have obligations to provide it. Similar provisions are made in article 13 of 
the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007. But few people are conscious of these provisions 
because there are no follow up mechanism and institutional expertise to aware people about 
this provision. According to article 33 (C) of the Interim Constitution, the state has 
obligations to maintain people´s sovereignty, rule of law, judicial independence, civil society 
monitoring, right to information, transparency, people´s participation and elimination of 
corruption and impunity (Paudel et al., 2011). In the study site, the constitutional framework 
for transparency had not implemented due to reluctance of the civil society to maintain 
transparent procedures. However, there are many legal agencies and Local Self-governance 
Act (1990) to procedure for maintaining transparency and public information at district and 
local level. For example Chief District Office (CDO), District Court, and District 
Development Committee, these three institutions involvement create confusion about roles 
and responsibilities and thus create space for corruption and mismanagement in the 
community forestry and other sectors. The Forest Act (1993) do not specifically mention the 
measure of ensuring transparency but recent guidelines issued by MFSC for the Community 
Forestry Development Program (2009) indicated provision for public hearings and public 
audits (sections 5.2, 5.9 and 7.1/ 7.2) for transparency in fund mobilization (section 3.8). 
CFUGs are expected to include such provisions in their constitutions and operational plans 
because it is important to create good governance. But many research and monitoring reports 
indicate that transparency in CFUGs is not satisfactory in practice. Table 31 presents the 
implementation status of governance related provisions by CFUGs. 
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Table 31 Implementation status of governance related provisions in Ludikhola 
watershed, Nepal 2015 
Major provision CFUG1 CFUG2 CFUG3 
Proportionate representation of poor, Dalits, 
women and Janajati in the CFUGC 
No No No 
Inclusion of committee members from all 
villages (toles) of CFUG HHs 
Yes Yes Yes 
Organize public audit by all CFUGs at least 
once a year ensuring participation of Dalits, 
women, poor and Janajati  
No No No 
General assembly of the CFUG should assign 
the auditor  
No No No 
User´s committee is only allowed to spend 
money according to the annual plan approved 
by general assembly of user´s group 
No No No 
CFUGs should report to DFO and other service 
providers about the progress of livelihood 
improvement program 
No No No 
Include poor as a new member either free of 
cost or at subsidized membership fees 
No No No 
 
The table 31 shows that the CFUGs did not implement most of the governance related 
provision. The only provision implemented by all CFUGs was representation of members 
from village of CFUG HH.  
Besides CFUGs governance related provision, various civil society groups also have their 
own rules and statements in the forest sector to maintain transparency such as rule of law, 
public auditing of funds and public hearings program which are presented in section 6 
FECOFUN bylaws. According to chapter 8 of FECOFUN´s regulations, internal and annual 
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audit reports should submit to its meetings assemblies and ensure that the information flows 
from center to district and local level including its funds and their utilization. These activities 
had not appeared in the ground, they were doing unprofessionally, as a result accountability 
and transparency problems occurred and there are no clear legal provisions for them to 
maintain transparency. In the study site, there were no clear, documented and understood 
steps for resolving conflicts between transparency and confidentiality norms and their 
employee also refused to provide information. During the field visit, I gave phone call so 
many times to FECOFUN chairperson and their employee but they refused to give 
information. They don´t have a single answer. They are very clever to pretend and they rarely 
give the correct answers. They were skeptical, if they had been transparent, why were they 
refusing to give me the auditing report, why did they escape from these emerging issues. Such 
activities indicate that there were not mechanisms for maintaining transparency. There is 
much room for improvement. 
On the other hand, international donors are demanding effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy but here CSOs and CFUGs did not properly follow the 
guidelines. There is no formal national forum that can make the agencies aware of raising 
issues of concern with the forest authorities. We asked the respondents, “do you know why 
corruption activities have been continuing in CF”? We gave many options for them to select 
their opinions and they were also free to choose their own. Table 32 presents the reasons of 
continuing corruption in CF. 
Table 32. Respondent´s opinion of continuing corruption in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 
2015  
Corruption in CF Respondents (%) 
Conventions, norms and rules 79 
Lack of good governance 91 
This is established as an institution 90 
This is an effect of neglecting local people from resource use 5.5 
Misuse of power 83.5 
Higher bargaining system 6 
Poor mentality of politician 75 
N=109 
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Table 32 shows that 79% believed that corruption is continuing in the CF through existing 
convention, norms and rules. In the context of the Nepalese society, conventions and norms 
shape the human behavior such as if you have power you will learn how to accumulate 
resources (misuse power) and if you are powerless you learn how to tackle such power. Our 
convention and norms teach us we have to give certain amount of money if we need our work 
done on time. Basically, norms say us to give money (bribe) to the officer rather than pending 
your work. 91% of the total respondents thought that it is a lack of good governance, the 
management practices where self-governance or collective action has not taken properly. So, 
90% of the respondents believed that it has established as an institution, which is defined by 
habitualized actions by type of actors where a “reciprocal typification” has seen. Neglecting 
local people from resource use and higher bargaining system has seen only 5.5% and 6%. 
Rather than this people thought corruption is continue because powerful actors misuse their 
power in the forest governance, where 83.5% of the total respondents believed on it. 
Similarly, 75% thought that there poor mentality of politician continued corruption activities 
in CF.  
Already having established corruption in the community forestry, which was overall seen as 
the poor option by villagers. We asked to the villagers to evaluate the most corrupt people in 
the REDD+ introduction and implementation, some list of most corrupt people has found 
regarding forest governance, which can see below in table 33.  
Table 33. Corrupt people associated with REDD+ and CF in Ludikhola watershed, 
Nepal 2015 
Corrupt people in forestry sector Respondents (%) 
Ministers 83 
Government officials 79 
DFO (District Forest Officer) 34 
Local politician 52 
Executive Committee (EC) of CFUG 31 
Community elites 64 
Civil Society Organization  42 
N=109 
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Unexpectedly there was no big difference in opinion between wealth groups, where for 
instance 51% in all three groups thought there was corruption, and when asked whom do they 
believe the most corrupt actors, 76% poorest and middle livelihood status people answered, 
while 7% of higher class villagers answered the same. Similarly these groups believed 79% 
government official are most corrupt, where educated people agreed highly rather than 
illiterate people. This means that in between 30 to 50 years people were more vulnerable by 
bribing and answered that they have been continuously paying extra money to government 
official to process their documents.  
34% respondents thought that there were corruptions by DFO, where 22% and 12% middle 
and high livelihood status group corresponded. As we said before, these groups were highly 
interested in forest management resources, in this process they need to talk with DFO so they 
knew well the behavior of DFO´s compared to lower livelihood status people.  
52% of the respondents thought that local politicians did more corruption, where Dalits 
(19%), ethnic groups (31%) and higher caste (1%) responded in particular. This result was 
found in CFUG3, where we found a highly political scenario in CF management. One 
respondent said, “there was always bargaining which party would lead the CF rather than we 
were capable”. 83% of the total respondents believed that politician were corrupt in CFUG3, 
12% in CFUG2 and 5% in CFUG1. 31% believed that the CFUG´s executive committee was 
corrupt.  
8.4.2. Is there any legal enforcement system to control the corruption in 
community level?  
In order for the REDD+ pilot project to work in community, an overall accepted and well 
functioning management system has to be put in place. So it is important to know if there are 
any legal enforcement systems in community to control corruption. We asked the respondents 
regarding the legal system, which we can see below in figure 23.  
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Figure 23. Legal enforcement system to control corruption in Ludikhola watershed, 
Nepal 2015 
 
N=109 
Overall (74%) respondents claimed that there was no any legal enforcement system to control 
corruption, while 11% believed there was and 15% had no idea about this. 64% of lower and 
middle livelihood status group and 10% higher livelihood status group claimed lack of 
existence of legal system. Repetitions of stealing forest products by some identifiable 
individuals raise questions over the capability of responsible committee in controlling illegal 
activities effectively.  
8.4.3. Is Anti-corruption institution useful? 
According to the CFUGC, the sanctions need to reshape and more improvements in order to 
work more effectively to control illegal activities in CF. Many people (91%) claimed that the 
system of sanctioning works well. However, to control the corruption, many institutions have 
been established only in the municipality level. Many of the respondents were unaware about 
this institution. We asked to the respondents about the usefulness of anti-corruption 
institution, which we can see in figure 24.  
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74% 
15% 
Yes No Don´t know
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Figure 24. Usefulness of anti-corruption institution in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015 
 
N=109 
Overall adherence (17%) claimed effectiveness of anti-corruption institution. 51% and 32% of 
respondents claimed it not applicable and ineffective in controlling corruption respectively. At 
present, existing news also indicates that the anti-corruption institution favor powerful actors 
and held only for lower levels of authorities. In some cases, politicians also blamed them not 
to properly follow juridical authority and handling cases according to their favoritism and 
nepotism. Overall, people do not find the anti-corruption institution effective to reduce 
corruption.  
In community forest management, many conflicts are linked to low access to forest and 
benefit distribution. Many villagers are reported to attempt various means to ensure forest 
management and its related benefits on their area. A lack of tenure right causes a lot of stress, 
space and conflicts especially during alternative sources of firewood shortage periods. 
Conflict resolution mechanisms should be embedded around the nature of the conflicts, for 
instance internal forest management conflicts are mostly resolved through customary 
arrangements in rather harmonized ways. Most reported illegal cases were resolved through 
discussions and negotiations by forest users through local and user groups‟ leaders. Some of 
the cases were reported at district level when two parties denied negotiating and sanctions.   
Again, the CFUGC is the lowest level of resolving internal conflicts and if failed the case 
could be referred to VDC and further to DFO and DDC up to the district level. Some 
accountability and transparency issues were still seen as being of particular concern. 
Useful 
17% 
Useless 
32% 
Not applicable 
51% 
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Therefore, to understand people opinion we asked to the respondents “do you think CFUG 
members can stop the corruption through REDD+”?  
Community forest user group´s executive committees have the ultimate right to account their 
interest of the forest management and they are the direct beneficiaries of the forest 
management policy. CFUG functions as a legitimate body for issuing forest user permits and 
charging forest fees. CFUG through village officials are managing and organizing their daily 
operation with little or more external interference. They are the lowest appropriate level of 
management of forest; it includes management, distribution and conservation of forest for 
their users.  
The district forest officer and community forestry related civil society organizations are the 
external authorities that collaborate on certain responsibilities with structure management 
authority in this small-scale forest management. Sound relationship with external interference 
is actually reported in the community. Local people have not good collaboration with DFO, 
agencies donors and other stakeholders in making vital decisions regarding forest 
conservation programs. So people seem skeptical to mitigate corruption through any civil 
society organizations.  
So, the given question elaborated clearly and asked “direct REDD+ involvement in forest 
conservation”. 51% respondents in the total sample claimed that they could reduce corruption 
activities in the community forestry through direct involvement of REDD+. Forest users 
believed that direct involvement of REDD+ would be more efficient and cost-effective and 
also reduce the heavy amount of transaction cost. While 18% believed that the corruption 
activities will not be reduced through REDD+ involvement. They clarify that corruption is 
established as a social norms, if they involve in the CF they will employ the local people, who 
have mentally corrupt nature, they misuse the power. Similarly, 31% answered that they don´t 
know.  
8.4.4. Controlling corruption in community forestry 
To those who answered the question of “can corruption reduce in CF through REDD+”? We 
asked, “How can we control corruption?”  Some suggestions are outlined here which can be 
seen below in table 34.  
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Table 34. Users´ suggestion to control corruption in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal 2015  
Control corruption Respondents % 
Reporting police officer  1 
Awareness regarding right, authority and duties  53 
By inclusive participation in decision making process  83 
By educating local people  83.5 
By charging high amount of money and long time custody 2 
By avoiding caste and gender discrimination 75 
By avoiding government´s monopolies in CF 36 
By providing clear land tenure 53 
 
Respondents, expressed their opinions about the role and function of CFUGs, was mainly due 
to the contribution of CFUGs in mitigating corruption and conservation natural resources and 
accessing external services for local benefits. As reported by respondents, the effort will be 
successful in promoting collective actions and reducing corruption in community forestry 
sector. The poor people expressed their opinions and claimed that reporting police in the 
process of reducing corruption is not a possible strategy. They have mainly focused on three 
main points such as inclusive participation in decision making process (83%), educating local 
people (83.5%) and avoiding caste and gender discrimination (75%).  
Despite these issues, creating good governance and transformation of CFUGs in favor of 
marginalized groups seems impossible in the community forestry. Most of the persons in 
decision-making positions had their connections with political parties and the political 
connections were also used to gain power and to continue a lack of transparency. Much of the 
concern for mismanagement of funding and unequal distribution of payments was concerned 
with who would be the overall authority responsible for the management of REDD+ and for 
its distribution. To some extent, specifically how much the CFUGs would be involved? 
Overall, people felt that individual awareness about the project would mean that the 
management authority have the less chance of mismanagement. It should be put forward as a 
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way of solving corruption issues that there should be good communication throughout the 
process, where the villagers would be informed of what those in charge were doing, who were 
getting what and in what basis. If this is done, they could be more easily notice any lack of 
transparency in the management system. Many of the respondents also have mentioned some 
factors such as; education, equal participation and equity are required to establish good 
governance. In addition, some suggested that in order to make sure things were carried out in 
a proper manner, it would be good if the anti-corruption institution or district authority kept 
an eye on the activities in the communities and controlled that CFUGC were performing their 
tasks as set out in the beginning.  
According to FCTF guidelines, there were training on good governance for village leaders as 
well as the CFUGs and during the project FCTF also planed to assist and help the villagers or 
CFUGC without analyzed unequal distribution or grievance. Much of their assistance seemed 
to lay carbon measurement, and overall benefit distribution and awareness responsibilities 
went to the hands of the community elites and CFUGC. Issue of corruption in general, and 
elite capture in particular seems quite difficult to avoid specially in Nepal, however also 
closely linked to the issue of governance and institutional capacity is the way in which 
accountability and transparency can be ensured.  
8.5. WHY REDD+ PILOT PROJECT IS FAILED TO GET 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN CF 
A lack of accountability and transparency seems to have been a major issue under CF, and a 
reason for why many CF projects have not reached its full potential of benefits for local 
people is made a current issue in Nepal.  
The ways in which FCTF guideline to ensure; firstly, to aware people or build capacity 
through training or MRV, governance training for community leaders and the CFUGs in order 
to strengthen decision making processes and transparency as well as building the capacity of 
communities to advocate for their rights. Secondly, while acknowledging the risk of 
marginalized groups being excluded from the process and benefits. They aim to recognized 
those marginalized groups and come up with measure that will ensure that they benefit from 
the project as well as keeping good communication with and establish a monitoring system 
that the principles should also be applied to forest users to track the impact of REDD on these 
groups as the project process.  
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As issue that comes to mind is the level of local institution assisted in the work. Previously 
under the CF, besides initial training it appears most of the people within the CFUGs have 
dedicated a lot of time and effort without being compensated for it. Primarily, the forest 
management to be inclusive where everyone‟s interests are acknowledged but it has not done 
often and forced to people to accept the guidelines. The experiences from CF tell that if not 
sufficiently incentivized or provided assistance, the conflict may emerge and we can find 
many examples. Once the “loyalty” of the project wears off the people placed with the 
responsibility of performing these tasks has stopped and returned to their day-to-day tasks. 
These practices has been establishing since the community forestry establishment.  
Secondly, the current power structure in place in each village is difficult to influence or 
change. Dalits women are the most vulnerable groups who face the double burden of caste 
and gender discrimination in all aspect in Nepal. Practically, high-caste women dominate 
Dalits women, and men also dominate women in the collection of forest products from 
community forests. The influence of single caste and gender in decision-making also leads to 
inequality access to resources and benefits. Dalits and women are discriminated against at all 
levels from local to national level which led to the exclusion of millions of Dalits and women 
from the benefits so far. In such a situation, REDD+ staff can influence and facilitate better 
performance through training on governance and hope that issues like elite capture and 
unequal distribution will improve. One possible way is the formation of alliances and local 
capacity building that has given the local forest users “power with” and “power within”. The 
method of capacity building is a channel for mobilizing invisible power for resisting or 
shifting social norms and beliefs internally among the local forest users.  
Whether or not this more “hands-off” approach of the REDD+ is not suffice at in establishing 
a transparent and equal benefit sharing system because of its own lack of initiatives. It does 
not likely that an improved governance system would happen on its own. As the benefits 
available got more substantial, for instance as a result of carbon payments, the risk of 
mismanagement and unequal distribution increased. This can be seen as a big risk in terms of 
performance, involved actors did fraud monitoring and reporting to get more benefits. As a 
result, conflicts increased. If the majority, especially forest dependent people feel they do not 
benefit and that they only lose from the project and strong sanctions placed on their forest 
access and use, they are unlikely to continue supporting the project. People would rather start 
going back into the forest and disregard the rules put in place, such as forest fires. In addition, 
it is noticeable that only a few are subjected to large amount of benefits. It stands a higher 
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chance of increasing conflict levels and disintegrates the social structure. It also hampers the 
social well-being of villagers and do not bring villagers together even though the project 
intended to do so. It rather increased the tension between villagers. We need to emphasize the 
great challenge that the poorest people in the community have. Their lack of capacity and 
inability to take part in many social activities are left out of the benefit steam. If these benefits 
do not reach them but instead only costs added upon them, the effect can be detrimental to 
this group and push them in more vulnerable condition and serve as marginalized positions as 
before.  
In addition, local government authority has set several governance provisions, but has not 
properly implemented on the ground. Before implement any project, project managers should 
study what provision they have and what can be done to provide more benefits to locals. In 
the study sites, after completed the pilot project, many CFUGs started to take benefits back 
and penalized who has not paid yet back. In FCTF guidelines, it has clearly mentioned that 
60% weighted social benefits goes to local poor and marginalized groups. But after completed 
the project, why these benefits are taking back from those groups. This is completely fraud 
activity of CFUGC, who would like to accumulate the whole benefits. If such activities are 
continued, forest dependent people will not accept the project in future.  
Therefore, Ostrom and her design principles for sustainable natural resource management 
clearly put forward that not only collective participation and decision-making need to be in 
place, there also need to be congruence between the efforts that is put into the project with 
what is gained. There needs to be in place a management authority which is accountable for 
its actions (Vedeld, 2002).  
8.6. WHY CORRUPTION IS CONTINUED IN FORESTRY SECTOR?  
In this section, I illuminate the generalized institutional model of corruption. This analysis 
underlines that corruption is established within existing social regimes, not outside of them. 
Corruption creates particular system through incentives and actions on the ground.  
8.6.1. De jure law becomes de facto corruption  
The forest users represent a variety of caste groups and a range of class strata, which 
scheduled caste group as higher caste, ethnic group and Dalits. Enforcement of the rules falls 
upon a dozen of forest department officers from district level to local level. These officials 
patrol the areas, their job is to enforce the rules against cutting and poaching and to facilitate 
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plantation of nurseries. Forest Act 1993, gives them authority of monitoring the forest and 
transmitting information about the condition and status of ecosystem health back to the Forest 
Department in order to create and adapt management policies. Primarily, these officials select 
their own birthplace or their favorite area and it is possible if you have a good relation with 
politician or national forest department officials. Higher caste people are traditionally 
landowners, warriors and administrators by trade, have come to occupy important positions in 
government, policing and forestry sector. Lower-level forest guard comes from lower caste or 
a wider mix of caste backgrounds. This pattern of understanding and forester background is 
not only Gorkha district; it is widespread elsewhere in Nepal.  
The formal (de jure) institution described above has, over the period since Rana regime was 
removed, been transformed into a set of stabilized extra-legal exchange rules, rotted in local 
system of power. Especially in community forestry, corruption takes place by giving goats, 
money, alcoholic drinks etc. to the forest officials as a bribery. The forest smugglers cut the 
green timber and forest products, which they are not entitled to do by law and they extract 
quantities beyond the maximum quota per HH established by law. These activities balance by 
paying lower level forest officers or forest guards. If local people do such activities without 
any setting with lower level forest officers then they are liable to a fine and a normal 
enforcement of rule. The fine is a discretionary charge, often decided on the spot by the forest 
officer. The prices for forest products are comparatively very high than the charges set by 
Forest Department policy. 
Box 4: Forest Officer-smuggler nexus causing deforestation 
Nepalgunj- Wood mafia in Banke District have registered national forests as 
community forests with a view to cut down more trees than instructed by the 
government to rake huge money overnight. A report on the condition of community 
forests recently revealed that trees value several million rupees belonging to 
community and national forests have been felled down in Banke district with the 
involvement of Forest Officers and other employees.  
According to the forest office sources, Forest Officers, Rangers, middlemen and 
smugglers had hatched a clandestine plan to register national forests as a community 
forests enabling to cut down huge number of green trees and collect millions of 
rupees by selling them in Nepali and Indian markets. The source claimed that most of 
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the community forests did not follow the rule and regulations during the time of 
registering the forests as community forests. They seemed to be in a hurry to register 
the forest so that they would be able to cut down trees valuing millions of rupees, 
trees of the forests that once belonged to a certain community. The huge amount of 
commission money is the core reason behind the massive cutting of trees in the 
district. Likewise, the leaders of various political parties are involved in safeguarding 
the wood smuggler. According to a report, the office can give permission to cut down 
only 2250,000 cubic feet of woods at a time but it was found that about 600,000 cubic 
feet of timber is being cut down at the community forests.  
Source: The Rising Nepal, (TRN, 2010) 
At present, some products, especially green trees are unavailable except through bribery but 
this timber earns significant mark-up in nearby towns and is the foundation of a widespread 
illegal timber harvesting. The fate of bribe money paid for extraction of these products could 
not be traced during the field visit but it is widely believed that in Terai region money 
collected for illegal forest use is divided into shares that handed upwards in the Forest 
Department bureaucracy.  
Box 5: Village forests go through midlife crisis: Nepal´s community forestry movement 
is threatened by corruption and greed 
Kathmandu: Political fluidity and a breakdown in the rule of law have led to rampant 
logging nationwide and threatening to undermine Nepal's internationally recognized 
community forestry programs. Trees are being felled by logging groups that enjoy 
political patronage and protection from district forest officers (DFOs). Community 
forestry user groups, on the other hand, have been colluding with timber poachers 
and corrupted local officials to harvest trees.  
Illegal logging is now so rampant and blatant that Prime Minister Madhav Kumar 
Nepal summoned the Minister of Forests and Soil Conservation, Deepak Bohara, and 
asked for clarification. The ministry then recalled DFOs from two districts, but no 
one has been charged.  
Source: Nepali Times, (Mahato, 2010) 
The structure of the bureaucracy accounts for much of the perpetuation of corruption through 
class and caste backgrounds of both foresters and the local elites in the wood trade establish 
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strong bounds of trust for extra-legal exchange. The upper level activities tend to encourage 
corruption to the lower level officials too. Forest department functionaries are promoted 
through seniority in statewide pool, the wait for promotion is of ten to twenty years so they 
misuse the power and the incentive to take profits “off the top” through bribes is far higher for 
those with little hope of promotion.  
On the other hand, if foresters are scrupulous and deny the cooperative bonds of the 
institution by not complying with powerful elites who except access to forest products, his 
transfer to other places will follow. By institutionalizing the norms of discretionary rights laid 
out along lines of local obligation, the system appears to its practitioners more like a 
legitimate protocol for the use of the forest (Robbins, 2000). The institution amongst a largely 
homogenous community of foresters continues a “norm” of corruption, reinforcing a sense of 
inevitability.  
8.6.2. Cooperation, trust and sustainability in corruption  
Everyone is not equally well positioned in the community to access this “market”. A 
community elite always makes good relations with foresters, which allows him to get trees 
even it is closed for everyone. Lower caste groups are still underrepresented in the forest 
department bureaucracy, so they receive less immediate access. These groups make up a bulk 
of the bureaucracy (community forestry), which is established over time. The system of 
bribery also creates a form of  “membership fees” as preliminary bribes that also marginalize 
poor people. Women cannot be in a social position to establish “closeness” to the foresters 
because they are not allowed to attain the parties and drinking. Later, women and poor people 
chose the tactics of evasion rather than cooperation and trust.   
The forest management system is generally unsustainable, however, REDD+ rules are 
specific. In the Ludikhola watershed, the tree suffered serious decline in the period before the 
establishment of CF in 1992, and, as a result, received attention from upper-level bureaucrats 
who oversaw the community forest management. It is dubious why bureaucratic pressures to 
protect some important indigenous trees such as Acacia catechu, why not other species? Such 
arrangements suggest the merging of de facto and de jure rules in the constitution of the actual 
corrupt management institution (Robbins, 2000). As a hybrid form of rules, corruption is an 
institution with specific and measureable effects; it is not the absence of one. 
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8.7. EVERYDAY RESISTANCE AT LOCAL LEVEL  
At the local level, creating a common enemy is an old strategy, and it is easier to say no to the 
authoritarian regimes. Therefore, communities have created and claimed spaces to claim their 
rights and promote their interests, and have become involved in the “everyday resistance”, 
gaining access to hidden arenas of power. In the community, rather than seeing “resistance as 
organization”, we can see the less visible or every-day forms of resistance as Scott introduces, 
such as foot-dragging, evasion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and 
sabotage (Scott, 1985). Resistance is a subtle form of contesting “hegemony” by making use 
of prescribed roles and language to resist the abuse of power including things like rumour, 
gossip, disguises, linguistic tricks, metaphors, euphemisms, folktales, ritual, features, 
anonymity (Scott, 1985). These methods seem practically effective in the community forestry 
where violence is used to maintain the status quo and people do this kind of resistance by 
coordination and planning to resist without directly confronting or challenging elite norms. 
New forms of resistance activities have been done by youth, without particular permission 
they will access public resources and talk openly about their rights, which is typically not 
socially permitted by the higher caste people. A few years ago, Dalits used to access public 
water taps in the night to escape from higher casts because they are not allowed to touch the 
public tap. They were and are considered as untouchable cast, as they touch other higher cast 
people or water or entered into the temple, then all these thing would be impure and they have 
to purify it by arranging meticulous ritual practices. Still, meals are serving outside the house 
in leaf plates in some communities in the villages. Some educated Dalits opposed this system 
and so that, nowadays, in many communities, higher caste people started to serve them in 
normal plates but still outside the home. Scott talks about resistance from dominated groups 
who voice their resistance in “cryptic and opaque” ways often for their own safety (Scott, 
1990).  
Scott describes the social groups by the hidden transcript and the public transcript. The 
public transcript in the community forestry can be seen in the dominant group of the whole 
society, the “higher caste” people. In these practices, marginalized groups follow the rules and 
show their willingness to work with them. However, through hidden transcripts they are very 
polite and kind with the upper caste people and do what they are told to do, but they quench 
their anger by street drama, social celebration and badmouthing. It does not appear like 
resistance, but seems like starting, rehearsal and some day in future they will shout out in the 
state (Scott, 1990). In this case, marginalized groups are not organizing them self-consciously 
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but they are doing it more as a survival mechanism. Class and caste system is marginalizing 
everyday life so people are following different practices at local level as for example; they 
took cattle during night to destroy the crops to take revenge, set forest fires, and created 
barrier in the irrigation canals.   
As I discussed above, corruption creates particular system through incentives and actions on 
the grounds rather than through formal complaints, organizing groups and resisting the 
process of overcharging and unjust distribution of rights. The marginalized groups are 
complicit in the corrupt institution. In the case of bad governance system, there is a lack of 
resistance, which means there is a clear result of the coercive pressure and normative social 
power exerted by caste and class elites. The poor people are unable to resist because they are 
themselves complicit in corrupt exchanges and it is also rooted firmly in existing institutions.  
Many people in local communities, especially marginalized groups, have prepared small 
groups to create awareness of their rights. They said that they are not against the REDD+ pilot 
project or other related projects. What they oppose are the current practices of powerful 
actor´s behavior and their activities in the natural resource management. Powerful actors 
implemented the REDD+ pilot project in the communities without consulting local people, 
without including them in benefit sharing and without seeing them as “members of the 
society”. The opposition to REDD+ is not opposition to REDD+ per se, or to the 
development, but it is seen as part of everyday resistance of local struggle. With a long 
history of exclusion in participatory forest management, inequitable benefit sharing biased 
from development agendas and marginalization of poor and lower caste people in many local 
communities had simply enough to prepare for everyday resistance. Development projects 
became an industry of interests so people can create their claimed space and fight for their 
right in the case of power and corruption in natural resource management.  
8.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Corruption represents the transformation of equitable rules of forest management into 
inequitable ways through establishment of persistent institutions along strong networks of 
cooperation between local politicians, elites and forest officials. Authority over forest 
resources is established through formal law, but the community forest management structure 
is formed along axes of classed, casted and gendered social power. A pervasive and 
normatively disturbing feature of the institutional regime at Ludikhola, however, which 
continues to puzzle the participation of marginalized groups in the CF. is the lack of 
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organized resistance groups, which could have been a result of the coercive pressure and 
normative social power exerted by caste and class elites who make up the bulk of participants 
in the community management system. At local level, I found that many marginalized people 
taking revenge invisibly to kill their anger, such as they took cattle during the night to destroy 
the crops to take revenge, forest fire, create barrier in irrigation canal and gossips. 
According to the respondents, there are three possible sources of corruption; embezzlement, 
bribery and fraud monitoring and reporting. In addition, nepotism and favoritism are also 
dominated in the areas. Corruption in the REDD+ pilot project is the logical extension of 
those system of power, extending them into the control of nature, where corruption is the 
vehicle through which local political economy becomes implicated in civil society power, 
making relatively equitable informal rules and therefore providing space for agent and local 
elites to govern nature/society interactions despite rules to the contrary. In the REDD+ 
process, many institutional configurations occurred that respond to changes in the state of 
resource and built from diverse interest and practices but corruption linked institutionalized 
system of society pushed to REDD+ in two locks of system. However, it is an essential 
component for inclusion of marginalized group in REDD+ program and measures to increase 
intersectional and public oversight to give equitable benefit sharing, social justice, rights and 
responsibility to them. Finally, politically influence civil society groups; corrupt bureaucrats 
and local power networks require further consideration. It is still difficult to conclude that in 
what level localized resource management aimed at institutional reform and equity curb 
corruption under conditions of significant imbalances in social power.  
  
 181 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1. CONCLUSION  
The thesis has attempted to form a picture of the empirical situation and some development 
outcomes of the REDD+ pilot project in Ludikhola watershed, Nepal. The project was 
conducted from 2009 to 2013. This study has focused primarily on describing the policies, 
activities, and outcomes of community forest management in the area. In addition, the 
national REDD+ policy-making process has analyzed and some of its related ambiguities 
have been identified related to power and bad governance and corruption.  
This thesis explored the relationship between power and corruption through comparing and 
evaluating previous and the existing resource governance regimes. It helped to identify the 
actors and their interests, motivations in policymaking process and their influences in 
resource governance and expected outcomes. I have investigated the negotiations and 
contestations between various actors involved, and how these actors exercise power in 
different settings, spaces and how these again will influence the national REDD+ policy 
outcomes. In relation to corruption, I have identified how legal systems (actors) have been 
practiced in informal systems to accumulate resources in forestry sectors. 
I found that elite captures, political influence, mismanagement of fund, power and corruptions 
are hindering sustainable forest management systems. Caste-based and gender-based social 
hierarchies are still prevalent in the community, which has structured access to the resources 
and benefit distributions. I also found that contemporary community forest policies focus on 
state community relationships, which has affected the poor people because of neglect of 
transformative participation. There were not only policies, but also organizational structure 
and actor´s roles in policy implementation that has marginalized the outcomes for poor 
people. Such practices, in turn, provided substantial power and authority to the dominant elite 
in terms of caste and class. The activities of poor information sharing and poor coordination 
of organization have been found in the study area. Powerful actors influence the spaces of 
participations and negotiations and it de-legitimizes the REDD+ processes.  
At local level, I found that communities have created resistance activities and claimed spaces 
to put forwards their rights and promote their interests, and have become involved in the 
everyday resistance, gaining access to the hidden arenas of power. In the community, rather 
than seeing “resistance as organization”, I found invisible or everyday forms of resistance. 
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Class and caste system is marginalizing everyday life so people are following different 
theories and practices at local level for example; they took cattle during night to destroy the 
crops to take revenge, forest fire, create barrier in irrigation canal, and backbiting. Corruption 
creates particular system through incentives and actions on the grounds rather than complain, 
organize groups and resist the process of overcharging and unjust distribution of rights.  
In terms of the REDD+ pilot project, so far, land use planning exercises has been carried out 
in a few communities and participatory methods and awareness raising were used to create 
acceptance and to elect members to the Watershed REDD Network in charge of managing 
REDD+ pilot project in the village. The various forest user groups were identified with 
particular attention given to the marginalized groups. Drivers of deforestation in each village 
were mapped out. But again, when viewing the project in terms of its ability to create net-
carbon storage, only selected areas had been chosen, and not the entire forest area - thus not 
preventing leakages. What I found is that CFUGC suggested to the local forest users to go to 
particular “other” areas to access forest products. It means, forest users were continuously 
using forest products from other forest landscapes or taken the same landscapes except that 
those selected for carbon measurement. Such kind of fraud activities has been found in the 
study area, where a lack of clear consultants and no comprehensive leakage strategies had 
been established.  
On the other hand, a lack of equal REDD+ benefit sharing has become a main source of 
conflict in the study area. CFUGC started in fact to take back benefit funds and established 
micro finance businesses. REDD+ funds have been opened to hijacking by local elites. Thus, 
there is a need for a clear land tenure system to control discretionary powers and reduce the 
poor downward accountability. On the basis of widespread actors consultation and in-depth 
studies, a National REDD Strategy has formed which is followed by the REDD cell. It is the 
main guidelines for REDD in Nepal. The Ministry of Soil and Conservation has the over all 
coordination responsibility; the REDD Cell has the main management responsibility; while 
the Local Government Authorities are the main implementers on the ground. 
It is found that collective action has failed to mention and address the problem of corruption 
also at the local level, which is developed as a social norm in the community. We could not 
be sure that REDD+ was free from vested economic and political actors. Powerful actors 
affect REDD+ payments, institutional structures and project outcomes and established 
business-as-usual practices in the community forestry. The REDD+ revenue streams were 
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vulnerable through different forms of corruption; even though at the local level “fraud 
monitoring and reporting” is the dominant one. For instance, 65% in CFUG1 45% in CFUG2 
and 43% in CFUG3 answered that corruption existed. In the piloting CF, villagers were sure 
that there was wide range of corruption regarding fund misallocation to fraud carbon 
monitoring. 
I found that CFUG1 (Ludhidamgade) had the highest restriction of access to forest resources, 
and that people´s participation is very low in the decision-making processes. A majority of 
people belongs to higher caste in these communities and they have been using forest products 
according to their own interest. This group proves that the presence of a heterogeneous 
culture produces complex power and knowledge among different groups of actors. They did 
not follow the community forestry guidelines, where it was postulated a 50% women 
participation in most executive committees but there has been no women and Dalits 
representatives in the CFUGCs at all in the REDD+ project. The other two CFUG2 
(Birenchowk) and CFUG3 (Mahalaxmi) also followed the same trend in the community 
forestry management system and excluded the marginalized groups in most development 
incentives.  
Overall, this thesis presents that in the community forestry REDD+ pilot project, power and 
corruption are interlinked in the establishment of poor environmental governance. 
Community forestry policy processes is a top-down approach even it defines itself as a 
bottom-up approach and where the REDD+ pilot project followed the same practices at the 
local level. This gave enormous opportunities to exercise power and corruption in the 
governance structure. Therefore, I suggest that the REDD+ pilot project for the future could 
assist in improving local livelihoods and establish more predictable and transparent tenure 
systems and create sounder community forest management. More attention needs to be given 
to the specific challenges that REDD+ will pose, the financial flows and the main goal of this 
globally emerging program: to Reduce Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation. 
NORAD as a funding organization, together with FECOFUN, ICIMOD and ANSAB believed 
that REDD project could conserve forest, store carbon as well as improve local livelihoods all 
at the same time. From the findings, I can say that the REDD+ pilot project was based on 
PFM, which most likely gave a low return in terms of net-carbon storage, while creating even 
more  spaces for misuse of  power and corruption.  
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There are no acknowledged motivations connected to the REDD+ policy, besides the obvious 
interest in limiting climate change. I assume that the REDD+ is a good policy fit for reducing 
the GHG emissions, however developed countries are focusing too narrow on forests, trying 
to avoid more costly and complicated reductions back home by promoting and financing 
reductions of emissions in developing countries. It will be fair to note that in the developed 
countries, there are not sufficient domestic actions to reduce emissions. The promise to save 
rainforests seems as a taste of “political indulgence”, which not only fulfills the self-interest 
but also gives prestige and making one stand out as a “climate-hero”. 
In the case of large scale offsetting, REDD+ will not contribute to global reductions of 
emissions, it will be only compensated for emissions elsewhere and there are also risks 
connected to social and economic rights, in particular those of indigenous peoples and local 
communities. It is clear that establishment of monoculture plantations in natural forests that 
may have a negative effect on biodiversity and global carbon mitigation. Unclear rights to 
ownership of land and increased economic value yields concern for how REDD+ may affect 
indigenous peoples, marginalized groups and local communities. The increased economic 
value may increase the pressure on land and lead marginalized groups to be driven off 
ancestral land by other actors.  
9.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
When analyzing the national REDD+ policy-making processes, I conclude that it is important 
to involve all stakeholders from relevant government institutions, not only FECOFUN and 
NEFIN. By involving more sectors, less individual interests will come to play and more 
capacity may enhance the transparency in the national REDD+ operations and consequences 
will reduce the bad governance and corruption.  
Many of the existing policy frameworks in community forestry need to be revised, since it has 
been practicing for more than two decades, to create a facilitating environment for REDD+. 
The new policies and acts should include both agriculture and the livestock sector. Moreover, 
a particular focus needs to be given regarding land tenure to establish a system where rights to 
carbon payments are clearly defined. In this process, the current reality of both formal and 
informal institutions must be taken into consideration in order to create a more equal and fair 
benefit sharing mechanism.  
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Further, national ownership and stakeholder inclusions needs to be developed to support 
policy and institutional frameworks, both horizontally and vertically, that can facilitate the 
establishment of REDD+ as an overall legitimate policy program within the country. 
Similarly, REDD+ cannot operate without fully being capable to establish accountable 
institutions and empower relevant stakeholders to control corruption and mismanagement 
within the forestry sector. So, capacity building ensuring good governance and a knowledge 
sharing system should be in place, which can disseminate knowledge and ensure transparency 
and equity.  
Finally, I encourage local peoples participation in forest governance. I believe that eligible 
strategies for the distribution of forest related incomes and benefits to the households level in 
a fair and justifiable way is essential. Equitable benefit-sharing among CFUGs motivate 
sharing of information among them, which can again encourage pressures for transparency, 
accountability and law enforcement. This may hinder elite capture and contribute to 
strengthen local institutions and the systems around forest governance. In order to REDD+ 
function properly, there is a great need of improved agricultural practices. Options for other 
livelihood activities help to reduce the forest dependency such as practicing agro-forestry 
systems help to reduce the dependency on forest for firewood. 
Globally, REDD+ negotiations and coordination should take place in both developed and 
developing countries. Developing countries were more or less ignored in the real international 
negotiations and in policy-making, and this should be corrected. 
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APPENDIX  
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY: 
Respondent No…  
1. Full Name…………………………………………(identify the social status) 
Codes: 1 higher, 2 ethnic groups, 3 lower (Dalits) 
2. Gender……….      (Codes: 1male, 2 female)  
3. Age………. 
4. Education level……… 
 Codes: 1=none, 2= primary, 3= secondary, 4= Higher( +2 level) , 5= University 
(Questions 5 to 9 are organized to identify livelihood rank) 
5. How many members in your family… 
6. How much forest product do you use in a year…………… 
7. How many livestock do you have-……… 
8. How much land do you have………….. 
9. How much income do you have in a month……………. 
10. According to CFUG, what is your livelihood status? 
Codes: 1= higher, 2=medium, 3= poor, 4= extremely poor, 5= landless 
 
(REDD+ awareness) 
i) Have you ever heard about REDD+ pilot project ? 
ii) What is REDD+ means? ……………………. 
iii) Do you why pilot project was implemented in your 
CF?.............................................................. 
iv) Did you participate indirectly/ directly in the REDD+ pilot 
project………………………………… 
v) Did you get the full information and right information about project? 
……………… 
 
 
 ii 
 
Section A: Resource Regime 
A1. How do you evaluate your livelihood strategies after implementing REDD+?  
1=Very worse 2= Worse 3= Good 4= very good 5= Unable to 
answer 
 
A2. Are you benefited from REDD+ pilot project? 
Codes: 1= yes, 2= no, 3= don´t know  
If “no”, why? 
……………………………………………………………………… 
A3.  How do you evaluate REDD+ involvement in community forest? 
No REDD+  1=Strongly 
satisfied 
2= 
satisfied 
3= 
Dissatisfied 
4= Strongly 
dissatisfied 
5= 
Unable 
to 
answer 
1.  Actively involve to 
reduce deforestation 
and degradation 
     
2. Involving actors are 
knowledgeable 
     
3.  Providing equitable 
benefit-sharing 
     
4.  Distribution of rights 
and authority is fair 
     
5.  Management cultures 
are neglected 
     
6.  Very low amount are 
distributed to 
improve local 
     
 iii 
livelihood 
7.  Involved 
marginalized people 
in decision making 
arena 
     
 
A4. Do you think you get right information about REDD+ pilot project in forest 
committee? 
Codes: 1= yes, 2= no, 3= I think so  
If “No” why?   
Codes:  
1= they said it‟s a official process 
2= they don´t want to share with us 
3= I don´t have formal right to ask them 
4= I am not member of FUGs 
5= they don´t like to discuss openly about any projects 
6= they fear from powerful actors to share any information 
7= Don´t know 
A5. How satisfied are you with the rules that govern use and management of 
community forest by REDD+ 
1. Very satisfied 2. Satisfied 3. Dissatisfied 4.Very dissatisfied 5.Unable to answer 
 
A6. Please describe your opinions on the following statements in relation to REDD+ 
as a resource regime 
No REDD+ as a 
resource regime 
1=strongly agree 2=agree 3=disagree 4=strongly 
disagree 
5=unable 
to answer 
1. Clear boundaries/ 
outsiders are kept 
out. 
     
2. Fairly distributed 
resource use and 
benefits 
     
 iv 
3. Current rights, 
duties and 
management 
structures are 
organized by 
local people 
     
4. More focus on 
carbon 
sequestration 
rather than 
livelihood 
improvement 
     
5. Despite of formal 
institution, social 
institution 
function  
     
6. Proper 
enforcement of 
rules/ sanctions 
     
7. Conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms are 
appropriate 
     
 
A7. Do you believe that technological changes enhance the deforestation and 
degradation? 
Codes: 1=yes, 2= no, 3= Don´t know 
A8. Assessment of various external conditions in relation to resource regime 
No Effects 1=strongly 
agree 
2=agree 3=disagree 4=strongly 
disagree 
5=unable to 
answer 
1. Community elite pose 
threat to forest governance 
     
 v 
2. NGOs, INGOs and donor 
agency often make their 
own rules and regulations  
     
3. Government´s economic 
policy impact the resource 
regime 
     
4. Frequently changing law 
can create conflict in 
community 
     
5.  Politician work for 
individual benefits rather 
than community 
development  
     
6. Social institutions are 
based on power structure 
     
7. Technological change 
increase deforestation and 
degradation 
     
 
A9. How do you evaluate the overall REDD+ outcomes? 
No REDD+ outcomes 1=Strongly 
Agree 
2=Agree 3=Disagree 4=Strongly 
disagree 
5=Unable 
to answer 
1.  Increased forest density      
2. Increased local people 
livelihoods 
     
3.  Improved social services      
4.  Avoided land clearing       
5. Improved transparency      
6.  Involved women, ethnicity 
and Dalits to create social 
equity 
     
 vi 
7.  Established good forest 
governance through 
avoiding patron-client 
networks  
     
 
Section B: Power 
B1. Do you think everybody felt free to take whatever position they wanted 
concerning establishing CFUGs? 
Codes: 1=yes, 2=No 
B2. Do you know, often who hold the major position of CFUGs? 
……………………………………………………. 
B3. Do you know why they did so?  
………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………. 
B4. How would you rate your knowledge about the rules of participating in 
REDD+? 
1=don´t know 
any of them 
2=know a few 
of the rules 
3=know most 
of the rules 
4=know all 
the rules 
5= unable to 
answer 
 
B5. How would you rate the effectiveness of the rules in reducing deforestation in 
your area? 
1= no 
impact 
2=Highly effective 3=effective 4= less 
effective 
5= unable to answer 
 
B6. Do you know who are the powerful actors in your community? 
………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………… 
B7. Do you think, powerful actors influenced by REDD+ pilot project? 
Codes: 1=yes, 2= no, 3= don´t know 
B8. If yes, specify in what ways……………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………… 
 vii 
B9. Did powerful actors account your voice to establish rules regarding forest 
resource use? 
Codes: 1= yes, 2= No, 3= sometimes 
B10. If no, then who defines resource use and management rights in CF? 
…………………………………………………….. 
B11. Do you think powerful actor get more forest right than local people?  
Codes: 1=yes, 2=No, 3=don´t know 
B12. If “Yes”, what is the reason to give more rights to powerful actors? 
Codes: 
1= for individual benefits 
2= for communal benefits 
3= for illegal resource capture 
4=for fraud monitoring and evaluation 
5=for power or Prestige 
6= for Kinships (Nepotism) 
7=Others (specify)………………………….. 
B13. Do you have any suggestions how can we avoid monopolies in forest 
governance? 
…………………………………………………………………………. 
…………………………………………….. 
B14. Do you believe that your REDD+ benefits have been reducing by powerful 
actors? 
Codes: 1=yes, 2= no 
B15. Have you ever try to discuss this issue in the CFUGs meetings? 
Codes: 1= yes, 2= no 
If “yes”, what they said about this issue? 
…………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………. 
B16. Can you specify, what kinds of activities have been doing to exclude you to 
access forest resources by powerful actors? 
……………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………….. 
 viii 
B17. What actions do you aspect from REDD+ to establish good governance? 
………………………………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………. 
Section C: Corruption 
C1. Recently, have you heard any mismanagement of fund or forests resources in 
your community?   
Codes: 1=yes, 2= no 
C2. If “yes” specify what was that…………………………………. 
C3. Who did that? 
………………………………………… 
C4. Was there any third person (party) involved to help his work? 
………………………………… 
C5. If “yes” who was that…………………………….. 
C6. How often do you find illegal activities in your CF? 
Codes: 1=always, 2=sometimes, 3= rarely 
 
C7. What kind of possible sources people do to gain individual benefit from forest 
resources? 
Codes: 1= embezzlement (stealing money directly in national level) 
2=Bribing (giving money to government officer) 
3= illegal timber trade 
4= cutting trees and fraud monitoring 
5= elite capture 
6= social institutions (specify the name………………………………..) 
7=lack of enforcement of laws 
C8. How was “illegal activities” case resolved? 
………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………… 
 
 ix 
C9. How much are you satisfied with case resolved activities? 
1=strongly 
satisfied 
2= 
satisfied 
3= dissatisfied 4= strongly 
dissatisfied 
5=unable 
to 
answer 
 
C10. Do you think, money can help to the authorities in order to speed up your 
process?  
Codes: 1= yes, 2 =no, 3 =don´t know 
C11. Can you say, why they do so? 
…………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………….. 
C12. Do you know, why corruption activities have been continuing in CF? 
Codes: 1=we believe that little bit money can help to process our case (social 
norms and value) 
2=Lack of strong policies 
3=established as an institution  
4=result of excluding people from forest resources 
5=misuse of power (job) 
6=political influence 
7= people don´t believe in law  
C13. Is there any legal enforcement system in your community to control the 
corruption?  
Codes: 1 yes, 2 no, 3 don´t know 
C14.Do you think villagers can stop the corruption through REDD+ pilot project?  
Codes: 1= yes, 2= no, 3= don´t know   
If Yes, How…………………………… 
Codes: 1= reporting to police officer 
2= empowerment regarding right, authority and duties, 
 3 = by equal participation in decision making process 
 x 
4 =by charging high amount of money and long time custody 
5= by educating local people 
6=by avoiding caste and gender discrimination 
7= by avoiding individual policy making process 
   
Questionnaires for group discussion with local people: 
1. How do you view the existing resource regimes in your community forestry 
and what are the positives and negatives social and ecological outcomes? 
2. How do you see the powerful actors in the communities and their interference 
in the policy making process? 
3. What kind of formal and informal institutions have existed and how do you 
see the role of state in community forestry?  
4. What kind of information was delivered from the REDD+ projects? And was 
there anyone who participated in the REDD+ negotiations in the national 
level? 
5.  How often do you visit the forest and who make you sure that the forests are 
well conserved?  
6. Have you heard illegal forest use practice in your CF and what are the reasons 
of doing such activities and who resolved such problems? 
7. What kind of actions should take place to control forest mismanagement, 
corruption, illegal timber trade, and fraud monitoring and evaluation?  
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